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ABSTRACT 
The cost of maintaining existing civil infrastructure is enormous. Since the livelihood of the 
public depends on such infrastructure, its state must be managed appropriately using quantitative 
approaches. Practitioners must consider not only which components are most fragile to hazard, 
e.g. seismicity, storm surge, hurricane winds, etc., but also how they participate on a network 
level using network analysis. Focusing on particularly damaged components does not necessarily 
increase network functionality, which is most important to the people that depend on such 
infrastructure. Several network analyses, e.g. S-RDA, LP-bounds, and crude-MCS, and 
performance metrics, e.g. disconnection bounds and component importance, are available for 
such purposes.  Since these networks are existing, the time state is also important. If networks 
are close to chloride sources, deterioration may be a major issue. Information from field 
inspections may also have large impacts on quantitative models.  
To address such issues, hazard risk analysis methodologies for deteriorating networks subjected 
to seismicity, i.e. earthquakes, have been created from analytics. A bridge component model has 
been constructed for these methodologies. The bridge fragilities, which were constructed from 
data, required a deeper level of analysis as these were relevant for specific structures. 
Furthermore, chloride-induced deterioration network effects were investigated. Depending on 
how mathematical models incorporate new information, many approaches are available, such as 
Bayesian model updating. To make such procedures more flexible, an adaptive importance 
sampling scheme was created for structural reliability problems. Additionally, such a method 
handles many kinds of system and component problems with singular or multiple important 
regions of the limit state function.  
These and previously developed analysis methodologies were found to be strongly sensitive to 
the network size. Special network topologies may be more or less computationally difficult, 
while the resolution of the network also has large affects. To take advantage of some types of 
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topologies, network hierarchical structures with super-link representation have been used in the 
literature to increase the computational efficiency by analyzing smaller, densely connected 
networks; however, such structures were based on user input and subjective at times. To address 
this, algorithms must be automated and reliable. These hierarchical structures may indicate the 
structure of the network itself. This risk analysis methodology has been expanded to larger 
networks using such automated hierarchical structures. 
Component importance is the most important objective from such network analysis; however, 
this may only provide the information of which bridges to inspect/repair earliest and little else. 
High correlations influence such component importance measures in a negative manner. 
Additionally, a regional approach is not appropriately modelled. To investigate a more regional 
view, group importance measures based on hierarchical structures have been created. Such 
structures may also be used to create regional inspection/repair approaches. Using these 
analytical, quantitative risk approaches, the next generation of decision makers may make both 
component and regional-based optimal decisions using information from both network function 
and further effects of infrastructure deterioration.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the current, enormous, built environment, one finds less need for new structures. Many 
ordinary needs are met by the current state of lifeline infrastructure, e.g. power lines, 
transportation networks, water and gas pipelines, etc.; however, the status of these existing 
systems is not fixed. Moreover, various hazards such as earthquakes, reinforcement corrosion, 
tornadoes, scour, etc. degrade the ability of these systems to perform their functions. Due to the 
weakening state of these, there is a real, present need to accurately quantify their reliability. The 
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) rated the overall state of the United States’ (US) 
infrastructure at D+ and US bridges at C+ (ASCE 2013). An estimated 3.6 trillion US dollars 
(USD) is required to improve such infrastructure to an ASCE B grade by 2020. While both of 
these grades improved since the 2009 report card, the required investment has increased by 1.3 
trillion USD, which is well above the inflation rate. In particular, the average age of the US’ 
bridges is 42 years old. This is of particular concern if structural response of aging bridges is 
sensitive to time. One could treat each part of the system individually, since there are models for 
commonly used components available, e.g. reinforced concrete (RC) bridge fragility models, but 
this would not accurately describe a component’s role in the system. Since such network 
reliability analysis rapidly becomes computationally expensive with the problem size, 
particularly for simulation-based methods, one must be careful in how they formulate the 
network and what tools they use to analyze it. There is also a need to use real information in this 
process, either in the construction of the system or to update the current status of the system, e.g. 
Bayesian updating, reliability updating. To address these concerns, a two-fold approach must be 
used: one to focus on updating the system, and another to focus on the network analysis itself. 
In the initial explorations of updating the system using Bayesian inference (Box and Tiao 1992), 
the most common way to calculate the posterior estimates of the fitting parameters was by using 
the distribution of the experimental observations for the importance sampling (IS) density (Song 
et al. 2006). Typically, the prior distribution is assumed to be non-informative, so this approach 
2 
 
is best; however, there could arise an instance where the prior has non-negligible information 
content, e.g. both the prior distribution and the distribution of observations have similar amounts 
of information, and the locations of both distributions are not necessarily near one another. In 
such a situation, the center of the posterior distribution would lie somewhere between the prior 
distribution and distribution of experimental observations. IS densities based strictly on the 
experimental data would be inappropriate in such a situation. For this reason, a method was 
developed to find the optimal location for sampling as further explained in Chapter 2. This 
method had been developed as a general IS method for component and system reliability 
problems which adaptively located the optimal sampling distribution using pre-samples and a 
Gaussian mixture model (Kurtz and Song 2013). Not only did this method not require prior 
problem specific knowledge, but it showed promise for many types of systems. Given that one 
can now locate an optimal IS density for the Bayesian updating procedure, despite whether the 
distribution of experimental observations is optimal or not, this study then focused on developed 
the network level model where such an updating procedure may be further used. 
When constructing the bridge network, a major goal was to observe “realism” and efficiency. If 
one would like accurate output from their computational models, the network realization and 
component models must properly reflect the most important attributes of the real system. Such 
an attempt at modeling is explained in Chapter 3. The overall framework of this network 
modelling approach is not limited to bridge networks. To guarantee that component models 
include significantly more information than engineering judgment, cutting-edge, time-variant 
fragility models were used, based on probabilistic capacity and demand models (Gardoni et al. 
2003; Choe et al. 2007; Choe et al. 2009). These bridge fragility models are time-variant in that 
they model the effect of chloride-induced corrosion (Gardoni and Rosowsky 2009). This 
correlation model in this analysis includes, but is not limited to, the dependence between bridge 
failures due to spatial correlation from ground motion. The network topology and bridge 
placement also rely on real data (Caltrans 2013) so that the results further correspond to realistic 
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networks. Efficiency becomes important for real networks, as they grow in size quite rapidly. For 
this reason, the modified form of the Recursive Decomposition Algorithm (RDA), the “selective-
RDA” (S-RDA) (Lim and Song 2012), is used to identify disjoint cut-sets and link-sets that 
influence the network failure event most. Additionally, the network resolution for S-RDA uses 
link components, which have many bridges on it, requiring a multi-scale approach, which 
decreases the computational complexity of the network analysis.  
Since this analysis uses many pieces of information, there are many areas that must be improved. 
Due to the exponential time-cost the S-RDA inherited from the RDA, one must control the 
network size. A way to do this is to use hierarchical structures to model clusters of components 
as “super-components.” A common related issue is guaranteeing that any introduced inaccuracy 
does not compound into largely inaccurate system results. Furthermore, one needs to automate 
the process so user preference does not create too much subjectivity in identifying the 
hierarchical structure. Such automated hierarchical structure identification analyses (AHSIAs) 
are explored in Chapter 4. Several such methods were created, but fall into two classes: AHSIA 
based only on component information in clusters, and AHSIA based on objective function 
information. These were then explored on many different kinds of network topologies with both 
pipeline and bridge component models. Another issue with network analysis is inherent in 
component important measures. This paper uses Conditional Probability Importance Measures 
(CPIMs). 
Perhaps the importance of individual components and the overall system performance does not 
provide the whole picture.  One may find that a component that has little effect on network 
performance but is highly correlated with a component having large effect on network 
performance may be given a large CPIM value. These component importance measures also only 
indicate which specific pipelines segments, bridges, etc. ought to be inspected/repaired first and 
do not give much of a regional perspective. Since network hierarchical structures can be easily 
generated by the AHSIA in Chapter 4, group importance measures (GIMs) have been developed 
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and are tested in Chapter 5. The GIMs are investigated using representative examples. Given 
these interesting output metrics are available, further impacts of deterioration can be more deeply 
explored. 
Since some time-variant component importance has been analyzed using the bridge component 
model on a simple yet realistic network in Chapter 3, the idea is more fully explored in Chapter 
6. The purpose of revisiting the network deterioration effects was to explore differences in 
network metrics over time. Here, both bridge and pipeline component models are explored. A 
pipeline deterioration model was created by fitting a function based on the form of the bridge 
deterioration model. Inspection-based information was also incorporated. Adjacency matrix 
modifications based on reliabilities are explored to make the hierarchical clustering more time-
variant. Regional understanding of the network is framed on the absolute and relative changes in 
CPIMs and GIMs.  
See Figure 1.1 to see a graphical description of the relevant studies. The Ph.D. work begins in 
Chapter 2 where the adaptive importance sampling scheme, “General Bayesian Updating,” is 
investigated. Chapter 3 then explains the time-variant, realistic, seismic, bridge network analysis 
methodologies, “Bridge models,” which are tested with numerical examples. Chapter 4, where 
the multi-scale approach is explained, explores the automated hierarchical structure identification 
approach to improve the analysis methodology, “S-RDA with AHSIA.” Chapter 5 then describes 
how to obtain GIMs and a more regional perspective, “Structure Identification.” Using all of the 
information from previous chapters, Chapter 6 then explores many different deterioration 
scenarios with the hierarchical structures, “Deterioration effects study.” Figure 1.2 further 
explains the relationships and work flow in this study. Lastly, Chapter 7 presents conclusions and 
proposes further exploration. 
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Figure 1.1 PhD study topics. 
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Figure 1.2 PhD study topic work flow relationships. 
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2. CROSS-ENTROPY-BASED ADAPTIVE IMPORTANCE SAMPLING 
USING GAUSSIAN MIXTURE 
2.1 Background and motivation 
Structural reliability analysis seeks to obtain the probability of an event typically related to a 
possible failure of various engineering systems including complex infrastructure. For many 
structural reliability problems, one commonly attempts to use the First-Order Reliability Method 
(FORM). This method first locates the point of maximum likelihood in the failure domain, the 
so-called “design point,” and then approximates the failure domain by the linear half-plane 
obtained at this location. In order to locate the design point, one often uses a nonlinear 
constrained optimization algorithm, such as the improved Hasofer-Lind Rackwitz-Fissler 
algorithm (iHL-RF) (Zhang and Der Kiureghian 1995). If the failure surface has non-negligible 
curvatures near the design point, one may use the Second-Order Reliability Method (SORM) to 
improve the accuracy of the first order approximation. A thorough review of the FORM and 
SORM can be found in Der Kiureghian (2005). It is known that the complexity of the failure 
domain, large curvatures, multiple design points, numerical noise in the limit-state function or 
various other issues may prevent structural reliability analysis employing the FORM or SORM 
from providing accurate failure probabilities. To address these issues, one typically uses a 
sampling method. 
One of the most commonly used sampling methods, due to its straightforward application, is 
crude-Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS). Given enough computational time, this method finds the 
“exact” failure probability; however, the computational cost may be exceedingly large, 
especially for rare events described by computationally expensive limit state functions, e.g. those 
requiring finite element simulations. Typically, crude-MCS focuses on finding the failure 
probability estimate and the variability associated with that estimate, but not on identifying the 
design point or important areas in the failure domain. To remedy these issues, importance 
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sampling (IS) is typically used (Shinozuka 1983, Engelund and Rackwitz 1993, Melchers 1999). 
When implementing IS, one must specify an alternative sampling density that is expected to 
reduce the variability of the sampled estimates and thus the associated computational cost. One 
example of such alternative densities is a Gaussian density whose mean vector is located at the 
design point found from a FORM analysis (Fujita and Rackwitz 1988, Melchers 1989); 
nevertheless, this approach does not completely address the aforementioned issues for structural 
reliability problems with (1) multiple design points (Der Kiureghian and Dakessian 1998), which 
might result in significant errors, or (2) numerical issues that make a FORM analysis difficult, 
including numerical noise in the limit-state function (Liu and Der Kiureghian 1991). 
For series system reliability problems, there have been some attempts to combine multiple 
sampling densities centered at the design points identified from FORM analyses of the 
component limit-state functions; however, it is difficult to optimally determine the relative 
weights of those densities (Fu and Moses 1988) or filter non-critical ones (Melchers 1989). For 
parallel systems, it is desirable to sample around the joint design point, which can be found by 
mathematical programming (Melchers 1989, Melchers and Ahammed 2001); however, the 
approach may introduce significant computational cost in addition to that required for a FORM 
analysis. For general system reliability problems, i.e. neither series nor parallel, no general 
procedure is available to find an effective importance sampling density based on the results of a 
FORM analysis. 
To identify an effective IS density, various adaptive IS procedures have been suggested, which 
are categorized into two major approaches. One approach focuses on updating the sampling 
density function based on intermediate results or pre-sampling while the other focuses more on 
updating a surrogate representation of the limit-state function. Many have made hybrids of these 
two approaches. Bucher (1988) proposed an adaptive IS approach in which the sampling density 
is updated based on statistical moments estimated by pre-samples. Ang et al. (1991) used an IS 
density found by constructing kernel models based on samples generated in the failure domain. 
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Ching and Hsiegh (2005) used subset simulations coupled with a maximum entropy optimization 
to find a local approximation of the limit state for given design values. The maximum entropy 
approach selects a probability density function (PDF) that maximizes its entropy subject to 
moment constraints from sample data. Dubourg et al. (2011) used a variance minimizing IS with 
a surrogate meta-model based on a Kriging procedure. Grooteman (2011) used an adaptive 
directional IS approach to improve the efficiency of directional IS approaches by finding the 
most important directions and sampling the rest using a response surface. Several other methods 
have been suggested, but most of these fall within similar veins of the aforementioned methods. 
Another notable adaptive IS approach is to find a near-optimal IS density by minimizing the 
Kullback-Leibler cross entropy (CE) (Rubinstein and Kroese 2004) through a few rounds of 
small-size pre-sampling. In this methodology, CE is used as a measure of the “distance” between 
the absolute best sampling density function (Rubinstein 1981) and the current IS density model; 
however, the suggested PDF distributions in this work are based on uni-modal distribution 
models of statistically independent random variables. This unfortunately limits the breadth of 
structural reliability problems the methodology can address; nevertheless, such a CE-based 
adaptive IS (CE-AIS) approach is largely absent from general use in the field of structural 
reliability, although various approaches do perform entropy maximization, as discussed 
previously.  
Using such a CE-AIS approach allows one the ability to find an optimal sampling distribution in 
a general and efficient manner. This also provides a solution for the optimal IS approach in the 
situation where one cannot merely rely upon the experimental data distribution for Bayesian 
updating as discussed further in this chapter. To handle such situations where specifying the 
optimal IS distribution is non-trivial, a new adaptive IS approach is developed by incorporating a 
nonparametric multimodal density function to the aforementioned CE approach as the IS density 
model. This is done to enhance accuracy in fitting the IS density model with the absolute best 
sampling density function showing complex shape, especially for component reliability problems 
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with multiple design points and for a variety of system reliability problems. As an example of a 
nonparametric distribution model, a Gaussian mixture (for a review, see Bishop (2006)) is used 
in here. An efficient procedure is developed to update the Gaussian mixture model by small-size, 
pre-sampling toward a near-optimal density with the minimum CE. The resulting IS density 
accounts for the regions that contribute most significantly to the failure event, and is used for the 
final IS to estimate the failure probability. 
The next section summarizes the underlying theory of the existing CE-AIS approach. Then, a 
new procedure using a Gaussian mixture will be introduced. Through numerical examples of 
challenging component reliability problems, the proposed approach will be tested in terms of a 
few evaluation criteria (Engelund and Rackwitz 1993), i.e. robustness against multiple design 
points and noises in limit state functions; and efficiency and accuracy with respect to space 
dimension, probability level and curvatures of limit-state functions. Furthermore, the 
performance of the method in various system reliability problems will be demonstrated by 
numerical examples of series, parallel and general systems. Throughout numerical examples, the 
updating process and the identified important regions will be visualized to give further insight. 
Lastly, a summary of the results and conclusions are presented. 
2.2 Adaptive importance sampling based on cross entropy 
For a thorough background for the method proposed in this paper, a summary on the CE-AIS 
method (Rubinstein and Kroese, 2004) is first provided. Consider a numerical integration 
 
( ) ( ; )tI H f d  x x u x  (2.1) 
where H(x) is a general function of random variables x, and f(x;u) is the joint PDF of x with 
parameters u. For structural reliability analysis, in which the failure event of concern is usually 
indicated by the negative sign of the limit-state function g(x), one can compute the probability of 
the failure event using (2.1) by setting H(x) to be the binary indicator function I{g(x)≤0}, which 
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gives “1” if the limit-state function g(x) is negative or zero, and “0” otherwise. To compute a 
statistical moment using (2.1), one can set H(x) to be the corresponding polynomial function. 
When the integration in (2.1) is performed by a sampling approach, one can improve the 
efficiency by introducing an alternative sampling density, i.e.  
 1
( ) ( ; )( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ; ) 1
( ; )
( ; ) ( ; ) ( ; )
N
i i
t h
i i
H fH f H f
I h d E
h h N h
   
     
   

x x ux x u x x u
x v x
x v x v x v
 (2.2) 
where h(x;v) is an alternative sampling density with parameters v, Eh[] is the mathematical 
expectation with respect to the density h(x;v), and xi is the i-th sample generated from h(x;v), 
i=1,2,…,N. The performance of this IS approach is optimal when the variance of the estimate in 
(2.2) is minimized. The “best” IS density minimizing the variance is derived as (Rubinstein 
1981)  
 
*
( ) ( ; )
( )
( ) ( ; )
H f
p
H f d


x x u
x
x x u x
 (2.3) 
However, one cannot use the best IS density in (2.3) because the denominator is practically 
equivalent to computing It in (2.1), and exactly the same if H(x) is non-negative as in structural 
reliability problems. Nevertheless, one can still improve the efficiency by choosing a near-
optimal IS density whose shape is similar to that of p
*
(x) in (2.3). 
One can find a near-optimal IS density by minimizing a measure of the difference between p
*
(x) 
and h(x;v), such as the Kullback-Leibler CE 
 
* * * *( ( ), ( ; )) ( ) ln ( ) ( ) ln ( ; )D p h p p d p h d  x x v x x x x x v x  (2.4) 
Since the IS density parameter v appears in the second term only, one can find a near-optimal IS 
density h(x;v) by maximizing the second integral in (2.4). For structural reliability analysis, it is 
noted that H(x) is non-negative, and thus from (2.3), p
*
(x) is proportional to H(x)f(x;u). 
Substituting this to (2.4), one finds 
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 (2.5) 
where Eu[] denotes the mathematical expectation with respect to the original joint PDF f(x;u). 
For purposes of evaluating the expectation in (2.5) more efficiently, an alternative sampling 
density h(x;w) is introduced, i.e.  
 
* ( ; )arg min ( ( ), ( ; )) arg max ( ) ln ( ; ) ( ; )
( ; )
arg max [ ( ) ln ( ; ) ( ; , )]
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 (2.6) 
where Ew[] denotes the mathematical expectation with respect to the density function h(x;w), 
and W(x;u,w) is the likelihood ratio, f(x;u)/h(x;w). By estimating the expectation in (2.6) by IS 
with h(x;w), one can obtain a near-optimal density approximately by 
 
*
1
1
arg min ( ( ), ( ; )) arg max ( ) ln ( ; ) ( ; , )
N
i i i
i
D p h H h W
N 
 v vx x v x x v x u w  (2.7) 
where xi is the i-th sample generated using the density h(x;w), i=1,2,…,N. The IS density h(x;w) 
introduced to estimate the expectation in (2.6) employs different parameters w to decouple the 
parameters of the optimization process, i.e., v, from those used for the sampling. In most 
applications, the function in (2.7) is concave and differentiable with respect to v (Rubinstein and 
Kroese, 2004); therefore, the values of the parameters v that makes h(x;v) a near-optimal density 
can be obtained by setting the gradient of (2.7) to be zero, i.e.  
 
1
1
( ) ( ; , ) ln ( ; ) 0
N
i i i
i
H W h
N 
  vx x u w x v  (2.8) 
It is noted that if a member of the exponential family of distributions is used for h(x;v), the 
applied logarithm ensures that each parameter has an explicit updating rule. Rubinstein and 
Kroese (2004) derived such explicit updating rules for selected distribution models so that one 
can find a near-optimal density function by a few rounds of pre-sampling, and then perform the 
final IS until the target level of convergence is achieved.  
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2.3 Cross entropy-based adaptive importance sampling using Gaussian mixture model 
The aforementioned CE-AIS by Rubinstein and Kroese (2004) uses parametric uni-modal 
distribution models for the IS density h(x;v), and assumes statistical independence between 
random variables so that the parameters of the marginal PDFs in h(x;v) can be updated 
individually. When a structural reliability problem has multiple design points or complex failure 
domains, such IS density models may not be flexible enough to fit the complex shape and 
orientation of the best IS density in (2.3). Therefore, in this chapter, a nonparametric multi-modal 
density model called the Gaussian mixture is implemented into the CE-AIS approach, and 
updating rules are derived to obtain optimal parameters of the Gaussian mixture through a few 
rounds of pre-sampling.  
 Gaussian mixture distribution model 2.3.1
Suppose a random vector x whose outcome is determined by one of the K multivariate Gaussian 
distributions selected according to their pre-specified relative likelihoods. This random selection 
of a Gaussian density can be described by use of a “latent variable” z={z1,z2,…,zK}, which is a K-
dimensional binary random variable array where only one entry 
kz  can be 1 at a given time to 
describe that the k-th density is selected. Let k denote the probability that the k-th density is 
selected at a given time, that is, P(zk=1)=k where 1π 1
K
k k   and 0 1k  . The joint  
probability mass function (PMF) of the latent variables is then 
 
1
( ) π k
K
z
k
k
p

z  (2.9) 
Each time, x follows the selected Gaussian density indicated by the outcome of the latent random 
variable z. Therefore, the conditional PDF of x for a given z is 
 
1
( | ) ( | , ) k
K
z
k k
k
p N

x z x    (2.10) 
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where N(x|k,k) is the joint PDF of the Gaussian distribution with mean vector k and 
covariance matrix k, k=1,2,…,K. Using the multiplication rule with (2.9) and (2.10), one obtains 
the joint distribution of x and z as 
 
1
( , ) [π ( | , )] k
K
z
k k k
k
p N

x z x    (2.11) 
Marginalizing (2.11) over z leads to the joint PDF of x, i.e.  
 
1
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k k k
k
p h N
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 x x v x    (2.12) 
In order to obtain a near-optimal IS density, the CE-AIS method proposed minimizes the 
Kullback-Leibler CE in (2.4) between the joint PDF model of the Gaussian mixture in (2.12) and 
the best IS density in (2.3). The distribution parameter v in the IS density h(x;v) has (3×K) 
terms, , v={1,…,K,1,…,K,1,…,K}. Based on the condition in (2.8), rules for updating the 
parameters in the Gaussian mixture model through pre-sampling are developed as follows.  
 Updating rules to minimize cross entropy for Gaussian mixture 2.3.2
Substituting the IS density in (2.12) into (2.8), the CE minimization problem for a given round of 
pre-sampling becomes 
 1 1
1
( ) ( ; , ) ln π ( | , )} 0
N K
i i k i k k
i k
H W N
N  
 
  
 
 vx x u w x    (2.13) 
where xi is the i-th sample generated using the density h(x;w), i=1,…,N. The parameters v 
obtained from the updating of the previous round can be used as w of the current pre-sampling. 
Based on a similar procedure developed for maximum likelihood estimation (Bishop 2006), 
updating rules to find v that satisfies (2.13) are developed as follows. 
First, from (2.13), the equations regarding the derivative with respect to 
j , j=1,…,K are 
 
1
1
1
π ( | , )1
( ) ( ; , ) ( ) 0
π ( | , )
N
j i j j
i i j i jK
i
k i k k
k
N
H W
N
N



  

x
x x u w x
x
 

 
 (2.14) 
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Multiplying (2.14) by j, and introducing γ ( )i jz  1π ( | , ) / π ( | , ),
K
j i j j k k i k kN Nx x     one 
finds an updating rule of the mean vector,  
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   (2.15) 
One can show that γ ( )i jz  is ( 1| ),j iP z  x  which is thus referred to as the “responsibility” jz  
takes for describing observation .ix  This responsibility indicates from which region of 
importance the samples may come from while the mean and covariance indicate the location of 
the region and the spread/orientation of the region, respectively. The mean vector j in (2.15) 
indicates the updated location of the important region represented by the j-th Gaussian density. 
Similarly, the derivative with respect to j from (2.13) leads to 
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j indicates the updated relative size and orientation of the important region represented by the j-
th Gaussian density. Finally, derivatives with respect to π ,j  using a Lagrangian multiplier for the 
constraint 
1π 1,
K
k k  result in 
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 (2.17) 
This indicates the relative importance of the corresponding Gaussian density. One should also 
note that at times some densities may cluster together to form one important region.  
 Cross entropy-based adaptive importance sampling algorithm using Gaussian mixture 2.3.3
Using (2.15)-(2.17), a CE-AIS algorithm is developed as follows using the Gaussian mixture 
distribution model in (2.12) as the IS density:  
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1. Initialize: Set t=0. Choose initial values of parameters 
( ) ( ) ( )π ,  and ,t t tk k k  k=1,2,..,K, e.g., 
uniform weights (i.e. 
(0) (0) (0)
1 2π π ... π 1/K K    ), and covariance matrices with unit-
standard deviations and zero correlations (i.e. the identity matrix for all k

’s) will 
suffice. For 
(0) ,k  I propose that the CE-AIS method be run using a single Gaussian 
density (Rubinstein and Kroese, 2004), and K points be sampled uniformly on the surface 
of the hypersphere with the radius being the half of  obtained from the AIS by a single 
Gaussian density. These sampled points can be used as 
(0) ,k  k=1,2,…,K. 
 
2. Sample: Generate random samples xi, i=1,2,…,N, using h(x;w) with w being the initial 
parameters v
(0)
 from Step 1, (for the first pre-sampling round) or the updated parameters 
v
(t)
 from the previous round,  (for the other pre-sampling rounds). Since h(x;w) is 
following a Gaussian mixture, each sample is generated by “ancestral” sampling: (1) a 
latent variable z is sampled according to 
( )π tk , k=1,2,…,K in w to determine which 
Gaussian density will be used to generate samples; and (2) x is sampled from the selected 
Gaussian density with the corresponding mean and covariancein w. Calculate the -
quantile of the limit-state function g(x) from the samples {g(x1),…, g(xN)}, denoted by 
g. If g<0, set g=0, indicating that the adaptive scheme has converged. This corresponds 
to the instance in which at least ×N of the samples are within the failure domain, i.e. 
g(x)<0. 
 
3. Update: Find the parameters v(t+1) satisfying (2.13) using the samples from Step 2. Use 
the updating rules in (2.15)-(2.17). 
 
4. Check convergence: If g>0, update the iteration step t to (t+1) and return to Step 2. 
Otherwise, proceed to Step 5. 
 
5. Final importance sampling: Estimate the probability of the event {g(x)≤0} using the 
Gaussian mixture with the updated parameters v
(t)
 as a near-optimal IS density, i.e. 
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where Nf denotes the number of samples for the final importance sampling, v
(t) 
denotes 
the parameters in the Gaussian mixture optimized by the previous steps, u corresponds to 
the parameters of the nominal density, e.g., uncorrelated standard Gaussian distribution, 
and xi, i=1,2,…,Nf  are samples generated from the Gaussian mixture PDF in (2.12) with 
the updated parameters v
(t)
. 
From my experience, the quantile percentage in Step 2, , is typically on the order of 10%. A 
good rule of thumb for K is “K≥NRV and K≥Ncomp” where NRV is the number of random variables 
in x, and Ncomp is the number of components (for a system reliability problem).  
2.4 Numerical examples 
The breadth of applications and performance of the proposed CE-AIS procedure are 
demonstrated by numerical examples. First, to demonstrate the performance of the method in 
component reliability problems with multiple design points or many failure points with similar 
likelihoods, the method is applied to parabolic limit state functions. Second, to demonstrate the 
wide range of system reliability problems the proposed method is useful for, parallel, series, and 
general system problems are explored. Third, the efficiency and accuracy of the proposed 
method are tested with respect to space dimension, level of probability and curvatures of limit-
state function. Finally, the robustness of the method against a noisy limit-state surface is tested. 
All limit-state functions in the examples are described in the uncorrelated standard Gaussian 
space, i.e. f(x;u)=N(x|0,I) where 0 and I respectively denote the vector of zero’s and the identity 
matrix. If random variables do not follow the uncorrelated standard Gaussian distribution, one 
can perform a proper transformation to achieve the condition (Der Kiureghian 2005) to use the 
proposed method. 
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 Component reliability analysis for parabolic limit state function 2.4.1
The first example comes from Der Kiureghian and Dakessian (1998) focusing on FORM and 
SORM for situations in which multiple design points occur. The limit state function is 
 2
2 1( ) κ( )g b x x e   x  (2.19) 
where b,  and e are deterministic parameters (5, 0.5 and 0.1, respectively for the example), and 
,  1,2ix i   are uncorrelated standard Gaussian random variables.  
 
Figure 2.1 Limit-state surface, design points and contours of a function proportional to the best importance 
sampling density for parabolic limit-state function with two design points. 
Figure 2.1 shows the limit-state surface, the two design points and the contour plots of a function 
proportional to the best IS density in (2.3). The IS density for each step of the convergence is 
shown in Figure 2.2 (N=10
2
, K=2 for each step). The Gaussian mixture density quickly 
converges to the optimal distribution parameters after only 2 steps. The optimal IS density (“Step 
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2” in Figure 2.2) clearly identifies the most important regions associated with the failure 
probability, and matches the best IS density in Figure 2.1 fairly well.  
 
Figure 2.2 Convergence of Gaussian mixture for parabolic limit-state surface with two design points. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the final results in which the proposed method (CE-AIS-GM) shows 
superior efficiency to crude-MCS and CE-AIS with a single Gaussian density (CE-AIS-SG). The 
columns named “Number of Samples” in the tables give the sum of the samples for finding the 
optimal density (N×K) and those for the final IS (Nf) to achieve a given level of coefficient of 
variation (c.o.v.) (e.g. “400+3,000” means 400 samples for the pre-sampling and 3,000 for the 
final IS). The results demonstrate that the proposed method significantly reduces the number of 
function evaluations required to achieve a reliable estimate on the failure probability, while also 
obtaining the most important regions of interest (from the mean vectors of the optimal Gaussian 
mixtures). Note that there does not seem to be a significant difference in the estimated failure 
probability between CE-AIS-SG and CE-AIS-GM for this example. 
c.o.v 
(%) 
Number of Samples Failure Probability 
MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM 
10 32,000 400+3,000 400+403 3.16×10
3
 2.85×10
3
 2.61×10
3
 
5 1.28×10
5
 400+8,000 400+434 3.12×10
3
 2.98×10
3
 2.49×10
3
 
3 3.64×10
5
 400+23,000 400+1,390 3.06×10
3
 2.98×10
3
 2.85×10
3
 
 
Table 2.1 Comparison for parabolic limit-state surface with two design points. 
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When the limit state function in (2.19) is modified by using b=5, =0.1 and e=0, the top of the 
limit state surface becomes as important as the areas around the two design points. Figure 2.3 
shows the limit-state surface, and contour plots of a function proportional to the best IS density 
in (2.3). Figure 2.4 shows the updating process of the adaptive IS using N=2×10
3
 and K=30. The 
IS density in the last step of the convergence (“Step 5” in Figure 2.4) demonstrates that the wide 
region around the top of the limit state surface is sampled, which greatly improves the efficiency 
of the final IS. Table 2.2 summarizes the final results in which the CE-AIS-GM shows superior 
efficiency. One can also find in this result that the proposed method is much less sensitive to the 
level of the probability than crude-MCS. The impact of level of probability on the accuracy and 
efficiency will be investigated later. 
 
Figure 2.3 Limit-state surface and contours of a function proportional to the best importance sampling density for 
parabolic limit-state function with many failure points with similar likelihoods. 
 
c.o.v. 
(%) 
Number of Samples Failure Probability 
MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM 
10 1.34×10
8
 4,000+500 7,000+100 7.47×10
7
 8.17×10
7
 9.45×10
7
 
5 4.77×10
8
 4,000+1,500 7,000+600 8.38×10
7
 8.27×10
7
 8.10×10
7
 
3 1.34×10
9
 4,000+16,500 7,000+1,700 8.32×10
7
 8.55×10
7
 8.35×10
7
 
 
Table 2.2 Comparison for parabolic limit-state surface with many failure points with similar likelihoods. 
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Figure 2.4 Convergence of Gaussian mixture for parabolic limit-state surface with many failure points with similar 
likelihoods. 
To investigate the effect of the number of Gaussian densities in the mixture, the CE-AIS-GM 
was performed using the original parameters (b=5,  and e=0.1) for K = 10, 25, 50 and 100. 
Note that 310N   for each step of the updating algorithm because N must be large enough to 
accommodate the selected number of Gaussian densities. Figure 2.5 shows the c.o.v. of the 
failure probabilities estimated by the CE-AIS-GM for K = 10, 25, 50 and 100, and that by the 
crude-MCS. It was observed that the c.o.v. curve converged as K increases. It is also noteworthy 
that the c.o.v. plots for the CE-AIS-GM become smooth only if a sufficiently large N per step is 
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used, which indicates that the Gaussian mixture model has enough flexibility to fit the best IS 
density in (2.3). 
 
Figure 2.5 Effect of number of Gaussian densities in the mixture. 
 System reliability analysis 2.4.2
To test the applicability of the proposed method to system reliability problems, three examples 
are explored: a parallel, a series, and a general system.  
2.4.2.1 Parallel system 
First, the parallel system example with two component limit states (Melchers and Ahammed 
2001) is tested. One can describe a system failure event by a single limit-state function, e.g., a 
maximum of component limit states for parallel systems, a minimum of component limit states 
for series systems, and a minimum of maxima of the functions in the cut-sets for cut-set systems. 
Thus, for the parallel system problem, the overall limit-state function is determined as 
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     
x x x
 (2.20) 
The results in Figure 2.6 and Table 2.3 were obtained using N=10
2
 and K=2. Figure 2.6 shows 
how the two Gaussian densities converge to one located near the “joint” design point for the 
parallel system, which Melchers and Ahammed (2001) tried to identify by an iterative procedure. 
It is interesting to note that, for limit-state surfaces with only one region of importance, multiple 
Gaussian densities in the mixture model can merge to one density without causing numerical 
issues. One also sees significant savings in computational time cost when compared to crude-
MCS results in Table 2.3, since the total number of samples for the proposed method requires 3 
or 4 orders of magnitudes less. It is also noted that there is not a significant difference between 
the single point search and the multiple point search in this example, since there is only one 
obvious design point present. 
 
Figure 2.6 Convergence of Gaussian mixture for parallel system limit-state.  
c.o.v. 
(%) 
Number of Samples Failure Probability 
MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM 
10 1.59×10
7
 500+4,500 600+5,240 6.28×10
6
 7.80×10
6
 6.30×10
6
 
5 5.72×10
7
 500+18,500 600+20,300 7.00×10
6
 6.70×10
6
 6.28×10
6
 
3 1.77×10
8
 500+50,000 600+53,600 6.29×10
6
 6.48×10
6
 6.14×10
6
 
 
Table 2.3 Comparison for parallel system limit-state surface. 
2.4.2.2 Series system 
As a series system example, the CE-AIS-GM is applied to the following example by Waarts 
(2000). The limit state function can be represented by 
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Figure 2.7 shows the limit-state surface and contours of a function proportional to the best IS 
density in (2.3). The best IS density shows four competing regions of importance near the limit-
state surface. For N=10
3
 and K=4, one obtains the sampling density as shown in Figure 2.8, and 
the results are summarized in Table 2.4. It is noted that the proposed method immediately 
identifies important regions without performing preliminary component reliability analysis for 
each limit-state. The effect of
k at each important region can easily be seen, as this effectively 
ensures that samples adhere to the slope of the limit-state surface. Note that the proposed method 
converges two orders of magnitude quicker than crude-MCS, and that the CE-AIS-SG converges 
to a wrong value, since the single Gaussian density converged to only one of the four important 
regions spaced far away from one another. The c.o.v. behavior for the single point search also 
exhibits a very jagged behavior and can lead to false confidence at small amounts of samples. 
 
Figure 2.7 Limit-state surface and contours of a function proportional to the best importance sampling density for 
series system problem. 
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Figure 2.8 Convergence of Gaussian mixture for series system limit-state. 
c.o.v. 
(%) 
Number of Samples Failure Probability 
MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM 
10 60,000 4,000+500 3,000+30 1.83×10
3
 7.97×10
-4
 1.50×10
3
 
5 1.90×10
5
 4,000+1,500 3,000+348 2.12×10
3
 8.80×10
-4
 2.12×10
3
 
3 5.20×10
5
 4,000+2,500 3,000+943 2.16×10
3
 8.72×10
-4
 2.15×10
3
 
 
Table 2.4 Comparison for series system limit-state surface. 
For situations in which multiple regions of importance occur, there may be interest in 
quantifying the degree of relative impact each important region has. Considering the structure of 
the Gaussian mixture, one may consider these contributions for each region based on the values 
of the relative weights, k, k =1,2,…,K. For the series system example, the optimal values of the 
weights are 1=0.367, 2=0.125, 3=0.401, and 4=0.108. Note from the structure of the 
component limit states in (2.21) that there are two pairs of symmetric limit states. Based on the 
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resulting means, the first and third Gaussian densities in the mixture are associated with the 
parabolic limit states and the second and fourth Gaussians are associated with the linear limit 
states. The parabolic limit states are closer to the origin and result in higher contributions to the 
failure probability. 
2.4.2.3 General system 
To test the proposed framework for a general (i.e. neither series nor parallel) system, the example 
in Song and Der Kiureghian (2003) is examined. The cut-set system event has three cut-sets 
consisting of five components and the limit-state function is represented by 
  1 2 3 4 3 5( ) min max[ ( ), ( )],max[ ( ), ( )],max[ ( ), ( )]g g g g g g gx x x x x x x  (2.22) 
The results in Table 2.5 were obtained using N=10
3
 and K=10. The results confirm that even for 
a general system event, the proposed method requires much fewer samples than crude-MCS to 
achieve the same level of c.o.v. They also indicate that the single point search results in a density 
that displays both jagged convergence and a possibility of false early convergence. The limit 
state and a contour of each Gaussian mixture during the updating process are shown in Figure 
2.9. Note that the distances from the origin to the centers of the important regions are also shown 
in the figure. One can see from this representation that there are two important regions and that 
the method managed to identify both of them, even in a domain that is difficult to visualize. The 
method did not require any a priori knowledge regarding the shape of the best IS density. The 
surface of the density contour is strongly non-spherical, which implies that having more than two 
densities in the mixture helped in this example. All 10 densities in the mixture have different 
means and non-zero weights. This example demonstrates that the proposed method can be used 
for general system events with complex limit-state surfaces. 
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Figure 2.9 Convergence of Gaussian mixture for general system limit-state. 
c.o.v. 
(%) 
Number of Samples Failure Probability 
MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM 
10 20,000 3,000+48 4,000+48 7.50×10
3
 7.42×10
3
 7.46×10
3
 
5 60,000 3,000+700 4,000+310 7.58×10
3
 6.98×10
3
 7.99×10
3
 
3 1.50×10
5
 3,000+4,100 4,000+1,001 7.61×10
3
 7.25×10
3
 7.74×10
3
 
 
Table 2.5 Comparison for general system limit-state surface. 
 Efficiency and accuracy 2.4.3
In a review of various IS procedures, Engelund and Rackwitz (1993) characterized the efficiency 
and accuracy of a sampling procedure through three rubrics: effect of space dimension, level of 
probability, and curvatures of limit state function. To evaluate the proposed method’s efficiency 
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and accuracy, the very same criteria will be tested as follows. First, effect of curvatures of the 
limit state function was tested. The limit state function used to test the effect of curvature was 
 
1 2
1
1
( ) β κ
2
RV
RV
N
N ii
g x x


   x  (2.23) 
where β is a deterministic parameter that determines the distance of the design point from the 
origin, κ represents the principal curvature, and xi, i=1,2,…,NRV are uncorrelated standard 
Gaussian random variables. For the purposes of this study, NRV = 5, and β and κ were 
parametrically controlled so that the estimated failure probability is around 1.3210-3. Three 
cases were considered: convex limit-state with β = 2.0 and κ = 1.154; no curvature with β = 3.0 
and κ = 0.0; and concave limit-state with β = 4.0 and κ = 0.291. Table 2.6 summarizes the 
results by crude-MCS and the proposed method for c.o.v. = 5%. In all three cases, CE-AIS-GM 
outperforms crude-MCS by two orders of magnitude in terms of number of samples required to 
achieve the same level of c.o.v. while only needing four or less pre-sampling rounds to converge. 
The efficiency by the proposed method does not seem to be significantly affected by curvatures. 
Curvature
Number of Samples Failure Probability 
MCS CE-AIS-GM MCS CE-AIS-GM 
1.154 (convex) 308,300 5,000+700 1.30×103 1.28×103 
0 (neutral) 292,400 4,000+600 1.39×103 1.36×103 
0.291 (concave) 306,400 6,000+1,000 1.31×103 1.36×103 
 
Table 2.6 Comparison of efficiency and accuracy with respect to curvature in limit-state function. 
Secondly, effect of space dimension was tested using the limit state function (Engelund and 
Rackwitz 1993)  
 
1
( ) β
RVN
RV ii
g N x

 x  (2.24) 
This limit-state has a special form in that the failure probability is Φ(β) regardless of the space 
dimension, where () denotes the cumulative density function (CDF) of the standard Gaussian 
distribution. This enables us to test the efficiency and accuracy of the proposed method with 
respect to space dimension without worrying about the effect of level of probability. Figure 2.10 
shows the number of samples required to achieve c.o.v. = 5% for the limit-state function in 
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(2.24) with β = 3.5 by crude-MCS and CE-AIS-GM. The required number of samples for crude-
MCS is independent of space dimension. The results also show that the superior performance of 
CE-AIS-GM is not significantly affected by large dimension.  
Thirdly, in order to test the method with respect to level of probability, the failure probability of 
the limit-state function in (2.24) was evaluated for a range of  with NRV = 5 and c.o.v. = 5%. 
Figure 2.11 clearly shows that when the level of probability decreases in magnitude, the number 
of samples crude-MCS requires exponentially increases, while the number of samples for the 
CE-AIS-GM does not seem to change significantly. CE-AIS-GM requires more samples than 
crude-MCS only for failure events with high probability (e.g. greater than 10%) while showing 
dramatic improvement in efficiency for rare events. 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Effect of space dimension. 
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Figure 2.11 Effect of level of probability. 
 Robustness against noise in limit-state function 2.4.4
To investigate the effect of numerical noise in the limit-state function on the performance of the 
proposed method, the parabolic limit state function from Der Kiureghian and Dakessian (1998) 
was expanded by adding a numerical noise term. This limit state function has the form 
 
22
2 1 1
( ) κ( ) 0.001 sin(100 )iig b x x e x     x  (2.25) 
where xi, i=1,2 are uncorrelated standard Gaussian random variables, and b, κ, and e are 
deterministic parameters. Using 5, 0.5, and 0.1 respectively for these parameters, one creates a 
component problem with two design points. The multiple design points make it unapproachable 
using traditional FORM/SORM, and the high-frequency noise term creates convergence issues 
for the gradient-based optimization often used for finding design points. Table 2.7 compares the 
results by crude-MCS, and CE-AIS approaches. Using K = 10 and N = 10
3
, the proposed method 
quickly converges to a near-optimal density after three rounds of pre-sampling. While the CE-
AIS-SG converges in just two rounds, it unfortunately converges to a wrong solution, as the IS 
density can only capture one of the two important regions. CE-AIS-GM procedure converges to 
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the desired level of c.o.v. using far less samples than crude-MCS. As all of these methods are 
sampling-based, the noise seems to have little effect on their convergence. 
c.o.v. 
(%) 
Number of Samples Failure Probability 
MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM MCS CE-AIS-SG CE-AIS-GM 
10 23,400 2,000+100 3,000+100 2.99×10
3
 1.08×10
3
 2.74×103 
5 1.30×10
5
 2,000+300 3,000+300 3.07×10
3
 1.08×10
3
 2.94×103 
3 3.60×10
5
 2,000+900 3,000+900 3.07×10
3
 1.09×10
3
 3.05×103 
 
Table 2.7 Comparison for noisy parabolic limit-state surface with two design points.  
2.5 Conclusions 
To address issues associated with structural reliability problems having complex limit-state 
surfaces and to further enrich the field of IS methods, a new AIS method using Kullback-Leibler 
CE coupled with a Gaussian mixture has been developed. The method searches for a near-
optimal IS density by minimizing the difference between a Gaussian mixture model and the best 
IS density, measured by the CE. This new method obtains a near-optimal sampling density in 
very few rounds of pre-sampling by use of closed-form updating rules, which greatly improve 
the efficiency and accuracy of the final IS.  
The breadth of applications of this method, CE-AIS-GM, was demonstrated through several 
component problems, a series system problem, a parallel system problem, and a general system 
problem. For every situation, the proposed method required significantly less samples than 
crude-MCS and CE-AIS-SG. One also finds that the proposed method avoids false convergence 
that may manifest for IS approaches using a uni-modal density model. It is also noted that the 
mean values and the weights of the converged sampling densities in the Gaussian mixture can 
respectively identify important regions and quantify the relative importance in a variety of 
component and system reliability problems. Various numerical tests confirmed that the accuracy 
and efficiency of the proposed method is not sensitive to the level of probability, the number of 
random variables, or curvatures of limit-state surfaces. The method is robust against numerical 
noise in limit-state surfaces as well, as it does not perform much differently for the parabolic 
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limit state with multiple design points with or without the presence of numerical noise. Lastly, 
one can also see that if the distribution of experimental observations and the prior distributions 
are supplied, a Gaussian mixture could be used to fit the unknown optimal sampling distribution 
by minimizing the CE distance between it and the overlap. 
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3. SEISMIC RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF DETERIORATING 
REPRESENTATIVE US WEST COAST BRIDGE TRANSPORTATION 
NETWORKS 
3.1 Background and motivation 
In the built environment, many developed countries have found that the needs for future 
construction projects pale in comparison to the needs associated with determining the hazard 
resilience of existing, deteriorating, lifeline civil infrastructure, e.g. water and gas pipelines, 
transportation networks, etc. Due to limited economic resources, most governing bodies must 
determine which components in the system they must retrofit or replace. Since one must consider 
the network importance of these components to guarantee best system function, a systems 
understanding of the components is quintessential for proper management strategies. In 
particular, earthquake hazard presents a major concern for engineers and policy makers in 
seismically active zones. After a seismic event, it is possible that many of these systems have 
become compromised in complex, non-intuitive scenarios. It is then essential for decision 
making bodies who want to make effective risk-informed decisions to have an efficient and 
accurate method for calculating the network reliability for many times in the future. Calculating 
the disconnection probability is important for quantifying network hazard resilience. One also 
gets a multitude of information from such an analysis, e.g. decision makers may want to know if 
first responders may be able to access a downtown area and/or if affected people can evacuate. 
Note that there are other approaches for determining network functionality, such as network 
flow; however, the dearth of post-hazard origin-destination data make these predictions much 
more difficult. On the basis of life safety and economic losses associated with transportation 
networks subject to hazard, one can assume that bridges are the most fragile and critical 
components. One must guarantee that should special features of the network emerge, e.g. 
tunnels, culverts, etc., that the previous assumption is justifiable. 
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While network reliability analyses on small scales may be simple, larger-size, more realistic 
network topologies for existing metropolitan areas, e.g. Los Angeles, California (LA), United 
States (US), require special treatment, as straightforward, simulation-based methods, e.g. crude-
Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS), quickly become computationally expensive. To reduce the 
impact of such costs, Lim and Song (2012) proposed the selective-Recursive Decomposition 
Algorithm (S-RDA) to identify the paths that influence the network disconnection probability 
most; nevertheless, a multi-scale approach is still required to analyze large networks due to the 
exponential time cost associated with RDA. 
Should one attempt to analyze multiple cases considering different seismic events with time-
variant deterioration and retrofit, computational costs become even larger. Several have 
approached this problem by performing individual analyses at various time points for the 
deteriorated system (Liu and Fragopol 2005, Guikema and Gardoni 2009, Lee et al. 2010). Many 
analyses of lifeline infrastructure used simplifications, e.g., HAZUS fragility curves and simple 
functions to degrade the seismic capacities for time-variant analyses. One primary criticism for 
these simplifications is that one finds more engineering judgment evident in these approaches as 
opposed to conclusions based on real data. To address these concerns, probabilistic seismic 
demand  and capacity models for both single-bent and multiple-bent reinforced concrete (RC) 
bridges have been created from data that reflects both scientific understanding of structural 
response and experimental data using a Bayesian estimation procedure (Gardoni et al. 2003, 
Huang et al. 2010). Furthermore, Gardoni and Rosowksy (2009) proposed a methodology that 
handles continuous time-variant deterioration by reshaping the as-built fragilities while 
accounting for the structural configuration and atmospheric condition. These works provide a 
basis for accurate assessment of individual bridge time-variant fragility. 
In this section, a novel network reliability analysis methodology is proposed for accurate, 
realistic, deteriorating, bridge networks and applied to the LA metropolitan area, as shown in 
Figure 3.1. The lighter, orange portion of this figure shows the novel constructs and applications 
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of this work with text boxes and arrows. There are three basic inputs to this framework. The first 
is the deterioration map, which determines how the deterioration parameters are spatially 
distributed. The second is the hazard model, i.e., the attenuation rule, the “hazard map.” The last 
is the data specific to the application, e.g., bridge data. In cases where the infrastructure contains 
a large range of bridges, representative classes may be used to represent groups of components to 
diminish computational expenses. The network realization describes the topology and how the 
bridges are located within the topology.  
 
Figure 3.1 Flowchart of proposed methodology. 
Using these inputs, a component-driven network model is created using the following approach. 
While the component fragilities describe the likelihood of the limit states subject to hazard, e.g., 
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seismicity and/or storm surge, the effects of time variance must also be handled. For this 
analysis, time variance is handled by “Fragility Increment Functions” (FIFs), which rescale the 
fragilities using ratios that account for the structural configuration and the environmental factors. 
The rest of the network model is driven by these high-information-content component models, 
resulting in a component-driven network model. Accounting for the individual components and 
the network realization, the sources of correlation between components failures are directly 
found. Using all of these inputs and techniques, a component-driven network model is created. 
Multi-scale approaches (i.e., those with many components per link) using hierarchical structures 
to account for scale, are used together with the network analysis S-RDA to diminish 
computational costs. Selected outputs identify the important aspects of the network model. These 
outputs include component importance measures, e.g., Conditional Probability Importance 
Measures (CPIMs), and the network disconnection reliability. First, the component models are 
discussed, which rely on the representative bridge concept, aforementioned bridge fragility and 
deterioration models, spatial correlation model, and  link definition. Secondly, the network 
analysis algorithm, the S-RDA, and conditional importance measures that arise from the 
identified cut-sets and link-sets are explained. Then, several experiments to validate the analysis, 
to explore the time-variant effects, to determine the effects of how the source or terminal nodes 
are represented, and to show the effect of dependence between components are explored. Lastly, 
some conclusions and thoughts for future improvements are shown. 
3.2 Component reliability analysis 
To perform a realistic and accurate network analysis, one must assure that the component hazard 
behavior is appropriately modeled. For the case of a bridge network in seismic zones, the most 
accurate approach would model each bridge’s seismic behavior directly; however, this approach 
tends to become computationally intractable, especially if the component models are 
computationally expensive. For this reason, a representative bridge approach for the LA 
metropolitan area is used to represent different classes of bridges to account for geometric and 
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material structural variability. To further ensure that bridge classes represent real bridge 
behavior, fragility curves based on laboratory testing and time-history models were used. One 
ought to note this is the first use of these models in this manner. Since this process is data-driven, 
a numerical example is used to demonstrate how to obtain these classes. It is also important to 
mention that the resolution for the final network analysis consists of multi-bridge links, making 
this a multi-scale analysis. For this reason, bridge models will be discussed first, with the system 
reliability analysis to obtain the link correlations and disconnection probabilities second.  
 Los Angeles metropolitan area representative bridges 3.2.1
To obtain representative bridges, one must first specify data that accurately represents variability 
of the phenomenon being modeled. Since the network model used is based on bridges on state 
routes, published data by the California Department of Transportation (CalTrans) for California 
District 7 (CalTrans 2013) is used. Note that this data is specific for state route bridges in LA 
county, while the National Bridge Inventory (NBI) covers a more broad sample of bridges. Many 
of the aforementioned bridges in the NBI may not be relevant to the network of interest. Since 
several bridges in the data set had been listed as having zero vertical clearance, width, length, 
and/or spans, this data was filtered to remove them as they would not contribute significantly to 
the network failure events. Structures outside the realm of the bridge fragility models that will be 
presented later, e.g. culverts, tunnels, etc., were also removed.  
After the data filtering process, around 1800 bridge descriptions remained which contribute most 
to the network failure events. To specify the representative bridge classes, a clustering approach 
is used; however, one must note that the exact bridge behaviors cannot be obtained with these 
classes. The descriptors used in the clustering from this data set are bridge length, width, vertical 
clearance, and number of spans. Note that the fourth descriptor (number of spans) takes integer 
variables while the other three are continuous. Several descriptive statistics from this data set are 
shown in Table 3.1. Also note that this data had several other useful entries such as dates of 
construction and retrofit, post-mile and state-route locations, and structure type description. 
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 Mean Median Mode Standard deviation 
Length (m) 120 61.0 43.6 362 
Width (m) 30.0 25.0 16.2 20.1 
Vertical clearance (m) 5.24 4.93 4.57 1.00 
Number of spans 4.46 3.00 2.00 14.5 
 
Table 3.1 Statistics of bridge descriptors for CA district 7. 
Since this dataset was large in size, “k-means” style clustering approaches are most efficient, but 
may give inaccurate values for data containing integer descriptors. Two clustering analyses were 
considered for this approach: Partition Around Medoids (PAM; Kaufman and Rousseeuw 1990) 
and k-prototypes (Huang 1998). While both algorithms have been adapted to handle both 
categorical and continuous data, PAM is selected, due to the construction of the k-prototypes 
objective function. This function uses a weighted combination of difference based on the L2 
norm for continuous data and discrepancy for categorical data; however, estimating this 
additional parameter, is strongly non-trivial. Additionally, a commercial open-source software is 
available for PAM on the MATLAB© platform, which is the principal analysis software used in 
this study. PAM has the added benefit of returning cluster median observations from the dataset, 
while most k-means type algorithms return averages which may not correlate to a realistic data-
point.  
To determine the optimal number of clusters, i.e. k, the gap heuristic was utilized (Tibshirani et 
al. 2000). This method selects the number of clusters based on the difference between the 
“within-cluster” sum of squares for clustering on the so-called null data, i.e. randomly generated 
data uniformly sampled over the original data ranges, and clustering on the real data. For k, use 
the smallest number of clusters showing the largest difference from the null data. Using PAM 
with the gap heuristic, 7 clusters were found. The silhouette plot, a device used for goodness-of-
fit for a clustering, in Figure 3.2 shows how similar each point is to points in its own cluster 
compared to points in other clusters. The abscissa shows the silhouette width, which is computed 
as    / max ,m m m mb a a b , where m=1,2,…,Nbridge indicates the bridge datum of interest, am 
represents the average cluster dissimilarity for the cluster m is assigned to, and bm represents the 
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smallest average dissimilarity of the other clusters, while the ordinate corresponds to each bridge 
in the dataset. Negative values reflect within cluster differences, while positive ones reflect 
within cluster similarities. 
           
Figure 3.2 Silhouettes of the 7 clusters of bridges. 
After this clustering, it was found that the fourth cluster had only one span. When compared to 
multi-span bridges, these contribute significantly less to network failure events, so this cluster 
was not considered for a bridge class. Based on typical lane and margin sizes, the first, fifth, and 
sixth clusters represent bridges with less than five lanes. These explain more than 70% of the 
bridges once the single-span, when the fourth cluster is removed, as can be seen in Figure 3.2. 
Further discarding the second and the third clusters due to them not being as accurately 
modelled, three representative bridges were identified based of the cluster descriptors; however, 
one notices these four parameters do not represent a full bridge design. How to obtain such a 
design from the parameters will be discussed in the following section, since certain assumptions 
are requisite for the chosen fragility models. Since the majority of highway bridges in the state of 
California are designed using Caltrans specifications, the bridges in this study were designed 
using examples from Mackie and Stojadinovic (2003).  
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 Bridge fragility models 3.2.2
To find exactly what parameters are needed from design, consider the form and required 
parameters of the so-called bridge fragility functions. One can define fragility as the conditional 
probability that a structure will be at or exceed a given limit state for a given demand parameter 
value. In seismic applications, ground motion intensity measure(s) are typically used for the 
demand parameter(s). The bridge fragilities in this study were constructed using seismic 
probability capacity models (Choe et al. 2007) and demand models (Huang et al. 2010, Gardoni 
et al. 2003).  
3.2.2.1 As-built bridge fragility 
Within the Caltrans dataset, 95% of the bridges in the network were standard highway RC 
construction; therefore, all probabilistic, seismic, bridge analyses assume standard highway RC 
structures. This distinction is very important, since the limit states for the demand model can be 
exhaustively accounted for by considering only the column shear and deformation. The 
considered probabilistic demand models also require that the bridge bents are single column; 
therefore, one must guarantee that the cluster results are compatible. Table 3.2 details the design 
parameters of the three representative bridge classes used in the LA numerical example.  In this 
table, the bridge geometry is described by (skew),
1L (the smaller span), 2 1/L L (ratio between 
the larger, central span and the smaller span), and
cH (the column height). The column section is 
described by
cD (the column diameter), yf and yhf (the longitudinal and transverse reinforcement 
yield strength),
'
cf (the test concrete cylinder crushing strength), l and s (the longitudinal and 
transverse steel reinforcement ratio), and ct  (clear cover). Additionally, 1w denotes the additional 
dead load while
soilK and abutK respectively denote the soil and steel models. The first 
representative bridge, Bridge 1, has two spans which implies a single bent, as in Huang et al. 
(2010), while the other two considered representative bridges, Bridge 2 and Bridge 3, have two 
bents and must be modeled as a series system of those bents, as in Gardoni et al. (2003). The 
bridge deck used for all of these models is based on the box girder structure design shown in 
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Fenves and Ellery (1994). The three-span bridges’ overall geometry assume symmetry in the 
approach spans and columns.  
Parameter Bridge 1 Bridge 2 Bridge 3 
  0° 0° 0° 
1L  (m) 37.1 17.0 47.0 
2 1/L L  1 1.25 1.25 
cH  (m) 5.87 4.88 10.8 
cD  (m) 3.05 1.03 1.80 
yf  (MPa) 345 345 345 
yhf  (MPa) 414 414 414 
'
cf  (MPa) 31.0 31.0 31.0 
l  (%) 3.4 2.85 2.00 
s  (%) 0.79 0.96 0.50 
ct  (m) 0.0889 0.0381 0.0381 
1w  (%) 20.0 20.0 20.0 
soilK  (USGS) C C C 
abutK  C C C 
 
Table 3.2 Parameters of representative bridges of CA district 7.  
To obtain the fragility curves, one must first be able to formulate and execute the capacity 
analysis, the demand analysis, and the limit states. One must complete a moment curvature 
sectional analysis for the capacity model, which is independent of the ground motion, and a full 
bridge pushover analysis using constant loading with the MN2 method as in Gardoni et al. 
(2003). Note that none of these models will not introduce significant error as long as they 
observe the MN2 method and are designed to Caltrans specifications. These are the assumptions 
implicit in the experimental and synthetic data used in the Bayesian updating processes to fit the 
original capacity and demand models; however, neither of these assumptions are limiting, 
assuming a proper data-set can be obtained. The column limit state functions can be written as 
 , , , ,, δ, , =1,2( , , ) ( , , ) ( ,..., )   , ik D k C k ik D k k C k bentg D C v i Nk  x d x d x     (3.1) 
where the δ, v represent the deformation and shear failure modes, Nbent is the number of bents, 
,D k and ,C k are the demand and capacity fitting parameters from the Bayesian analysis, x is the 
set of the design parameters as shown in Table 3.2, and d is the set of the corresponding ground 
motion parameter. Note that the capacity term is not bent dependent due to the symmetry 
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assumption for the multi-span structure geometry.  Using a series representation of the column 
limit states as shown in (3.1), the as-built fragility is 
 
, ,( ) ( , , ) |, 0ik D k C k
i k
F P g
 
    
 
d x d d  (3.2) 
While the single bent fragility for the first bridge class is quickly obtained using the point 
estimate approach found in Choe et al. (2010), the multiple-bent model fragilities must be 
obtained by sampling the design variables, x, and fragility coefficients, ,D k and ,C k , as indicated 
in Gardoni et al. (2003). The single-bent, first bridge class fragility can be seen in Figure 3.3. 
This fragility is bivariate in input, taking seismic intensity demand inputs of normalized peak 
ground velocity (PGV) and pseudo-spectral acceleration (PSA). Note the discontinuity that 
occurs along the normalized PSA due to the shear limit state. The multiple-bent bridge classes, 
the second and third classes, can be seen in Figure 3.4. These also use the most recently updated 
capacity models as in Choe et al. (2007). Note that these use only one input, spectral acceleration 
(
aS ). The first bridge class could use the same demand and capacity models as the second and 
third; however, the currently used models contain significantly more data.  
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Figure 3.4 Fragilities for the second (left) and third (right) bridge classes. 
 
3.2.2.2 Time-variant bridge fragility 
Since realism is a strong focus of this study, structural deterioration must be properly accounted 
for in the bridge models. For this purpose, a novel approach has been recently developed to scale 
the as-built fragilities using ratios, the so-called FIF, as in Gardoni and Rosowsky (2009). Once 
the terms for this approach have been fitted, this approach requires no additional reliability 
analysis, which presents a major savings in time-variant, large, bridge network analysis 
computational costs. The deterioration principally modeled for the FIF is the loss of rebar cross 
section due to the transmission of chloride ions from the member surface.  
Using the well-known Fick’s second Law and the corrosion initiation probability density 
function (PDF) from DuraCrete (2000), one can model the rebar area reduction. Deteriorated 
fragilities can then be written 
 
0( , ) ( ) ( , , , )a a aF GF t S F S G t S  x  (3.3) 
where ( , )aF t S is the deteriorated bivariate fragility, 0( , , , )aF GG t S x is the FIF, G is the set of 
the fitting parameters for the FIF, and t is the current age of the structure. Note that this model 
has currently been developed for
aS , but can be fit for other demand parameters. The fitted 
values from Gardoni and Rosowsky (2009) are used for this work; however, these values 
correspond to a specific bridge configuration and atmospheric condition. For complete accuracy, 
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the FIF ought to be appropriately justified for use or refitted for the three bridge classes. Since 
these fitted values assume splash zone atmospheric conditions, the worst case deterioration 
occurs for the FIF, leading to conservative bridge models. The FIF approach was also further 
rigorously confirmed via reliability analysis in Choe et al. (2009). 
3.2.2.3 Bridge correlations 
Since lifeline networks typically are spread over large land areas, one cannot neglect the 
statistical dependence of component failures during the system reliability analysis, which is 
largely due to spatial correlation of seismic intensity. Following the suggestions of Lim and Song 
(2012), one can obtain the spatial correlations of line-type components in a network using simple 
formulas. Since most attenuation relations are of the form 
 ln ( , , )m m m mY f M R      (3.4) 
where
mY is a ground motion intensity measure at the m-th location, ( , , )m mf M R  is a function that 
describes the attenuation of the ground motion intensity in terms of the magnitude M, the site-to-
epicenter distance Rm, and other possible input parameters, and and m are the inter-event and 
intra-event residuals with standard deviations  and , respectively. The correlations between 
site intensity measures can be written 
 
2 2 2 2
ln ln ( (
                     1,2,.
) )
.., , 1,2,... ,
/
,
m n m nY Y
bridge bridgem N n N m n
       
 
    

  (3.5) 
where )(
m n
  represents the correlation between intra-event residuals (Goda and Hong 2008). 
Note that all of the component fragilities are compatible with PGAs as a demand parameter 
through interpolation (Chopra 1995), one can model the site PGAs as random variables 
 ln ln mm mPGA PGA X  (3.6) 
where m = 1,2,…,Nbridge is the bridge number. Note that the aS approximation is not necessary 
should one find more recent attenuation rules for the appropriate data; however, this would not 
affect the methodology outlined in this work. The failure probability of the m-th bridge is 
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       , exp
mm m
mm mXP E t F t PGA u u du


   (3.7) 
where ( )  is the PDF of the standard Gaussian distribution, and
mX
 is the standard deviation of 
mX , and mu will be explained shortly.  
Although the original formulation relied on a Poisson assumption for locations of failures along a 
link to construct (3.7) in Song and Lim (2012), here a similar assumption can be used to 
represent the variability associated with the mean estimate of seismic intensity, where 
pu
represents the variability from both inter-event and intra-event residuals. Thus, one obtains Eq. 
(7) by integrating Eq. (6) embedded in Eq. (3) with respect to mu . This distinction is important, 
since the original formulation relied on fragilities for pipe-line type components that had a length 
term so that they could be applied to many different length of pipe, a proposition which does not 
have the same meaning for this application, e.g. most bridges are not several miles in length. If 
the bridges were many miles in length, or had special construction where the simple formulation 
in (3.2) no longer accounts for all dominant failure modes, specific fragility models must be 
created from data; however, such data, especially non-simulation based data, and such models 
are unavailable to my best knowledge. 
The joint failure probability for two bridges is thus 
 
       
  2
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 


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 
 (3.8) 
where   2 , ; m nX X t   denotes the bivariate standard Gaussian PDF with correlation coefficient
 
m nX X
t . One can describe the bridge failure event using   m m mE Z t   where mZ denotes 
the standard normal random variable and    1m mPt tE
      is the bridge reliability index. 
One can then calculate the joint failure probability using 
             
( )
0
2 , ;
ZmZ n
t
m n m n m nP E E t dt t t t

             (3.9) 
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where  
m nZ Z
t is the correlation between bridge failures. One can then combine (3.8) and (3.9) to 
obtain this correlation; however, attempting to use the network analysis tool by modeling every 
bridge as a link quickly becomes computationally intractable with the number of bridges. This 
would be particularly problematic for a massive bridge network, e.g. LA. Therefore, it is better to 
obtain link failures and correlations by describing all bridges on a link as a series system. This 
approach is described in detail in Lim and Song (2012). Note that this approach takes into 
account the structural seismic response, i.e. capacity and demand influences, implicitly by using 
the bridge fragility functions in (3.7) and (3.8).  
 Link reliability analysis 3.2.3
The approach to obtain the link correlations is similar in that (3.8) and (3.9) are used again. This 
process requires the component and joint component failure probabilities. To obtain link failure 
probabilities, by definition 
   1 1 ,      1,2,...,
u u u
link
u m m m link
m link m link m link
P E P E P E P Et t Nt t u
  
     
          
     
     
 (3.10) 
where link
uE  is the failure event of the u-th link, ulink is the index set of the bridges on the u-th 
link, and Nlink is the total number links in the network. To evaluate the intersection bridge 
survival events, one can use an efficient, high-dimensional, multivariate normal, numerical 
integration scheme such as Genz (1992). To obtain the intersection, modify the addition so that it 
appears as 
 
        ,  
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 (3.11) 
where ( )linkuP E and ( )
link
vP E are calculated as shown in (3.10). To obtain the union, one can use a 
slightly modified version of (3.10),  
   1
v u vu
link link
u v m n m
m link n link m link link
P E E P E Et tPt E
  
      
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 (3.12) 
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Using (3.12) with (3.11) and (3.10), one can simply solve for the link correlations using (3.9).  
 Efficiency considerations 3.2.4
If one has a network with several thousand bridges, the number of correlation coefficients 
needed to be calculated is ( 1) 2m m , which will require at least several hundred thousand 
evaluations of the aforementioned procedure. While this is fine for very powerful computers and 
will always calculate the correlations at each level accurately, it is completely unacceptable for 
single processor computers that need to execute in series. Because of the computational expense, 
an approximate approach is used for the correlation calculation. There are two types of 
correlations: intra-link and inter-link. These enter the analysis in (3.10), which requires a 
correlation matrix for all of the bridges present on a single link, and (3.11), which requires a 
correlation matrix for all of the bridges present on either link. The intra-link correlations terms 
are used multiple times for the link reliability analysis, due to them being required every time a 
link is used. Based on extensive studies, these must be calculated with the original formulation or 
else the incurred level of error in the link probabilities greatly biases the network level 
prediction; however, the inter-link correlations only effect the link correlations, do not affect the 
network reliability analysis as much, and are only needed once. For these reasons, the inter-link 
correlations were interpolated using 2-D shape functions from the finite element method (FEM) 
community with links that had only 3 points on them, greatly decreasing the computational cost 
while not contributing noticeable error at the system level, as will be shown in the numerical 
example. It was also found that increasing the number of points or varying their spacing did not 
have a significant impact on the accuracy of the estimate. Now that all component failure 
probabilities and correlations are accounted for, one can perform network reliability analysis.  
3.3 Network reliability analysis 
After the component models have been defined, the next step one must take when performing 
network reliability analysis is to specify the graph representation. One then specifies a terminal 
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and source node for a network definition of the aforementioned graph. While this may seem to 
constrict the outcomes for a single analysis, non-physical subjunctive links can connect 
subjunctive source and terminal nodes such that these nodes represent connectivity between two 
sets of nodes. These subjunctive links connect to physical nodes and have disconnection 
probabilities of zero. This representation was used in Lee et al. (2010) to model nodes in a down 
town area as a source, a technique which is replicated in this work. For some of the numerical 
examples in this work, all nodes that lie on the boundary of the metropolitan area which are on 
possible evacuation routes are connected to the subjunctive terminal node. The effect of 
subjunctive representation will also be explored in a numerical example. Furthermore, the 
network used in this work is a node-weighted one. It should also be noted that due to several 
reasons, e.g. lack of information on highway-intersections, modeling ambiguity, etc., the original 
nodes are assumed to have zero failure probability. Using this node-weighted approach, the S-
RDA (Lim and Song 2012) may be implemented with little modification. An extensive summary 
of various network representations and analysis methods is available in Ahuja et al. (1993).  
 Selective-recursive decomposition algorithm 3.3.1
For a full summary of the S-RDA method and its development, peruse Lim and Song (2012). In 
network analysis, some special notation helps to represent network events. In particular, the so-
called structure function, ( )G , is used in this work, where G represents the graph. ( )G  is 0 
and 1 when G is disconnected and connected. This analysis method decomposes subgraphs 
selectively based on their likelihoods, and, during decomposition, uses a version of Dijkstra’s 
algorithm that maximizes the path reliability based on probabilities to identify the more highly 
likely events. If a path maintains connectivity between the source and terminal node, it represents 
a link-set, where the sum of the link-set probabilities gives the survival probability 
    
1
1
Ln
i
iLG t tP P

       (3.13) 
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where
Ln is the number of link-sets. Note this assumes the link-sets are disjoint. If a path results 
in the source and terminal node becoming disconnected, it is a cut-set. The sum of the cut-sets 
gives the disconnection probability 
    
1
0
Cn
i
iCG t tP P

       (3.14) 
where
Cn is the number of cut-sets. To describe the analysis of the found paths more thoroughly, 
one represents the structure function using the first identified path
01A , i.e.  
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where the terms 01,01, , wwa a are Boolean descriptions that represent the survival and failure of the 
nodes and nodally-represented arcs along
01A , 01n is the total number of nodes and nodally-
represented arcs along 01A , and 01G  is the subgraph created by removing component w, the arcs 
connected to it and collapses components1,..., 1w and the arcs connecting to them into the 
source. By construction, the path decompositions, 01,01,1 01,2 01, 1... wwa a a a , are mutually exclusive.  
For a connected graph the first identified path using modified Dijkstra’s connects the source and 
terminal nodes. Due to the mutually exclusive formulation, one then updates the upper bound 
using simple addition 
    
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0 1
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G t P L tP

       (3.16) 
If one of the path decompositions in (3.15) disconnects the source and terminal node, a disjoint 
cut-set has been found. The lower bound rule is then the same as (3.14). The algorithm then 
investigates the yet to be analyzed subgraphs in order of their decreasing approximate path 
reliabilities from modified Dijkstra’s to identify cut-sets for disconnected subgraphs and link-sets 
and paths to further decompose for connected subgraphs. Once the bounds converge within a 
certain tolerance, the algorithm terminates. This, however, only provides the overall network 
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reliability. Due to S-RDA identifying cut-sets and link-sets in decreasing order of contribution to 
the network event, one can construct component importance measures.  
 Component importance measures 3.3.2
Using the identified cut-sets and link-sets, one can quantify component relative importance in 
terms of its contribution to the system failure probability. One technique which does this uses 
conditional probability importance measures (CPIMs; Lim and Song 2012):  
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where link
uE and sysE represent the u-th link failure and system failure. As previously mentioned, 
system failure events can be quantified by summing all of the identified mutually exclusive cut-
sets from the S-RDA. One can approach the correct CPIM by summing up a number of largest 
probability cut-sets 
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Conversely, one can pose (3.18) using the identified disjoint link-sets 
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where
link
uE represents the compliment of link
uE and the u–th link survival.  
3.4 Numerical example: Los Angeles bridge network seismic reliability 
As mentioned previously, a methodology has been applied for large bridge network analysis 
using location-specific data. For the numerical example, the LA metropolitan area bridge 
network topology is modeled using ArcGIS software. The original road map from the ArcGIS 
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base map World Street Map (ESRI 2011) is shown in Figure 3.5 while the network 
representation is shown in Figure 3.6.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Los Angeles bridge network (ESRI 2011). 
To create a network which is not too large in size for a reasonable testing of this methodology, 
the most critical routes are used. This network has 35 nodes and 138 uni-directional links for a 
total size of 173 components. The subjunctive source node is connected to three nodes that are in 
the vicinity of downtown, while the more arbitrarily placed terminal node is connected to all nine 
nodes on evacuation paths. These nodes are marked using a different node shape annotated with 
“S” and “T” in Figure 3.6. The subjunctive links are marked using orange, double-dotted-dashed 
lines. The links colored with blue solid lines represent the links with many bridges on them. 
Special links, marked with dashed purple, dash-dotted black, and dotted red lines, show those 
links with high CPIM values which will be further discussed in the numerical examples. Due to 
the renown of the 1994 Northridge earthquake, its epicenter, located at latitude 34.21°N and 
longitude 118.5°W (Thio and Kanamori 1996), is used for this scenario and is marked with a 
white star in the same figure. The bounds of the network are determined based on the top 6 most 
populous cities in LA and Orange county. These also compare well with past studies using the 
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LA metropolitan area (Shinozuka et al. 2003). Given the network topology, the locations of 
bridges must also be determined. 
 
Figure 3.6 LA network representation. 
From Figure 3.6, it is clear an approximate network representation has been constructed. Instead 
of individually locating every bridge along its route, specific state route bridge densities and a 
global bridge density are compiled from the Caltrans dataset. These averages are then used to 
determine the number of bridges per link based on the link lengths. If the route in question has a 
specific density from the data, it is used. Otherwise, the global average is associated with the 
1
2
3
4
5 6 7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18 19
20
21
2223
24
25 26
27
28 2930
31
32
33
 30'  15'  118oW  45'  30' 
 24' 
 36' 
 48' 
  34
oN 
 12' 
 24' 
75, 76 
                 
53 
 
link, especially if the link represents several state routes. The bridge class for one of the bridges 
in a link is then determined using a multinomial distribution which uses cluster membership 
percentages for the three bridge classes described previously. 
To model the seismicity of the region, the following attenuation rule is used for PGA (Boore and 
Atkinson 2008)  
 
   22 22
ln 0.53804 { 0.66050 0.11970( 4.5)}
              ln 1.35 0.01151 1.35 1.0
m
m m
wPGA M
R R
     
   
 (3.20) 
where Rm is the distance from the m-th bridge of concern to the surface projection of the 
epicenter, Mw is the moment magnitude, and PGA is the mean PGA estimate, returned in units of 
g. For the 1994 Northridge earthquake, Mw was 6.7 at a depth, H, of around 17.0 km; however, 
Mw = 8.0 was used due to the level of probability for the original magnitude  For this model, the 
standard of the natural logarithms of the inter-event, , and intra-event, , uncertainties are 0.265 
and 0.502. The associated correlation model for the intra-event residual natural logarithms is 
  0.40ln ln ( ) exp 0.27 ,      1,..., , 1,..., ,nm mn mn link linkm N n N m n         (3.21) 
where mn is the distance between bridges. Using attenuation relationships from the same work, 
the model for PGV is thus 
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where PGV is the mean PGV estimate, returned in units of cm/sec. This work assumes that the 
source of variability used to construct the correlation and to perform the crude-MCS validation 
analysis is only for the PGA. This had to be done so both the single-bent, i.e., bridge class one, 
and multiple-bent models, i.e., bridge classes two and three, could be used in tandem. This issue 
disappears if one only uses the multiple-bent models; however, the model developed specifically 
for the single-bent provides a much more detailed description of the response of the structure. 
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Note that this more detailed model uses two parameters while the multiple-bent model contains 
only one, causing this source of possible hand-waiving.  
Using these assumptions, several numerical examples are explored. First, the developed 
methodology is compared and contrasted with crude-MCS results. Then, the effect of 
deterioration is investigated further. The effect of dependence is then visited. Lastly, the effects 
of the subjunctive representation are investigated.  
 Crude-Monte Carlo simulation verification 3.4.1
To verify the proposed analysis, it and crude-MCS were used to evaluate several deterioration 
scenarios with different bridge initializations. The four cases were: as-built, 2013 conditions, 
deteriorated 100 years, retrofitted 100 years. The first case assumes no deterioration. For all 
other cases, the deterioration starts from the earliest build year specified for the three 
representative bridges, which were 1980, 1970, and 1970, respectively. To represent retrofit with 
a simple case, one assumes at the time of analysis, bridge class 1 is brought back to as-built 
condition. For current day conditions, the 2013 conditions case was deteriorated to 2013 from the 
bridge class build dates. The bounds from the developed methodology and crude-MCS estimates 
are listed in Table 3.3. Note that the as-built and 100 year deteriorated cases show the best 
agreement. For the 2013 case, the crude-MCS is slightly below the 1% prediction. These bounds 
contain the estimate at 2%. For the retrofitted case, the crude-MCS is slightly above the 1% 
prediction. These contain the estimate at 3%. Also note that the disconnection probability 
monotonically increases with time, even though each case has different bridge class placements. 
I have found that if the cases are separated by less time, different bridge location configurations 
may actually result in non-monotonic increasing of the disconnection probabilities. 
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Proposed Methodology Crude-MCS 
Case 
10% 
bounds 
5% 
bounds 
1% 
bounds 
Pf   
As-built 
UB 0.116 0.0912 0.0734 
0.0721 5% 
LB 0.0231 0.0415 0.0634 
2013 
UB 0.140 0.114 0.0973 
0.0840 5% 
LB 0.0435 0.0647 0.0873 
Deteriorated 
100 years 
UB 0.161 0.139 0.123 
0.122 5% 
LB 0.0639 .0891 0.113 
Retrofitted 
100 years 
UB 0.143 0.125 0.106 
0.113 5% 
LB 0.0473 0.0747 0.0965 
 
Table 3.3 Crude-MCS comparison: Disconnection probability. 
For an idea of how each case converges, see the bounds movement in Figure 3.7. It should be 
noted that, due to the exhaustive number of link-sets and cut-sets identified by S-RDA, the 
following results were generated based on when the median CPIM difference between link-set-
based and cut-set-based CPIMs was 2%. The top 5 link-set-based and cut-set-based CPIMs from 
each case are shown in Table 3.4. Note that the deteriorated 100 years case requires the least 
amount of time while the retrofitted 100 years case required the most amount of CPIM 
compilation time. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Bounds convergence for validation cases. 
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The most important links, regardless of the deterioration state, are 37, 38, 75 and 76 and are 
shown with red dotted lines in Figure 3.6.  Recall that the arcs labelled 2u and 2u-1 represent the 
two directions of the u line-type component. One also sees that components 15, 16, 23, and 24 
are also important, as these occupy the 5
th
 most important spots in the four cases. These are 
shown with purple dashed lines. While the more important components do not vary much by 
deterioration scenario, one sees that a few of the components with the top 20 CPIM values 
exhibit interesting behavior. By relative rankings, components 1, 2, 5, 6, 105 and 106 become 
less and less important with increasing deterioration and seem to oscillate and rankings and 
values. On the other hand, components 27 and 28 show increases in CPIM by virtue of both 
relative and absolute ranking. These moving CPIMs are shown with black dash-dotted lines. 
Since these validation analyses all have different bridge location configurations, several 
deterioration scenarios of the same bridge configuration will now be investigated.  
Proposed methodology 
Case Link Cut-set Link-set 
As-built  
(29,600 sec) 
76 0.997 1.07 
37 0.993 1.07 
75 0.995 1.06 
38 0.995 1.06 
23 0.98 1.04 
2013  
(22,014 sec) 
38 0.995 1.06 
76 0.994 1.06 
75 0.995 1.06 
37 0.991 1.05 
15 0.981 1.04 
Deteriorated 100 years  
(18,479 sec) 
38 0.989 1.04 
37 0.988 1.04 
75 0.988 1.04 
76 0.988 1.04 
16 0.966 1.01 
Retrofitted 100 years  
(44,442 sec) 
38 0.997 1.05 
76 0.998 1.05 
75 0.996 1.05 
37 0.997 1.04 
24 0.987 1.03 
 
Table 3.4 Top 5 CPIMs for validation cases. 
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 Time-variant effects 3.4.2
Since it is clear that deterioration has a significant effect on the disconnection probability as well 
as the CPIMs, a few more cases were generated to see bounds movement and verify the CPIM 
trends in 3.4.1. To see the effect of deterioration, the methodology was used to get an estimate of 
the disconnection probability every 20 years for a period of 100 years. See Figure 3.8 for a 
graphical description of the bounds over time. Note that this plot shows a monotonically 
increasing behavior, as expected. It should be noted that the 0 time case is not actually part of the 
same deterioration scheme, as this just uses as-built fragilities while the other ones deteriorate 
from the build time of the oldest bridge class (1970). This is listed merely for reference, and also 
explains why the slope between the first case and the 20 year deterioration scenario is 
significantly different than the rest. Evaluating the CPIM conclusions made in 3.4.1, the top 
ranked components remain the same; however, one finds that the increased information shows a 
more complex picture than described earlier for 1, 2, 5, 6, 27, 28, 105, and 106. While the trends 
over time seem unpredictable, the time-dependent movements of the CPIMs’ absolute and 
relative rankings indicate that the deterioration effects are non-negligible. An explanation for 
why this is happening is that the same FIF is being used for each bridge class. The only major 
difference between the bridge classes is that each has a specific deterioration initiation time. 
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Figure 3.8 Bounds for different amounts of deterioration. 
 Effects of spatial dependence 3.4.3
To see whether or not the results are sensitive to the impact of spatial dependence, the as-built 
case was selected to compare and contrast the results of the spatial correlation model with the 
case where spatial correlation is assumed zero. In simpler words, the “statistically independent” 
case (s.i.) is when (3.21) is set to zero. The 1% bounds on the disconnection probability for the 
s.i. case were 0.0517–0.0617 while the case using the original correlations were 0.0634-0.0734. 
This represents a 15.9% decrease in the upper bound, a non-negligible difference. Table 3.5 
contains the top 8 CPIM values for both cases while also showing the % difference relative to the 
case with full correlation. There does not seem to be a significant impact due to correlation on 
the CPIM rankings, as most of these are differences around 1% or less. It is cautioned that this 
may not be the case for every network. For instance, if the network has a loop like structure with 
an epicenter at its center, the correlation values will be much higher between links that may not 
be close to each other and will have generally higher values throughout the system. Such 
correlation impacts would manifest as significant differences between component rankings. 
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Component 
As-built 
Spatially  
Independent Difference 
LB UB LB UB LB UB 
76 0.997 1.066 0.999 1.054 0.26% -1.11% 
38 0.995 1.065 1.000 1.054 0.48% -0.98% 
75 0.995 1.065 0.999 1.055 0.38% -0.91% 
37 0.993 1.066 0.999 1.056 0.58% -0.95% 
24 0.981 1.040 0.984 1.032 0.30% -0.77% 
23 0.980 1.040 0.984 1.032 0.44% -0.80% 
16 0.980 1.040 0.978 1.026 -0.18% -1.29% 
15 0.979 1.040 0.978 1.026 -0.08% -1.31% 
 
Table 3.5 Statistical independence comparison. 
 Effects of subjunctive links 3.4.4
To determine the impacts of the subjunctive links, the subjunctive links attached to the terminal 
node were removed as shown in Figure 3.9. Note the lack of the subjunctive links and nodes that 
are represented as dashed in Figure 3.6. This network has 34 nodes and 120 uni-directional links 
for a network size of 154, which has 19 components less than the earlier network realization. 
Also note that the same special links are labeled with different number schemes due to the 
removal of the subjunctive components. The disconnection probability was then evaluated for 
evacuation route nodes. Two networks were constructed without using the nine subjunctive links 
connected to the subjunctive terminal node as shown in Figure 3.6. These used the same bridge 
location configuration so that a comparison is justified. These networks differ in that they use 
two different nodes. These nodes, labelled 1 and 16 respectively, are shown in Figure 3.9 for 
reference. Note that they use terminal nodes far from each other in terms of the network 
topology.  
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Figure 3.9 CPIMs and terminal nodes for subjunctive trials. 
These terminal nodes are denoted by nterm in Tables 3.6-3.7. Table 3.6 shows the bounds 
convergence of the original network and two networks without subjunctive components. Note 
that each of these bounds are very different, with the original subjunctive representation having 
the smallest disconnection probability bounds. This is due to the increased redundancy. The 
network with nterm of 1 has few reliable paths that can be taken due to the smaller number of 
components between the source node and the nearness of the epicenter, making its disconnection 
probability higher than the other selected nterm. The estimates for the non-subjunctive terminal 
node cases also required significantly more identified sets to converge. For this reason, the 
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analysis was conducted using 5% S-RDA bounds. The subjunctive representation has sets which 
contribute higher contributions to the upper bound convergence since all of the major link-sets 
for each evacuation route are used, as opposed to just one evacuation route, requiring 
significantly less sets.  
Case 10% bounds 5% bounds 
All subjunctive 
UB 0.116 0.0912 
LB 0.0231 0.0415 
nterm 1 
UB 0.700 0.699 
LB 0.600 0.649 
nterm 16 
UB 0.497 0.49 
LB 0.397 0.44 
 
Table 3.6 Subjunctive exploration disconnection bounds. 
See Table 3.7 for the top 5 CPIM values for the original network and non-subjunctive networks. 
Due to large changes in redundancy, each of these networks has different orderings for the top 5 
components. Major differences are that 13 and 14 are significantly more important for the non-
subjunctive representation while 65, 66, 29 and 30 are absent from the top rankings in the non-
subjunctive representations. The two non-subjunctive representations also identify 13 and 14 for 
nterm 1 and 1 and 2 for nterm 16 as important respectively. What is a bit surprising is that the two 
non-subjunctive representations have a lot of similar components despite using terminal nodes on 
opposite sides of the network. This is probably due to the proximity of the earthquake epicenter.   
Note that due to the loss of the subjunctive links, the labels for the as-built case using the 
subjunctive terminal links became smaller, although they are still the same component. The 
original 4 top CPIM link values are shown with black, dash-dotted lines, while the top 
components with nterm as 1 and 16 are shown in red, dotted and purple, dashed lines respectively 
in Figure 3.9. Those shown for the 16 case highlight the 3
rd
-6
th
 ranked CPIM valued links. This 
indicates that the subjunctive representation shows an averaging effect. For this reason, if one 
evacuation route is significantly more important than the others, a separate analysis ought to be 
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conducted using no subjunctive representation of the terminal node, as all results are strongly 
sensitive to this representation.   
Case Link Cut-set Link-set 
As-built  
(29,600 sec) 
66 0.997 1.07 
29 0.993 1.07 
65 0.995 1.06 
30 0.995 1.06 
17 0.98 1.04 
nterm 1 
(132,240 sec) 
5 0.904 0.936 
6 0.904 0.936 
18 0.901 0.927 
17 0.901 0.927 
13 0.889 0.924 
nterm 16 
(94,385 sec) 
18 0.896 0.933 
17 0.896 0.933 
13 0.885 0.921 
14 0.885 0.921 
1 0.858 0.893 
 
Table 3.7 Subjunctive exploration top 5 CPIMs. 
3.5  Conclusion 
A methodology has been developed to analyze realistic, bridge networks subject to earthquakes 
and deterioration. One identifies bridge classes using clustering on the most appropriate data for 
the particular application. Bridges are modeled using time-variant fragilities based on 
experimental and synthetic data using the MN2 method. Bridges are then located and distributed 
throughout the network based on data averages, providing an approximation for when the bridge 
locations are not known in particular. Component reliability analysis then obtains the link 
dependencies and reliabilities which are used by the S-RDA for the end system analysis. Using 
the disconnection probability and CPIMs, one can understand the overall system level of risk as 
well as which routes are most important based on network function.  
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This methodology was tested and validated using various bridge location configurations of a 
benchmark example based on the topology of the LA metropolitan area. From these 
comparisons, one concludes the FEM-type approximation used to calculate the inter-link 
correlations introduces tolerable error for the increase in efficiency it provides. One also finds 
that deterioration plays a pivotal role in determining the overall system risk, as it tends to 
increase even for different bridge location realizations. Additionally, the rankings of high-valued 
CPIM components also oscillate somewhat with increased deterioration. The effect of the 
dependence similarly affects the system level risk and cannot be neglected. Lastly, the 
subjunctive representation seems to present an “averaging” of effects of the different evacuation 
routes. This methodology presents a new paradigm particular for realistic, seismic, bridge, 
network reliability analysis which relies on analytical understanding of the network performance 
while also utilizing available data.  
64 
 
4. MULTI-SCALE SEISMIC RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF LARGE 
INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKS USING HIERARCHICAL 
STRUCTURES 
4.1 Background and motivation 
When evaluating various infrastructure network performance metrics, e.g., disconnection 
probability, one typically finds that the computational costs of analysis methods tend to grow 
exponentially. The selective-Recursive Decomposition Algorithm (S-RDA) has inherited this 
nature from the original RDA. Several have used multi-scale analysis to improve upon this. 
Some have taken advantage of the network topology. In Der Kiureghian and Song (2008), an 
electrical substation’s seismic reliability was evaluated in an expedient manner by using the LP 
bounds method with a “divide and conquer” approach where groups of components were 
represented with super-components; however, this approach relied principally on visual 
inspection. Gómez et al. (2013) used a hierarchical clustering paradigm where clusters were 
replaced with “super-nodes” that had assumed zero failure probabilities. While this represented a 
novel approach, the error inherited at each level of analysis resulted in non-negligible 
inaccuracy. Additionally, this approach did not allow for accurate modeling of correlations in the 
hierarchical structure; however, it did allow one to explore the hierarchical structure of the 
network. 
To draw upon this background information, Lim et al. (In print) presented a paradigm shift 
where the clusters were identified using hierarchical clustering, a classification approach which 
has the ability to identify clusters based on connectivity, the clusters were replaced using super-
links, which use accurately calculated component probabilities and correlations, and every 
hierarchical level was evaluated using the S-RDA. This work clearly indicated that using 
hierarchical clustering can greatly reduce the computational expense while not introducing much 
inaccuracy. This presents a significant advantage when using clustering for network 
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representations; however, spectral clustering is dependent on the number of clusters, k, which is 
generally somewhat nebulous. To select the number of clusters, a gap heuristic (Tibshirani et al. 
2001) was used. This approach requires one calculate the eigenvalues of the graph Laplacian. 
One then plots the differences between the eigenvalues and selects k to coincide with the largest 
gap at the smallest number of clusters; nevertheless, one finds that this approach works best for 
graphs that have obvious clusters. At its best, this heuristic tends to identify the maximum 
number of clusters on the lowest level of the hierarchy, but does not describe much of the 
hierarchical structure. In fact, the majority of the evaluated examples in this work used 
hierarchical structures that were created using visual inspection and information about the 
network connectivity from the Laplacian spectra, requiring a very active and informed approach 
from the user. 
To reduce some of the user requirements associated with identifying the hierarchical structure, a 
new approach is proposed. Noting that identifying the optimal hierarchical structure is an NP-
hard problem, a more heuristic approach is presented in this study. There are two objectives to 
consider during the hierarchical modeling process: increasing efficiency by use of super-
components, and understanding how the network is organized through identified clusters. Both 
of these are directly linked to the number of adjacent nodes, which are nodes on the edge of a 
cluster that connect the cluster to others, for each cluster. Since the hierarchical clustering 
approach is supposed to increase computational efficiency, this role will be given preference. 
Therefore, one must avoid a hierarchical structure that requires too many super-components. The 
number of super-components depends on several things: the number of nodes adjacent to other 
clusters and whether the source and/or terminal node is contained in the cluster or are an adjacent 
node themselves. 
With these past works in mind, several approaches to identify network hierarchical clustering 
structures are explored as follows. First, the mechanisms of obtaining a super-component 
representation are presented. Then, several algorithms for identifying hierarchical structure are 
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proposed. This methodology is then tested using several network examples and component 
models. Of particular interest is selecting the best approach for hierarchical structure 
identification. Lastly, conclusions are discussed about the relative algorithmic performances, 
limitations, network example component importance information, and the generated hierarchical 
structures. 
4.2 Super-component representation 
There are two parts in modeling networks hierarchically with super-components: clustering and 
super-component representation. A detailed summary of both can be found in Lim et al. (In 
print). The clustering process will first be described.  
 Hierarchical spectral clustering 4.2.1
When attempting to simplify a network, specifically to shrink the size so the S-RDA can be used, 
one first must consider what is meant by a “cluster.” For networks in general, it makes sense that 
a group of highly inter-connected components that have some sparse connections to other groups 
of components ought to be analyzed separately so that the overall computational costs are 
reduced. This “divide and conquer” approach can be automated using one of the various 
clustering algorithms available, e.g. k-means, agglomerative, hierarchical, and spectral 
algorithms. For the purposes of physical networks, since components that are near each other 
may not share a direct connection, connectivity rather than distance should be the prime-
motivation. Specifying such disconnected proximal components creates disconnected subgraphs 
that cannot by analyzed with the S-RDA. Since connectivity is the main objective, spectral 
clustering is the best choice. Other clustering techniques do not handle the effect of connectivity 
as well, due to them typically being oriented toward data analysis as opposed to networks. 
Spectral clustering, as summarized in Von Luxburg (2007), works by performing k-means style 
clustering on the first k eigenvectors of the graph Laplacian. A graph Laplacian is a modified 
form of the node-node adjacency matrix, A, which is defined by:  
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1   if  and  are connected
0                       otherwise
ijA
i j
 

 (4.1) 
The graph Laplacian L has two forms: the unnormalized form 
 
unL D A   (4.2) 
where D, the degree matrix, is a diagonal matrix of the row sums of the adjacency matrix, and 
the normalized or random-walk forms  
 
 
 
1/2 1/2
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norm
rw
L D D A D
L D D A
 

 
 
 (4.3) 
The eigenvalue solutions of both (4.2) and (4.3) actually solve relaxed optimizations of the 
objective functions called “ratio cut” (Ratiocut) and “normalized cut” (Ncut), respectively. These 
have similar formulations with an emphasis on minimizing the connections between clusters 
while maximizing the cluster density.   
First, Ratiocut defines the cluster density as the number of nodes within the cluster 
 
 
1
1
,
( ,..., )
i i
k
i
k
i
cut A A
Ratiocut A A
A
  (4.4) 
where , 1,...,iA i k  represents the different partitions or mutually exclusive sets of nodes in the 
subgraph being analyzed, ( , )iicut A A  is the sum of the weights on outgoing arcs from partition
iA , and the rest of the network outside of that set of nodes iA , iA is the number of nodes in iA , 
and k is the number of such sets of nodes. Note that the weights of arcs in an unweighted graph 
are modelled as a constant, e.g., 1. Second, Ncut, which is the objective function used by the 
normalized Laplacians, defines the density as the number of directed arcs, ( )ivol A ,  
  
1
)( , ,i i
k
i
i
vol A cut A G A G

   (4.5) 
where G is the complete graph represented by N nodes and M unidirectional arcs. Therefore, 
Ncut can be posed as  
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By minimizing the inverse of cluster density, both forms of spectral clustering avoid the typical 
singleton clustering pitfall associated with mincut, an algorithm often used to bifurcate networks, 
which may select a clustering where many clusters only have one component; however, since 
spectral clustering operates using the k-means on a matrix of the first k eigenvectors with largest 
eigenvalues of (4.2) or (4.3), determining the parameter k becomes difficult. If all obvious 
clusters are identified at the first scale, the represented network size may not be enough to 
facilitate the use of the S-RDA. Ultimately, if the optimal clustering is found at a given stage, 
some of the clusters may exhibit clear subclusters. A clear solution for these cases is that another 
level of clustering ought to occur; therefore, a hierarchical approach ought to be used, since it 
will reduce the computational costs further beyond what a single scale of clusters would. Such a 
multi-scale approach helps further by replacing the clusters on the lowest scale with super-
components. These super-components and other adjacent components then form the network 
used for the higher-scale clusters. Then super-super-components, super-super-super-components, 
etc. may be similarly used and created. The exact creation of these is described as follows.  
 Super-component modelling 4.2.2
There are two deliverables in the super-component modeling: (1) the reliability and topology of 
the super-links and (2) the dependence between these super-links and between these super-links 
and other components in the network. When placing the super-components, one must consider 
how the cluster is represented. What principally drives this process are adjacent nodes. There are 
two types of clusters for this analysis: (1) the cluster contains neither source node or terminal 
node or (2) the cluster contains at least the source or terminal node, which will be referred to as 
“special node(s)”. Lim et al. (In print) provides a good summary of the relevant background for 
these concepts. 
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4.2.2.1 Reliabilities for cluster containing no special node 
If one were to enter the cluster using one adjacent node and exit through another, there must be a 
super-link attaching each adjacent node. Super-link will be the term used to describe the super-
components from now on for that reason. For such clusters, this results in (  1 / 2adj adjn n  ) bi-
directional super-links, where
adjn denotes the number of adjacent nodes. To evaluate the 
reliability of each super-link, the cluster should be analyzed using the S-RDA to obtain the 
disconnection probability between the two adjacent nodes incident to the super-link. During the 
analysis, all other adjacent nodes and links connected to them ought to be removed, otherwise 
the super-link reliability may be overestimated. Since the source and terminal nodes are 
interchangeable in this analysis, the reliabilities for both directions of the super-link are the same. 
There is a special case for this type of cluster. If 1adjn  , two alternatives are possible for 
analysis: the corresponding subgraph is neglected and only the adjacent node is used, or a loop 
super-link and the adjacent node is used. This loop super-link only requires one direction; 
however, since such an attached subgraph may be large, all analyses will neglect such subgraphs. 
This is justified especially for networks with nodes that cannot fail.  
4.2.2.2 Reliabilities for cluster contains special node(s) 
For such clusters containing the source or terminal node, the source or terminal node must be 
connected to all adjacent nodes, or adjn bidirectional super-links. If the source or terminal node is 
an adjacent node, then only  1adjn   bidirectional super-links are required. To calculate the 
reliability of the super-link, one needs to use the S-RDA on the cluster to determine the 
disconnection probability of the source or terminal node and the adjacent node connected by the 
super-link.  
For the special case where the cluster contains both source and terminal node, both source and 
terminal node must connect to all adjacent nodes. Additionally, the source and terminal nodes 
must be connected to each other. This requires 2 1adjn  bidirectional super-links. Should either 
source or terminal node be an adjacent node, this expression shrinks to  1 2 1adj adj adjn n n    . 
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If both are adjacent nodes, this expression further shrinks to    1 2 2 3adj adj adjn n n     . To 
calculate the reliability of these super-links, one must omit certain nodes differently than the 
earlier case. For the super-link connecting the source and terminal nodes, all other adjacent nodes 
must be removed from the cluster to calculate the disconnection probability. For the other super-
links connecting the terminal or source node to an adjacent node, the source or terminal node 
must be removed before the S-RDA is performed. Since the procedure for obtaining the topology 
and reliability of the super-links is clear, and the major link-sets and cut-sets have been identified 
based on their biggest contributions to the failure probability for each super-link, the statistical 
dependence between super-link can now be obtained.  
4.2.2.3 Super-link correlations 
There are two kinds of statistical dependence that must be evaluated when new super-links are 
identified for the network: the correlation between new super-link failures, and the correlation 
between new super-link failures and original component failures. This approach is similar to the 
link reliability analysis discussed in Section 3.2.3. Using mZ to describe the standard Gaussian 
representation of the super-link or original component probability, the failure event mE can be 
defined by m mZ   , where m is the generalized reliability index of mE , i.e.  
1
m mP E
    
, where ( )  represents the standard Gaussian CDF. By either the earlier analysis in Section 3.4 
for the original components or the S-RDA as described earlier in Sections 4.2.2.1 and 4.2.2.1 for 
the super-links,  mP E can be found. Using the probabilities of the disjoint cut-sets from the S-
RDA for the super-links, one can construct the correlations. The probability of such a set,
iC , can 
be found using 
  ( ) ,
i
Ci
C
m
nmi m
S
P C P Z 

 
     
 



R  (4.7) 
where
iC
S is the index set of the components that belong to
iC , iCn is the total number of 
component indices in
iC
S , ( )
Ci
n  is the multivariate CDF having iCn standard Gaussian variables 
with correlations in R , the correlation coefficient matrix for the  ,mZZ iCm S , which 
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describes the component’s statistical dependence, and   is the reliability index vector for the 
components in 
iC
S . One can compute ( )
Ci
n   by the use of an efficient multivariate Gaussian 
algorithm, e.g. the algorithm by Genz (1992), the sequential compounding method (Kang and 
Song 2010), and the matrix-based system reliability method (Kang et al. 2012). This study uses 
the algorithm by Genz, which utilizes pseudorandom sampling. To utilize (4.7), one must also 
account for the correlation pairs that involve super-links.  
To find such correlations coefficients for mZ  and ( )nZ m n , mn , one must note that (3.9) 
requires their joint failure probability,    m n m m n nP E E P Z Z      . For the case where
mE and nE  represent a super-link and original component failures respectively, using the disjoint 
cut-sets identified from the associated S-RDA super-link analysis, one formulates the joint 
failure probability as 
  
11
( )
m m
C C
m m
n n
E E
m n i n i n
ii
P E E P C E P C E

   
    
   
  (4.8) 
where m
E
iC is the i-th disjoint cut-set that occurs with the failure of the m-th super-link, i.e. the 
associated subgraph disconnection identified using the S-RDA, for 1,...,
m
Ci n . Note the 
similarity to (3.18). A summation suffices in (4.8) due to the mutually exclusive nature of the 
disjoint cut-sets, m
E
iC . If both failure events describe super-link failures, (4.8) changes to 
  
1 11 1
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m n m n
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m n m n
n n n n
E E E E
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i ji j
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  (4.9) 
Using either (4.8) or (4.9) and the associated component reliabilities, (3.9) can be used to obtain
mn .  
Before describing any results of this analysis, it should be noted that the number of associated 
cut-sets in (4.8) and (4.9) may become large due to the nature of the S-RDA convergence; 
however, the study in Lim et al. (In print) found that a partial set of the disjoint cut-sets or link-
sets allows for reasonable accuracy for calculating mn . This is a result of the noncritical sets 
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having small ( )m nP E E  and ( ) ( )m n      in (3.9), leading to negligible contribution in the 
correlation calculation. 
4.3 Automated hierarchical structure identification 
To optimally improve the S-RDA, one must consider what most affects the computational time-
cost of this algorithm. The S-RDA exhibits an exponential increase of time-cost with network 
size, which can be thought of as the sum of the number of nodes, 𝑁, and the number of 
unidirectional links, 𝑀, or twice the number of bidirectional links, which was described as 𝑁𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑘 
in Chapter 3. Since both directions will most likely not participate in the network similarly, this 
distinction between directions is especially important. While special topologies may make the S-
RDA perform quickly even for large network sizes, general networks may not present such 
advantages for the S-RDA, especially if many source and terminal pairs are to be analyzed. To 
handle general networks, these networks must be divided into subgraphs for efficient S-RDA. 
Identifying hierarchical structures then becomes essential. Furthermore, this process must be 
automated to remove subjectivity from the structure identification. For these reasons, the 
proposed Automated Hierarchical Structure Identification Algorithms (AHSIAs) will be tested 
on several network topologies common to civil infrastructure. It must be stressed that the 
automation is essential, due to the complex nature of such hierarchical structures. This 
automation quality is also the major benefit of this study when compared to past studies. There 
are many ways such AHSIAs can be posed, as will be discussed soon. There are several terms 
that must be clarified first.  
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Figure 4.1 Network representations: (a) Original network. (b) Original subgraph (c) Lower-scale represented 
subgraph (d) Upper-scale represented subgraph.  
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Before these AHSIAs may be discussed, the idea of subgraph representation must be clarified. 
See Figure 4.1 for a graphical description of this. For a given network, as shown in Figure 4.1 
(a), the original subgraph of Figure 4.1 (b) is considered. Unless the cluster is a leaf cluster of the 
clustering tree, there are three levels of subgraph: (1) the so-called “original subgraph” shown in 
Figure 4.1 (b), which consists strictly of the original components, (2) the so-called “lower-scale 
represented subgraph” shown in Figure 4.1 (c), which consists of the combination of the 
represented subgraphs in the cluster of interest using super-links, adjacent nodes, and special 
nodes with the adjacent links between said subgraphs, and (3) the so-called “higher-scale 
represented subgraph” shown in Figure 4.1 (d), which consists of the represented cluster using 
super-super-links, adjacent nodes, and special nodes. The term subgraph is appropriate, because 
all clustering analyses are performed on subdivisions of the network once the AHSIA are used. 
 “Ignorant”-automated hierarchical structure identification algorithm 4.3.1
Since one must control the size of the subgraph being analyzed by the S-RDA, the first AHSIA 
only accounts for the size of the lower-scale represented subgraph while operating, making it 
“ignorant” of further clustering information; therefore, it will be called the Ignorant-AHSIA (I-
AHSIA). If original components in the subgraph are less than a network size that would allow 
for efficient S-RDA analysis, e.g. 30, there is no need to perform further clustering on that 
subgraph; however, if the number is larger, further clustering ought to shrink the size of the 
represented network. Since, if some of the clusters have very few represented components, few 
link-sets and cut-sets may be needed in higher-scale analyses, which results in the convergence 
being stepped and coarse, one might want to have balanced represented subgraph sizes so that 
they are neither too small nor too large.  Sometimes this causes errors in some of the additional 
analysis outputs, such as component CPIMs with link-set and cut-set values that either cannot 
agree within a few percent or component CPIM cut-set-based values that are larger than 
component CPIM link-set-based values. In general, the CPIM cut-set-based values are lower 
than the CPIM link-set-based values. If one assumes that the relationship between k and the size 
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of the lower-scale represented subgraph is convex exhibiting global minimum behavior and 
wants to use the earlier stated condition, then one ought to find the k*, which indicates the 
optimal k, where k* and k*+1 correspond to lower-scale represented subgraphs that are just less 
than and just greater than threshold num. The identified hierarchical structure does not need to 
have even divisions on stages, making it possible for each branch of the clustering tree, i.e. 
dendogram (Hastie et al. 2009), to be different lengths. Section 4.4 shows examples of such 
dendograms. The formulation of I-AHSIA also makes it possible for there to be any k at each 
division in the hierarchical structure, as opposed to fixing it at some number, i.e. 2. The 
algorithm can then be formalized with stage counter t as 
1) Initialize 0t  . Find  
* 1
* * *
1
 s.t. 
tk
i i
k N M


  is the first k found with 
 
1
* *
1
tk
i i
N M num


   and k+1 with  
1
* *
1
tk
i i
N M num


  for 2,3,...,10k  . 
 
1
* *
t
i
N M

 is the sum of nodes and uni-directional links for the lower-scale represented 
subgraph i on the k-th clustering at substage 1 1t   .  It is suggested that 30num  . 
2) Further branching: 1t t  . Find  
* 1
* * *
1
 s.t. 
tk
i i
k N M


   is the first k found with 
 
1
* *
1
tk
i i
N M num


   and k+1 with  
1
* *
1
tk
i i
N M num


  for max2,3,...,k k , where
max min(12, 2)
t
parentk N . 
t
parentN is the number of node type components in the entire 
subgraph. 
3) Convergence: Check if  
1
* * *,   1, 2,...,
t
i
N M num i k

    for all branches under 
consideration. If this is the case for one of the branches, it is no longer active. Otherwise, go 
back to Step 2 for the branch that doesn’t satisfy the criteria. 
It should be noted that, due to the nature of the clustering used in this analysis, it may not be 
possible to get smaller than num. For these cases, one of two heuristics ought to be used in Step 
2: (a) find   1* * * * max1 s.t. argmin ,   2,3,...,
tk
k i i
k k N M k k


   , where maxk is the same as for 
Step 2, the “minimum” heuristic, and (b) 2k  , the “bifurcation” heuristic. 
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Clearly, I-AHSIA (a) and (b) have some issues, particularly the heavy reliance on num. If the 
subgraph that is analyzed has a large number of adjacent nodes, or if the division by clustering of 
the subgraph has a large number of adjacent nodes, the represented subgraph may actually 
require more super-links than there were original components in the unrepresented network. 
Neither of the proposed algorithms handle this issue directly. These issues manifest in densely 
connected networks, e.g. regular graphs, scale-free graphs, etc. Since some networks may have 
clusters that have a large number of densely connected components, this causes the I-ASHIAs to 
suggest improper networks. For these reasons, the original algorithm had to use the 
aforementioned two heuristics and ought to be improved upon.  
 “Relative ignorant”- automated hierarchical structure identification algorithm 4.3.2
To eliminate this dependence on such a threshold, a relative selection algorithm, Relative 
Ignorant-AHSIA (RI-AHSIA), is proposed. Since this algorithm focuses on selecting the 
smallest of the k-cluster represented networks and the original network, it automatically selects 
the optimal clustering based on network size. Since the optimization is a function of the lower-
scale represented subgraph, this minimization biases the algorithm toward smaller numbers of 
clusters. 
Another issue that occurs when identifying hierarchical structures is that the number of super-
links in these subgraphs must not become too large on any scale, as they become the components 
of a subgraph S-RDA. To avoid the case with similar number of components for the lower-scale 
represented subgraph and original subgraph, another constraint must be used. There are two 
ways to consider such a network size reduction constraint: (1) the difference between the 
represented and original cluster networks, and (2) the difference between the upper-scale 
represented subgraph and the lower-scale represented subgraph. The more important issue is the 
first comparison. While there may be few cases where the upper-scale represented subgraph size 
is more than the lower-scale represented subgraph size, this is unlikely, since there must be more 
adjacent nodes on the lower-scale represented subgraph size than on the higher-scale. 
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Additionally, the upper-scale represented subgraphs are minimized first using a hierarchical 
approach. For these reasons, only the original and lower-scale represented subgraphs will be 
guaranteed to be different enough from one another, e.g. a difference of at least 10 components.  
Since this algorithm tends to continue arbitrarily, sometimes until all singleton clusters are 
found, explicit termination criteria are needed. When such small and numerous clusters are 
found, too much computational effort is required to analyze every stage of every branch of the 
dendogram. The first branch termination criterion halts clustering of the current branch when the 
number of components, i.e. N M , is less than a target threshold. From extensive study with 
network examples, this threshold ought to be 30 to achieve reasonably large original subgraphs 
for the leaf clusters. To handle the case where the subgraph is irreducible based on the number of 
original components and difference constraints, the relative optimization done at each step will 
indicate if no further clustering is required by selecting the original subgraph, i.e. k = 1.  If the 
original subgraph has less components than all of the other k = 2,…,kmax lower-scale represented 
subgraphs that meet the difference requirement, then the branch clustering stops. This represents 
the relative termination criterion. Note that there are cases where the relative termination 
criterion is active, cases where the threshold criterion is active, or cases where both are active. 
This allows the proposed methodology to handle any type of network and will divide the 
network into densely intra-connected subgraphs that are sparsely inter-connected. 
To formalize the “relative ignorant” automated hierarchal structure identification algorithm (RI-
AHSIA), a step-by-step description is written below. This algorithm operates using 2 selection 
constraints and 2 termination criteria: the relative minimum selection constraint, the difference 
selection constraint, the relative termination criterion, and the threshold termination criterion. 
1) Initialize: 0t  . Find   1* * * * max1 s.t. argmin  for 1,2,...,
tk
k i i
k k N M k k


   . 
 
1
* *
t
i
N M

 is the sum of nodes and uni-directional links for the lower-scale represented 
subgraph i on the k-th clustering at substage 1 1t   , and max 5k  . This maxk value was found 
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via parametric study. Due to the nature of the minimization, the first division is typically 2 or 
3. Additionally, the selection constraints need not be checked. 
2) Further branching: 1t t  . Find   1* * * * max1 s.t. argmin ,   1,2,...,
tk
k i i
k k N M k k


   , 
where 
max min(12, 2)
t
parentk N . 
t
parentN  is the number of nodes in the cluster network. There 
are two cases for the selection constraints 
a) For 1,...,3k  : Ignore difference selection constraint, observe minimum selection 
constraint. 
b) For 3k  : Observe difference selection constraint, 10diff  , and minimum selection 
constraint. 
3) Convergence: Check threshold and relative termination criteria for all branches under 
consideration. If at least one of Step 3a or Step 3b is satisfied, the branch is no longer active. 
If neither is satisfied, go back to Step 2. 
a) Non-reducible branch: The current branch’s relative minimum is the original cluster 
network, N M  (relative termination criterion). 
b) Reducible branch: The current branch’s original cluster network, threshN M   , where 
30 50thresh    (threshold termination criterion). 
Note that there is a relaxation of the difference selection constraint used for the first three 
division options, i.e. no clustering, two clusters or three clusters. This is for the special case 
where optimal clustering may occur at a lower-scale branch division if a case without best 
benefit is used at a higher-scale branch division, while also handling the case of no clustering, 
which has a difference of zero. Since this may happen at a lower-scale branch division, a pruning 
process is used to eliminate such divisions by detecting if the difference constraint has been 
violated within but not including three dendogram links of the leaves. Since the length of 
branches cannot be known a priori, this pruning process is essential. 
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  “Normalized cut-based”- automated hierarchical structure identification algorithm 4.3.3
Since the RI-ASHIA does not use any direct information about clustering, another AHSIA 
utilizing clustering objective function minimization is proposed. Due to the RI-ASHIA being 
developed for making network analysis more expedient, it may not be as accurate for grouping 
components. Since the RI-ASHIA does not use any direct network objective function 
information, its heuristic nature may not perform as well. A new AHSIA operates by minimizing 
the Ncut (4.6) objective function. Both Ncut and Ratiocut objective functions are solved using an 
eigenvalue solution in spectral clustering; however, they do not indicate directly which choice of 
clustering for subgraph is appropriate. Due to this issue, the minimum Ncut value selects the 
optimal clustering per subgraph. Ncut is favored over Ratiocut due to its compatibility with the 
normalized spectral clustering algorithm currently used for RI-AHSIA and the fact that it 
normalizes by connectivity, not just the number of the nodes in the cluster. Both objective 
functions prefer smaller numbers of partitions and show average monotonic increasing behavior 
with increasing number of partitions, k.  
This algorithm currently cannot terminate without using some further network information. To 
handle termination, several other clustering objective functions were investigated, such as 
modularity, infomap, and several others (Laarhoven and Marchiori 2013). Based on parametric 
study, modularity was best able to identify the correct number of clusters for various cluster 
topologies.  
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  
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  (4.9) 
where )( iw A is the sum of the weights on intracluster unidirectional arcs. The optimal number of 
clusters k is found by  1argmin modularity( ,..., )k kA A . This is used as the modularity cluster 
number termination criterion. Using the earlier suggestion and this termination criterion, the 
“Ncut-based-AHSIA (N-AHSIA) can be formally stated. 
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1) Initialize: t = 0. Find *
1 1
* 1 s.t. arg min ( ,..., ) ,  1,2,...,10
k t
k i k
k k Ncut A A k

  
  . 10 was 
selected based on parametric study and 1
1( ,..., )tkA A

 represents the k-th clustering at substage 
1 1t   .  Find max * 11 s.t. arg min modularity( ,..., )
k
i kk
k k A A

 
   for the termination 
criterion. 
2) Further dividing: 1t t  . Find    * * * s.t. arg max  current s s ss s k s   , where s is the set 
of current leaf clusters and s  is the difference between the lower-scale represented 
subgraph and original subgraph is largest for a current leaf cluster s. Find each  
1
* * 1
max1
 s.t. arg min ( ,..., ) ,  1,2,...,
k t
s s k si k
k k Ncut A A k k

  
  , where 1
1( ,..., )tk sA A
  represents 
the k-th clustering for current leaf cluster s at substage 1 1t   , 
max min(6, 2)
t
parentk N  and 
t
parentN is the number of nodes in the cluster network. Current leaf clusters refers to all leaf 
clusters if global divisions are being used. Otherwise, it refers to only those leaf clusters on 
the highest level of the dendogram. 
3) Convergence: Check to see if the number of leaf clusters is the same as maxk . If the number is 
the same, the algorithm has finished. 
The other formulation of this algorithm which uses the Ratiocut objective function, the “R”-
AHSIA, were found to be too error-prone. This was most likely caused by the lower reliance on 
connectivity information in (4.4). Note that there is an inherent difference between the N-AHSIA 
and RI-AHSIA. While RI-AHSIA explores each branch at a time until convergence criteria are 
satisfied, N-AHSIA has a global criterion for number of leaf clusters. Also, since the divisions 
for each possible clustering dendogram expansion are based on minimization, further 
information is required to select one over another. In this case, the cluster with the maximum 
difference between the lower-scale represented subgraphs and the original components is 
deemed optimal among the choices. This approach is the so-called “global” version, N-AHSIA 
(a); however, due to the nature of possible error propagation throughout the levels due to the 
pseudorandom nature of the results with increasing network size, it is typically better to use 
hierarchical structures with less depth. To artificially require that the clustering dendogram is 
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less deep, only the earliest level expansion choices are considered until all divisions on that level 
have been selected. This form is the so-called “stage-wise” version, N-AHSIA (b). 
Algorithm Convergence Forced clustering Parameters Depth 
I-AHSIA 
Bi Branch-wise Yes 1 Deep 
Min Branch-wise Yes 1 Deep 
RI-AHSIA Branch-wise No 2 Moderate 
N-AHSIA 
Stage Global Yes 1 Shallow 
Global Global Yes 1 Shallow 
 
Table 4.1 AHSIA qualitative descriptions. 
From the above discussion, five AHSIA have been proposed: the I-AHSIA with minimum 
heuristic, the I-AHSIA with bifurcation heuristic, the RI-AHSIA, the global N-AHSIA, and the 
stage-wise N-AHSIA. See Table 4.1 for a summary of these. Only the RI-AHSIA has constraints 
and convergence criteria that guarantee clustering will not be forced if the number of original 
components are not below a threshold value; however, the N-AHSIAs typically do not develop 
enough depth for such forcing to occur. The RI-AHSIA is also the only algorithm which requires 
2 parameters and developed moderate depth dendograms. The ignorant algorithms exhibit 
branch-wise convergence while the objective function based algorithms exhibit global 
convergence. These algorithms do not behave the same. Some may perform for different 
applications better. The objective function-based optimizations were developed more for 
analyzing the grouping structure of components in the network, while the ignorant algorithms 
were developed more for expanding the use of and reducing the computational complexity of the 
S-RDA. To investigate these ideas, these AHSIA will be applied to networks with different 
topologies and characteristics. These networks ought to exhibit the characteristics of civil 
infrastructure, e.g. bridge networks, pipeline networks, transmission networks, etc.  
4.4 Network examples 
To investigate characteristics of network civil infrastructure, one must identify which types of 
topologies are relevant. In road networks, one may see grid structures in cities. If one 
investigates a lower resolution only accounting for major roadways, the structure may contain 
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densely intra-connected clusters with few inter-connected links. This same type may also occur 
with pipeline structures, since many service nodes may be located inside a city with few 
connections between cities. It is widely understood that the electric transmission networks 
exhibit radial, e.g. “star-like”, topologies (Dueñas-Osorio and Rojo 2011). To investigate the 
usefulness of the proposed AHSIAs for a variety of network topologies, each algorithm will be 
tested on a regular pipeline network, radial pipeline network, large-scale pipeline network, 
United States (US)-inspired pipeline network, and Los Angeles metropolitan area (LA)-inspired 
bridge network. These examples used pipeline models from Lim and Song (2012) or bridge 
models from Chapter 3. The AHSIA results will then be compared with a crude-MCS baseline 
estimate. For each example, the RI-AHSIA cluster dendograms will also be presented.  
It should be noted that network examples with disconnection probabilities around 50% will be 
mostly reviewed, since lower probability examples will be cumbersome for crude-MCS and may 
cause scaling issues with the multi-scale S-RDA analyses using the AHSIA. Note that such a 
choice will not affect the conclusions from this study. For the purposes of this study, there are 
two parameters used for such cluster analyses: cluster correlation tolerance, corrtol , and bounds 
convergence tolerance, boundstol . The latter criterion has significantly more effect as it dictates 
when the bounds are close enough for each cluster to create the reliabilities of super-links. These 
have a first-order effect on the network disconnection probability. It was found from parametric 
study that   
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where 
UB
fP  is the current upper bound estimate of the disconnection probability. This function is 
piecewise linear to help scale for the lower probability errors on super-links. corrtol  defines the 
terms that are used in (4.8) and (4.9) to find super-link-super-link and super-link-original 
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components correlations by only using those terms which occur when the bounds are wider than
corrtol . These correlations have more of a second order effect on the network disconnection 
probability, so corrtol is significantly more coarse: 
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Such coarseness also has a pragmatic reason. This correlation calculation becomes much more 
expensive as more terms are used. This expense is exponential in nature when using smaller 
values than 0.30.  
Note that in the following examples, the very high probability end is avoided, because typically 
that indicates many components are failing the majority of the time for networks having sizable 
redundancy. Such civil infrastructure networks very unlikely for a network that has been 
designed by field engineers. Since this study is more focused on testing the analysis 
methodology for a range of topologies and component models with particular interest in 
performance on large network sizes, probabilities in the moderate to high range, e.g. 20%-80%, 
will be investigated. These events correspond to rare but highly damaging seismic events. This 
thesis assumes that those managing the network are more concerned with rare, destructive events 
than the more common, less destructive events. Using higher overall disconnection probabilities 
will seem to indicate better performance for crude-MCS when compared to the S-RDA with an 
AHSIA, but the proposed analysis provides more data and is less sensitive to lower-scales of 
probability for most topologies. These examples all used a computer with 7.76 GB usable RAM 
on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4700MQ @ 2.40GHz. The quoted times correspond to how many 
seconds the process required to execute on the aforementioned computer. 
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 Regular network 4.4.1
Often in physical networks, one finds that links are placed between nodes based on which are 
nearest. Such a graph is called “nearest-neighbors.” For an example of this kind of network, the 
graph will be constructed with “cells,” or a repeated pattern of four nodes, that are square. In 
terms of methodology in this thesis, this graph is called a regular network. Since such a graph 
does not exhibit identifiable clusters and also has many adjacent nodes, analyzing this kind of 
network presents some notable outcomes. In fact, among the many topologies that are found for 
civil infrastructure networks, the regular network presents a worst-case scenario for obtaining the 
disconnection probability using the S-RDA with an AHSIA. See Figure 4.2 for the network of 
interest. As marked, the source and terminal nodes are labelled 1 and 25 respectively.  
 
Figure 4.2 Regular network configuration.  
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There are 25 nodes and 40 bi-directional links, making the network size 105 components. Since 
the scale of these networks has a large impact on how the component models perform, the 
average length and distance will be given in this chapter. For the regular network, the average 
length of links is 4.00 km while the average distance to the epicenter is 7.18 km. The seismic 
event is characterized by an epicenter marked with a star and a moment magnitude of 6.0. The 
top RI-AHSIA CPIM value ranked components are shown and annotated in brown. This network 
also used only the first node definition for the node-type pipeline components from Lim and 
Song (2012). 
Figure 4.3 Regular network RI-AHSIA hierarchical structure. 
The dendogram generated by the RI-AHSIA is shown in Figure 4.3. Note that this representation 
of hierarchical structure contained in this thesis lists the number of original components at the 
leaf nodes and in the top box at each division node. In the bottom box at each division node, the 
size for each of the higher-scale represented sub-subnetworks, which correspond to each branch 
below, are shown added together with the last number being the number of uni-directional 
adjacent links connecting these sub-subnetworks. Adding these together, one gets the size of the 
16+13+16 = 45
13 + 16 + 8 = 37
105
55
34
29 18
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lower-scale subnetwork, which is shown on the right side. The corresponding original 
components that are contained in the subnetworks are shown to the right of these division nodes 
for reference. For the regular network, which has no clear hierarchical representation, no AHSIA 
selects an intuitive structure. The component models required 163.6 sec to compile. Due to the 
difficulty of this kind of topology, the parameter 0.3 in (4.11) was replaced with 0.1.  
Using all seven of the previously mentioned AHSIAs, Table 4.2 was obtained. In this thesis, two 
different bound values will be reported. Typically, bound values will be reported once the S-
RDA lower bounds and upper bounds converges within 5% and 1%. Only one duration will be 
provided because the closest bounds require the most time. Sometimes, there may be 
convergence issues, which stem from the component models being applied to an inappropriate 
scale or hierarchical structure, that may prevent the multi-scale S-RDA from obtaining the 1% 
and/or the 5% bounds. For these cases, “closest” bounds will be used. Crude-MCS obtained 
39.7% with 5% c.o.v. in 9.49 sec. From the merit of the probability comparison with crude-MCS, 
the majority of the algorithms perform rather well. As for time concerns, the RI-AHSIA 
performs fastest for the accurate algorithms. On the other hand, the N-AHSIA algorithms are 
fastest but have worst accuracy.  
Algorithm 
(MCS: 39.7%, 5% c.o.v) 
Closest % bounds 5% bounds 
Time (sec) 
LB UB LB UB 
I-AHSIA 
Bi 38.0 39.9 35.0 40.0 1,871 
Min 37.9 40.0 35.1 40.1 1,837 
RI-AHSIA 37.7 40.1 35.1 40.1 1,795 
N-AHSIA 
Stage 56.4 57.4 52.6 57.6 226 
Global 56.4 57.4 52.6 57.6 240 
 
Table 4.2 Regular network AHSIA comparison. 
As for the component importance, the RI-AHSIA component CPIMs required 5,219 sec to obtain 
link-set and cut-set values that had a median separation of 1%. Due to the grid nature of this 
network, there were a large number of link-sets and cut-sets for the highest-scale network 
representation, resulting in such long times to compile the CPIMs. Table 4.3 shows the top 
ranked components by CPIM value. Please review Figure 4.2 for their network locations, which 
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are shown with thicker links. The top four, ninth and tenth most important components were 
located on the intercluster links at the highest level of the hierarchy in Figure 4.3, while the other 
four most important CPIMs were on the lower-scale intercluster links. All of these top ten 
components were links close to the epicenter. 
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
57 62.8 64.0 
56 62.8 64.0 
64 62.7 64.2 
65 62.7 64.2 
75 56.9 57.5 
74 56.9 57.6 
84 55.9 56.9 
85 55.8 56.9 
73 55.6 56.6 
72 55.5 56.6 
 
Table 4.3 Regular network top 10 CPIMs.   
 Radial network 4.4.2
Since many networks, particularly electric transmission line networks, exhibit “star-like” 
topologies, the S-RDA with AHSIAs must be evaluated with them. Since the main hub that 
connects to many distribution nodes is just the central node of a star, these networks are the 
special case in which many of the clusters can be represented by a single adjacent node. Since 
the leaf clusters require simple, single node representation, one would expect that each AHSIA 
should perform rather well. See Figure 4.4 for an example radial network. Note that this network 
is simplified by using clusters that have varying numbers of nodes distributed around central 
nodes with a given radius. The central nodes of these clusters are connected to one another. Most 
of such distribution networks typically have additional branching for intracluster links, but, for 
the S-RDA, such branches would only be relevant if the source and terminal nodes are on that 
branch. To introduce an additional level of complexity, both node definitions from Lim and Song 
(2012) were randomly assigned. The source and terminal nodes where placed at 8 and 91 
respectively such that this pair was furthest from one another. There are 182 nodes and 192 bi-
directional links making the network size 566. The average length of links is 2.04 km while the 
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average distance to the epicenter is 6.12 km. The top RI-AHSIA CPIM value ranked components 
are shown and annotated in brown. The seismic event is characterized by an epicenter marked 
with a star and a moment magnitude of 6.0. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Radial network configuration.  
The component models required 3,688 sec to compile. It required 31.2 sec to get the crude-MCS 
estimate of 49.6% at 5% c.o.v. Reviewing the results for each AHSIA in Table 4.4, only 4 of the 
AHSIA were able to obtain top scale S-RDA bounds closer than 5%. At times, even after all the 
cut-sets and link-sets have been found, the algorithms could not close within 1%. This typically 
comes from errors in the component reliabilities or covariances and can be a factor in uni-scale 
or multi-scale S-RDA. With respect to probability, all of the methods seem to contain the crude-
91 
8 
553, 554 
565,566 
537, 538 
                 
89 
 
MCS prediction at 5% bounds. The N-AHSIAs results are left unreported because the algorithms 
could not converge within 5% bounds. 
Algorithm 
(MCS: 49.6%, 5% c.o.v.) 
Closest % bounds 5% bounds 
Time (sec) 
LB UB LB UB 
I-AHSIA 
Bi 51.2 52.2 47.3 52.3 71 
Min 51.1 52.1 47.3 52.2 70 
RI-AHSIA 47.1 51.6 46.6 51.6 83 
R-AHSIA Global 47.4 51.7 46.7 51.7 84 
 
Table 4.4 Radial network AHSIA comparison. 
Interestingly enough, the R-AHSIA global approach, which is similar to the N-AHSIA global 
approach except that it uses the Ratiocut objective function, provides results similar to the RI-
AHSIA within 1% bounds. The R-AHSIA rarely results in useful results, but, since neither of 
these two methods were able to converge within 1% bounds, these results are not particularly 
strong for support of these algorithms. Note that the R-AHSIA stage-wise approach does not able 
converge within 5%, indicating further major dependence on whether a stage-wise or global 
selection approach is used. Since the upper bounds have stabilized, the N-AHSIAs and RI-
AHSIAs seem to be the closest; however, the I-AHSIAs close within 1% and require the least 
time by 10 seconds. It should be noted that the only algorithm which identified each one of the 
10 star clusters without dividing a spoke off of an individual star or leaving two or more star 
clusters as a leaf cluster was the RI-AHSIA. The corresponding hierarchical structure is shown in 
Figure 4.5. Interestingly enough, the negative influence of not identifying the leaf clusters as all 
individual stars does not seem to have significant impact on the results for the other AHSIAs. It 
does not seem that there is an obvious best method for this example. The RI-AHSIA component 
CPIMs in this analysis required 4,200 sec. The top 10 of these have been compiled in Table 4.5 
and are shown in Figure 4.4. Despite including every link-set and cut-set, some of the link-set 
values are lower than some of the cut-set values. This is probably related to the component 
models; nevertheless, the top 8 CPIM value ranked components correspond to the uni-directional 
links that correspond to the 4 highest level intercluster links. Note the large drop in CPIM value 
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for the 9
th
 and 10
th
 ranked components. These components are on one of the next lower-scale 
intercluster links. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Radial network hierarchical structure. 
 
 
 
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
539 91.0 89.2 
540 91.0 89.2 
563 87.3 86.0 
564 87.2 86.0 
538 83.9 84.0 
537 83.9 84.0 
565 80.0 80.0 
566 79.7 90.0 
554 51.2 50.4 
553 51.0 50.4 
 
Table 4.5 Radial network top 10 CPIMs. 
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 Large network 4.4.3
An important question that arises with many network analysis methodologies is to what size they 
may be accurately applied. To investigate such a situation, a network was constructed by using 
clusters which were either radial or rectangular grid types. Several of these clusters were inter-
connected more densely than others, creating clusters of clusters. Using three such clusters of 
clusters, a cluster of clusters of clusters was developed. This multi-scale cluster was then rotated 
around a center point to create a network of three such multi-scale clusters. One can see a clear 
hierarchy in such a network. See Figure 4.6 for a description of this network. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Large network configuration. 
The source and terminal nodes where placed at 169 and 40 respectively such that this pair had 
little effect on the clustering. There are 306 nodes and 579 bidirectional links making the 
40 
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network size 1460. The average length of links is 0.921 km while the average distance to the 
epicenter is 15.9 km. The seismic event is characterized by an epicenter marked with a star and a 
moment magnitude of 6.5. The top RI-AHSIA CPIM value ranked components are shown and 
annotated in orange. The component models required 33,583 sec to compile. Note that this is a 
rather large investment of time to compile the component models. Since most of this time is 
related to obtaining the link correlations, one may obtain faster component models compiling 
times by considering previously considered correlations using basic parameters that do not 
require integration, e.g. the distance between links, the distance between each link and the 
epicentre, etc., with a statistical learning approach such as in Section 3.2.4.  Further development 
is needed for the component side to make this methodology more efficient. For comparison 
purposes, crude-MCS was used to obtain a disconnection probability of 55.6% with 5% c.o.v. 
requiring 3,870 sec. See Figure 4.7 for the hierarchical structure identified using RI-AHSIA. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 Large network hierarchical structure. 
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Note that due to the large nature of this network only the size of the lower-scale represented 
network is shown in the lower boxes of the divided dendogram nodes. Also, since many of the 
branches contain similar divisions, only a select few of the identified clusters are shown.  
Algorithm 
(MCS: 55.6%, 5% c.o.v.) 
Closest % bounds 5% bounds 
Time (sec) 
LB UB LB UB 
I-AHSIA 
Bi 1.74 2.74 1.31 6.29 34,700 
Min 55.6 56.6 52.3 57.2 9,719 
RI-AHSIA 55.2 56.2 51.9 56.9 3,673 
 
Table 4.6 Large network AHSIA comparison. 
See Table 4.6 for a description of the different methods. Since modularity only identifies 11 
clusters, none of the objective function based methods were able to get passed the lowest scale in 
a day’s time, so these results were not included. Both the N-AHSIA approaches identified similar 
dendograms that identified divisions in triplicate. On the basis of probability, RI-AHSIA 
performs slightly better than the I-AHSIA with the minimum relaxation. I-AHSIA with the 
bifurcation relaxation performs significantly worse than these, but recall that none of the 
objective function based functions were able to obtain results in a few days. On the basis of time, 
RI-AHSIA performs the absolute best. Part of the reason why the I-AHSIA with the bifurcation 
heuristic performs significantly more worse than the other 2 AHSIA results is that it requires the 
most depth of all algorithms. The hierarchical structure identified by the I-AHSIA with the 
minimum heuristic identifies many triplicate divisions, but also goes deeper than the structure 
identified by the RI-AHSIA. This example has demonstrated the necessity of an AHSIA being 
able to identify divisions larger than just bifurcations, especially if the network shows clear 
network divisions greater than bifurcations. It also shows that more depth, particularly with large 
networks, may not be helpful for analysis. RI-AHSIA clearly performs best in this situation. See 
Table 4.7 and Figure 4.6 for a list of the RI-AHSIA top 10 CPIM value ranked components. Note 
that the top 10 correspond to both directions of the 5 highest level intercluster links. The 11
th
 and 
12
th
 value ranked components correspond to the unlabelled highest level intercluster link. The 
highest level intercluster links seem to manifest as highly ranked CPIMs for more networks. 
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Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
1458 93.9 90.9 
1457 93.9 90.9 
1461 89.2 87.1 
1462 89.2 87.1 
1459 89.5 86.8 
1460 89.5 86.8 
1464 83.7 81.7 
1463 83.7 81.7 
1455 79.7 77.9 
1456 79.7 77.9 
 
Table 4.7 Large network top 10 CPIMs. 
 United States pipeline network  4.4.4
To investigate a more realistic example, an example uses a possible realization of a national gas 
pipeline network subjected to seismicity with epicentral location at the New Madrid seismic 
zone. Since the component models are strongly driven by the physical locations of these nodes, 
connectivity information is far from enough for creating realistic networks. Location information 
may also be safe-guarded for certain reasons, e.g. national security. For these reasons, this 
network was realized based on the locations of the airports (Opsahl 2011) for the nodes. All 
airports that had 10 or less uni-directional links to other nodes were trimmed out. Since airports 
typically represent regions where larger populations are concentrated, such locations 
approximate where major pipeline distribution nodes would be placed. Then, a random network 
was created by connecting each node to two of its first sixth closest other nodes using a uniform 
random distribution. Duplications of bi-directional links were then removed. Since the same 
attenuation models were being used as the rest of the seismic component models, a modification 
was necessary for the intra-plate earthquake, as shown in Figure 4.8 with a star and moment 
magnitude of 8.0. This type of earthquake has been found to attenuate significantly less over 
distance; therefore, since the current attenuation rules used in this methodology are for an 
earthquake the attenuates significantly more quickly, the distance of the links and nodes from the 
earthquake epicenter has been scaled down by a third. If one can find a more appropriate 
attenuation model, no such scaling would be necessary. Another issue had to be handled during 
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construction. The coordinates of these points were given in latitude-longitude. Due to this 
network’s large extent, special care was observed during construction to maintain location 
realism. To guarantee that the points in flat coordinates were correctly transformed, the points 
were scaled from transverse Mercator coordinates so that the source and terminal nodes 
maintained the proper distance. For this analysis, the source and terminal nodes were placed at 
coordinates corresponding to LAX and JFK airports respectively, as labeled in Figure 4.8 with 9 
and 67 respectively. It had 103 nodes and 183 bidirectional links for 469 total components. The 
RI-AHSIA top CPIM value ranked components are shown and annotated in brown. The 
component models required 3,292 seconds to compile. 
 
 
Figure 4.8 US network configuration. 
For comparison purposes, crude-MCS obtained 67.0% disconnection probability with 5% c.o.v. 
in 12.5 sec. All of the AHSIAs were then run on the example to obtain the results in Table 4.8. 
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Algorithm 
(MCS: 67.0%, 5% c.o.v.) 
Closest % bounds 5% bounds 
Time (sec) 
LB UB LB UB 
I-AHSIA 
Bi 49.4 50.3 46.5 50.8 2,434 
Min 47.7 48.6 44.5 49.3 2,378 
RI-AHSIA 65.7 66.5 63.8 68.5 2,874 
N-AHSIA 
Stage 72.0 73.0 71.8 74.8 3,817 
Global 71.0 72.0 70.9 73.9 3,628 
 
Table 4.8 US network AHSIA comparison. 
Of the algorithms, the RI-AHSIA and N-AHSIAs perform best in terms of probability; however, 
RI-AHSIA requires the least amount of time. Both N-AHSIAs had the same structures. The I-
AHSIAs presented fast results, but also largely underestimated the probability. The structures for 
both relaxations were the same, but found dendograms that were one level deeper than the RI-
AHSIA structure. This additional depth created too much error. For this network, one can easily 
conclude that RI-AHSIA performed best. See the RI-AHSIA dendogram in Figure 4.9.  
 
 
Figure 4.9 US network hierarchical structure. 
The top 10 ranked component using the RI-AHSIA hierarchical structure are shown in Table 4.9 
and Figure 4.8. The top 6 ranked components are the unidirectional links, i.e. the top 3 bi-
directional links, closest to the epicenter. The other 4 directions correspond to the unidirectional 
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links on the other side of the fault. For this example, the top CPIM value ranked components are 
strongly driven by the distance from the epicenter. It is interesting to note that none of these were 
used as RI-AHSIA’s intercluster links. 
 Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
132 99.4 99.6 
133 99.4 99.6 
285 99.3 99.4 
284 99.3 99.4 
131 97.3 97.4 
130 97.3 97.4 
460 97.0 97.2 
461 97.0 97.2 
274 90.1 90.3 
275 90.1 90.3 
 
Table 4.9 US network top 10 CPIMs. 
 Bridge network 4.4.5
As discussed previously in Chapter 3, the resolution of the network inspired by LA was rather 
coarse. To explore the bridge network idea, a finer resolution network inspired by LA was 
investigated. See Figure 4.10 for a graphical description of this network. The component models 
again used the LA county bridge dataset representative bridges and covariance models. Note that 
this is a different component model than one used in the earlier Chapter 4 pipeline examples, and 
that this analysis uses the correlation approximation detailed in Chapter 3. Since the 1994 
Northridge earthquake was used, the moment magnitude is 6.7. The source and terminal nodes 
are 18 and 57 respectively.  These were selected similarly to the example in Chapter 3 as 
corresponding to a downtown area and an evacuation destination. This network contains 77 
nodes, which have no failure probability, and 117 bi-directional links, making the network size 
311. The top RI-AHSIA CPIM value ranked components are shown and annotated in orange. 
The component definitions required 45,508 sec to compile.  
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Figure 4.10 Bridge network configuration. 
See Figure 4.11 for the hierarchical structure generated using the RI-AHSIA. The source node’s 
location has a large impact on how the heavily gridded section of the downtown area is divided. 
This has to do with how the source-adjacent node connectivity requires less super-components 
than a cluster with no special nodes. For comparison purposes, a crude-MCS estimate of 60.4% 
was obtained in 416 sec with c.o.v. of 5%. All of the AHSIAs were then run on the example, 
obtaining the results in Table 4.10.  
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Algorithm 
(MCS: 60.4%, 5% c.o.v.) 
Closest % bounds 5% bounds 
Time (sec) 
LB UB LB UB 
I-AHSIA 
Bi 54.6 55.5 50.6 55.5 317 
Min 54.5 55.5 50.6 55.5 345 
RI-AHSIA 60.1 61.0 56.3 61.1 629 
N-AHSIA 
Stage 61.5 62.5 57.6 62.5 757 
Global 61.0 62.0 57.1 62.0 747 
 
Table 4.10 Bridge network AHSIA comparison. 
I-AHSIA with the bifurcation heuristic was fast but also incurred much error. This is due to how 
deep the dendogram is for this AHSIA. Interestingly enough, both I-AHSIA heuristics created 
the same dendograms; however, due to the depth of these trees there is some randomness 
incurred that results in slightly different bounds and run times. Since the modularity function 
identifies only 5 clusters, both N-AHSIAs identify shallow trees, representing little time savings. 
The RI-AHSIA performs best on the merits of both probability and time. The I-AHSIAs require 
the least time, but provide inaccurate estimates of the disconnection probabilities. This error is 
due to the I-AHSIAs having the most depth in their hierarchical structures. While they have 
considerable depth, they identify smaller cluster divisions, which require less super-links, so they 
perform rather quickly. The N-AHSIAs required around 20% more time than the RI-AHSIA and 
were not as accurate. The upper bounds were overestimated by around 1.5% and 2%. Note that 
the hierarchical structures return different results for the two N-AHSIA. Due to its best accuracy 
and reasonable speed, the best method for this example was clearly RI-AHSIA.   
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
89 78.3 80.1 
88 78.3 80.1 
112 66.0 67.6 
113 65.9 67.6 
90 65.2 66.7 
91 65.2 66.7 
110 58.6 60.1 
111 58.6 60.1 
82 55.7 56.6 
83 55.7 56.6 
 
Table 4.11 Bridge network top 10 CPIMs. 
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Figure 4.11 Bridge network hierarchical structure. 
See Table 4.11 and Figure 4.10 for the RI-AHSIA top 10 CPIM value ranked components. Note 
that the two highest ranked components correspond to a bi-directional link that is on the network 
periphery leading to no place of particular importance; however, this link has many bridges on it 
and is close to the epicenter. The next two components correspond to one of the intercluster links 
on the highest levels.  The 9
th
 and 10
th
 components correspond to an intercluster links on one of 
the lowest scales. The rest of the components shown do not correspond to intercluster links on 
any level of analysis, but are close to the epicenter. It is interesting that the CPIM value top 
ranked components 88 and 89 components are ranked so highly considering they contribute little 
to network connectivity.  Looking at the location of this bi-directional link, it is clear that the 
proximity to the epicenter is artificially increasing its importance. Clearly, such a component 
should not have any major role in the network disconnection event.  
10+13+10 = 33
22 + 9 + 10 = 41 36 + 4 + 4 = 44
25 + 25 + 8 = 58 25 + 1 + 4 = 30 4 + 7 + 4 = 15
36 + 19 + 8 = 63
311
199 102
129 60
57
41
81
40 46 10 19 18
44 29
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4.5 Conclusions 
Since many network analysis methodologies, i.e. the S-RDA, have exponential time costs, using 
divide-and-conquer approaches are necessary for certain network topologies. Furthermore, 
automating such an approach is required, particularly for networks with unclear structure. To 
address this, several algorithms using either dividing branch criteria or global objective function 
criteria were developed and then tested on 5 networks with different characteristics and 
component models. For the regular network, the RI-AHSIA top CPIM value ranked components 
were both influenced by the epicenter as well as whether they were identified as intercluster 
links. These approaches struggle particularly with such topologies for obvious reasons, e.g. they 
do not exhibit hierarchical structures. The RI-AHSIA was the most efficient for this approach. 
For the radial network, most algorithms are not able to converge within 1% bounds, suggesting 
that this methodology must be improved if clusters having “star-like” topologies similar to those 
in the aforementioned example are present in the network application. The branch-wise AHSIAs 
perform best in this situation with RI-AHSIA performing the most accurately. RI-AHSIA 
identifies the expected tree structure in this example. Also, the RI-AHSIA top CPIM value 
ranked components occurred as intercluster links. In the large network analysis, only the branch-
wise type algorithms were able to converge with RI-AHSIA performing best. Deeper trees 
caused more error in this network, while the RI-AHSIA top CPIM value ranked components 
were intercluster links. For the US pipeline network, RI-AHSIA and the N-AHSIAs performed 
best, while the I-AHSIAs required much more time. The RI-AHISA top CPIM value ranked 
components in this analysis were strongly influenced by epicentral proximity. Lastly, the bridge 
network found that the N-AHSIAs performed best on the merit of probability, while RI-AHSIA 
was faster and performed similarly on the basis of probability. The RI-AHISA top CPIM value 
ranked components were also strongly dependent on proximity to the epicenter.  
Overall, one finds that the RI-AHSIA is the most robust and identifies expected structures most 
often. Since the objective function based AHSIAs use a global criterion toward convergence that 
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typically identifies smaller numbers of global clusters, they do not have the ability to analyze 
very large networks. The I-AHSIAs tend to create trees of too much depth, while the minimum 
relaxation outperforms the bifurcation relaxation. The N-AHSIAs perform significantly better 
than the R-AHSIAs for the objective function based approaches. Interestingly enough, there does 
not seem to be a large difference between the stage-wise and global realizations of the N-
AHSIAs. The RI-AHSIA top CPIM value ranked components seem to be strongly influenced not 
just by how they function in the network but by epicentral proximity. Such contingency on a 
specific seismic scenario indicates that perhaps a larger resolution above the component level is 
necessary for understanding network structure.  
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5. GROUP IMPORTANCE MEASURES  
5.1 Background and motivation 
There are many reasons to perform network analysis. In particular, interested parties, e.g. 
infrastructure managers, utility companies, state and federal departments of transportation, etc., 
would like to be able to define vulnerabilities in the system as well as identify the most important 
components in terms of contributions to network performance. In Chapter 3, an analysis used 
Conditional Probability Importance Measures (CPIMs), which quantified important components 
that had deep influences on the system disconnection probability, on the resolution level of links 
to identify the most important components. These CPIMs provided a nice outcome, because they 
showed that the majority of such top ranked important components tended to be either near the 
epicenter of the seismic event or along critical paths between the source and terminal nodes; 
however, some of these components had strong correlations. As seen in the earlier examples, 
interested parties may wonder if these components were not all truly important but simply 
strongly correlated with the most important components. Also, if such interested parties were a 
managing body of such networks, component-wise rankings may not be all that useful, especially 
if the resolution of the network has a large amount of components and the available funds can 
cover a large amount of components. Should that entity only be interested in upgrading one or 
two such links at a time a component-wise approach may be acceptable, but, in other cases, 
interested parties would prefer a more regional based strategy. Lastly, the results of how top 
CPIM value ranked components evolved over time exhibited a level of randomness that was 
unintuitive and inconclusive at times. For these reasons, it may be useful to consider a more 
“group-based” importance measure. 
A desire to consider more than one component at a time in terms of deciding where to intervene 
with first is something seen in many fields. In finance, many were describing risk to portfolios 
using “price risk” in the 1990s. This construct is defined as the likelihood of value loss for an 
104 
 
institution’s entire portfolio based on fluctuations in market conditions, e.g. commodity pricing, 
interest rates. For traditional products, such price risk is separable, meaning that part of the 
magnitude for the portfolio risk from one of the risk factors can be found by performing 
sensitivity analysis for that risk factor. This assumes that such factors are independent; however, 
there exists the so-called “correlation product” where many risk factors are found to be non-
separable in nature due to strong correlations. For these reasons, such financial risk analysis must 
consider combinations of risk factors when analyzing these correlation products (Mahoney 
1995). Such correlated risks indicate the structure in which the analysis should be conducted. In 
data mining, many have found that association rules are strongly useful. These are applications 
where the percentage of transactions containing two distinct products, e.g. diapers and beer, are 
mined from a data set (Holt and Chung 1999). Information about products with a high incidence 
of sale and strong association rules help indicate better store layouts for vendors, e.g. 
supermarkets, retail stores, etc. In a similar manner, grouping components in a network help 
indicate a better way to manage the network and for understanding how the network structure 
can be used.  
Since grouping components is both useful for understanding the structure of a network subject to 
hazard and how to manage the network, a methodology for ranking groups of components, the 
so-called “Group Importance Measures” (GIMs), based on the disconnection event is developed 
and tested. First, the general description of this approach is described. Execution concerns related 
to network analysis are explored. Several examples will then be used to show how such 
structures appear. Lastly, conclusions are discussed.  
5.2 Group importance measures methodology 
If a network risk analysis model is available, GIMs ought to utilize the output for construction. 
One of the strongest results of such analysis is the component CPIM (3.17). A more important 
discussion, however, is what such a description implies for a group, specifically a cluster of 
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connected components. From the component CPIM definition, the component importance 
measure describes how the component participates in a general system failure. For a network, 
this describes how a quantity can move through a component given the system failure. If one 
then seeks to extrapolate this idea to clusters, it seeks to show whether or not one can pass 
through the cluster given the system failure. Since cluster can be defined many ways, the 
adjacent nodes, the special nodes, i.e. source and terminal, and the super-links that describe 
cluster connectivity are the simplest way to describe movement through the cluster. The question 
then becomes what combination of these components best describes this. Conservatively, the 
intersection of said components’ failures is best; however, should the cluster be very large or far 
from seismic activity, the intersection probability may be very small and favor smaller clusters. 
On the other hand, the union of said failure events probability may be too likely and favor larger 
clusters, especially if several of the components have high CPIM values. Ideally there ought to 
be some middle ground between these two descriptions, such as combining the resulting GIMs 
based on some parameter; however, due to the complex nature of such networks it is difficult to 
identify such a parameter based on statistical analysis in the general sense. Once network 
examples can be distinctly and clearly categorized, such a statistical approach ought to be 
revisited after some analysis 
Using this discussion for the structure of the GIMs as well as the network hierarchical structure 
from the dendograms in Chapter 4, the GIM definition is 
  
 
 
| ,      1,...,
sys
i sys
sys
clus
iclus
i clus
P E E
GIM P E E i n
P E
    (5.1) 
where clus
iE  is defined as the failure of the upper-level represented subnetwork, and clusn  is the 
total number of clusters. clus
iE  can be described either as an intersection event, 
int
iE , or union 
event, uni
iE . Since the 
int
iE  require all relevant components to fail at once, the intersection 
description can be thought of as more constraining and sensitive to smaller subnetworks.  On the 
other hand, since the uni
iE  only require at least one component contained in the union to fail, 
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these are less constraining and sensitive to larger networks. Note that the uni
iE  shrink in value 
with larger correlations while the int
iE  have an opposite result. First, the 
int
iE  GIM, or 
intersection description ( int
iGIM ), will be presented. Then, the 
uni
iE  GIM, or union description 
( uni
iGIM ), will be discussed. Stating 
int
iE  formally   
 ,      1,...,
clus clus
i i
int nodes superlinks
i j k clus
j E k E
E E E i n
 
  
   
  
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 (5.2) 
where nodes
jE  are the failures of the adjacent and special nodes in the cluster 
clus
iE and
superlinks
kE  are 
the failures of the super-links in the cluster 
clus
iE . Using a formulation parallel to (3.18), the cut-
set formulation is 
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
 (5.3) 
where 
jC  is the j-th cut-set and recall that NC need not be the total number of cut-sets, since 
those identified earliest with the selective-Recursive Decomposition Algorithm (S-RDA) 
contribute the most to the system failure. Additionally, due to the nature of the highest scale of 
analysis, the network is simplified so that the total number of cut-sets is typically small. Recall 
that due to De Morgan’s laws in set theory and Boolean algebra that the compliment of an 
intersection is the union of individual complimentary events. Noting that
   int inti sys i sysP E E P E E , the link-set formulation using a formulation parallel to (3.20) is 
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 (5.4) 
where Lj is the j-th link-set and NL is the subset of the link sets used. Recall that most of these 
events are intersections that can be calculated using an efficient, high-dimensional, multivariate 
Gaussian, numerical integration scheme such as Genz (1992). Since (5.2) may have many terms, 
one may be concerned about how to calculate (5.4). Recalling the definition of complimentary 
events as it relates to conditional probabilities, i.e.,    1 | |int inti j i jP E L P E L  , 
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          1 |int int inti j j i j j i jP E L P L P E L P L P E L       (5.5) 
Using (5.5) in (5.4), the link-set formulation becomes  
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Now consider the uni
iGIM . The union description of (5.2) is  
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 (5.7) 
Note that when the GIM calculation uses (5.7), the process seems to be a group generalization of 
the Fussell-Vesely importance measure (Fussell 1975). Using (5.3), one must give special care to 
the numerator as it is non-disjoint. Using inspiration from (5.5), the cut-set formulation becomes 
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 (5.8) 
With the union description, (5.4) can be used in its original form for the link-set formulation, 
since the compliment of a union event is simply the intersection of the individual complimentary 
events. 
To truly be able to model the structure of such networks, one must also understand the 
parameters and outputs of the network analysis. The S-RDA is a network analysis tool that 
determines the disconnection probability between a specific source and terminal node pairing. 
Since this has an impact on not only the topology of the super-links but also the overall 
clustering hierarchy, it makes sense from the attempt to understand the true network structure to 
specify the source and terminus to be as far as possible from one another as well as to place them 
in such a way that they impact the hierarchical structure as little as possible. Keeping these 
concerns in mind, one can then evaluate the GIMs on several networks.  
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5.3 Network examples 
Several networks are analyzed using the link-set and cut-set formulations for int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM : 
(5.1) and (5.6) for the int
iGIM  and (5.8) and (5.4) for the 
uni
iGIM . To develop the hierarchy, RI-
AHSIA is used, as it tends to go deepest and capture the network’s structure the best. The top 6 
value ranked int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  are investigated for all examples. For comparison purposes, the 
highest ranked CPIM value components are also presented. First, a simple pipeline network with 
clear hierarchy is examined in Section 5.3.1. Then the Los Angeles metropolitan area (LA)-
inspired bridge network investigated in Chapter 4 is analyzed in Section 5.3.2.  These examples 
all analysed with a computer with 7.76 GB usable RAM on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4700MQ @ 
2.40GHz. 
 Clear hierarchical structure network 5.3.1
See Figure 5.1 for the clear hierarchical structure pipeline network. This network had 102 nodes 
with 176 bi-directional links for 454 total components. The seismic event is characterized by an 
epicenter marked with a star and a magnitude of 6.0. Note that it is one third of the network in 
Section 5.4.3; however, it has an average link length and average displacement of 1.58 km and 
9.87 km respectively, which is a larger scale than the network it was extracted from. The source 
and terminal nodes, at 24 and 50 respectively as shown, were placed in a way that it will not 
affect the hierarchy much. The highest CPIM value ranked components are shown and annotated 
in orange. Using RI-AHSIA, the hierarchy in Figure 5.2 was created. Note the resemblance to 
one of the branches of the larger network. The disconnection probabilities from the multi-scale 
S-RDA were 52.8%-53.7% at 1% and 49.1%-53.7% at 5% and required 2,447 sec. For 
comparison, the crude-MCS estimate was 53.9% with 5% c.o.v. and required 27.0 sec.  
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Figure 5.1 Clear hierarchal structure pipeline network configuration.  
Using the earlier stated definitions, the values for int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  for both formulations are 
shown in Figure 5.3 for a bar graph of all of the cluster values. These clusters are labelled from 0 
to the total number of clusters from the first cluster on the left to the bottom right in Figure 5.2, 
starting with non-leaf clusters then leaf clusters. Note that due to the exponentially decreasing 
nature of the intersection description, it may be tempting to use logarithmic scaling; however, 
one finds that linear scaling makes the most importantly ranked clusters much more obvious and 
that the int
iGIM  rankings are more informative due to their large variability. The link-set and cut-
set formulations show reasonable agreement for both GIM descriptions. Due to larger variability 
of Figure 5.4 shows ordinal rankings based on cut-set formulations for both int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  
in the clustering tree format. Cut-set formulations are preferred because there were far more cut-
sets used than link-sets in the top-scale analysis. The ovals in these figures present the ordinal 
rankings with the top and bottom values corresponding to int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  respectively. 
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Figure 5.2 Clear hierarchal structure pipeline network RI-AHSIA hierarchal structure. 
Note that three of the top six int
iGIM  ranked groups are the top three clusters while the other 
three clusters are leaf clusters. Interestingly enough, the top ranked cluster is the highest scale 
cluster containing neither of the special nodes. The second and third highest ranked clusters are 
both of size seven and the smallest in the hierarchy. Also, notice that the second highest ranked 
cluster contains the terminal node. The fourth ranked cluster is the other half of the identifiable 
cluster containing the terminal node. Lastly, note that the second through fourth clusters are 
somewhat close to the earthquake when compared to the rest of the network. Recall that Figures 
5.3 and 5.4 display the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  values and rankings. 
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Figure 5.3 Clear hierarchal structure pipeline network GIM values. 
On the other hand, for the uni
iGIM  top ranked groups, one finds that only one of the top scale 
clusters is ranked in the top six while four are leaf clusters. This cluster contains the source node. 
The top ranked cluster is a leaf cluster that is in the highest scale cluster that does not contain 
special nodes. The second highest ranked cluster contains this cluster. The third highest ranked 
cluster is a leaf cluster that is contained in the aforementioned highest scale cluster, which is 
ranked fourth. Note that this leaf cluster does not contain the source node. The fifth highest 
ranked cluster is a leaf cluster that is the half of the identifiable cluster containing the terminal 
node without actually having the terminal node inside of it. The sixth cluster is another half of an 
identifiable cluster within the same highest scale cluster containing the terminal node. Neither of 
these contains the terminal node. Note that both of these clusters are relatively close to the 
epicenter.  
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Figure 5.4 Clear hierarchal structure pipeline network
int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM cut-set rankings. 
For both descriptions, it seems that clusters that allow one to transverse through them most easily 
are ranked highest. Such connectivity driven importance is further improved by proximity to the 
epicenter. To investigate the relationship between int
iGIM , 
uni
iGIM , and the component CPIMs, 
the top 10 CPIM value ranked components are shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1. Note that all 
of these are links. The first three most important components are the links that connect the 
highest scale clusters. The majority of the next top ranked components including the fourth and 
fifth highest rated components are in the highest level cluster containing the source node. While 
the top three ranked components are inter-cluster links at the top level, the third and fourth 
ranked clusters using the uni
iGIM  and the fifth ranked cluster using the 
int
iGIM  contain the 
majority of the next category of highest ranked components. One finds that containing such 
important components seems to affect the union description somewhat more than the intersection 
description in this example. From the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  rankings, it is clear that the best 
investment of funds and management strategies for increasing network reliability is toward the 
clusters most proximal to the terminal node and larger scale cluster containing the terminal node. 
4+7+7+6 = 24
24 33 20
20 15 21 13
40 21
454
160 1.
11.
146 6.
7.
142 5.
4.
101 20.
2.
55
8.
20.
76 12.
9.
33 9.
16.
31
16.
14.
80 14.
15.
58
7.
3.
53 21.
17.
46
11.
8.
39 10.
21.
35
17.
12. 18
4.
5. 7
2.
13. 41
13.
22. 37
18.
19.
27 22.
1.
20 19.
10.
24 15.
6.
7 3.
18.
113 
 
The majority of high ranking int
iGIM  clusters consist of these groups and several high ranking
uni
iGIM  also consist of these groups. Due to the higher variability, the localization of the 
intersection description is most important, but the additional support from the union description 
indicates this region is most important for management.  
Overall, the component CPIM value rankings seem to function in a markedly different way than 
the GIMs for this network. Since the int
iGIM  ranks a cluster with many components as its top 
choice and the uni
iGIM  ranks a small leaf cluster with the top value within that highest scale 
cluster, one can conclude that this highest scale cluster is by far the most important to network 
function. Recall that when the description biases are seemingly violated by ranking certain 
clusters differently than usual these must be given special treatment. For this network, the 
highest level inter-cluster link and clusters nearest and containing the terminal nodes require the 
most management and investment. 
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
215 72.9 79.1 
216 72.9 79.0 
217 61.4 72.0 
218 61.4 72.0 
329 53.1 65.2 
330 53.1 65.2 
119 35.2 40.8 
120 35.2 40.8 
105 34.0 39.4 
106 34.0 39.4 
 
Table 5.1 Clear hierarchical structure pipeline network top ranked components. 
 Bridge network 5.3.2
See Figure 5.5 for the bridge network. This network had 77 nodes with 117 bi-directional links 
for 311 total components. The seismic event is characterized by an epicenter marked with a star 
and a magnitude of 6.7. Note that this network has the same bridge network topology as in 
Section 4.4.5; however, the source and terminal nodes are now located at 50 and 76 respectively 
as shown. These special node locations were placed far apart in a way that they had little 
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influence on clustering. Additionally, the highest CPIM value ranked components are shown in 
orange. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Bridge network configuration. 
Using RI-AHSIA, the hierarchy in Figure 5.6 was created. Note the key differences this 
hierarchical clustering has from the one shown in Figure 4.11. The influence of special node 
placement is particularly seen on the top branching to the cluster with 199 original components. 
For the new special node placements, many more super-links are required and the branch does 
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not have as much depth, especially for the leaf cluster of size of 81. The parameter for 
correlation as shown in (4.11) had to be changed from 0.30 to 0.10, as the first resulted in a 
convergence that was too coarse. The disconnection probabilities from the multi-scale S-RDA 
were 64.4%-65.3% at 1% and 62.2%-67.1% at 5% and required 1,652 sec. For comparison, the 
crude-MCS estimate was 66.8% with 5% c.o.v. and required 292 sec.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 Bridge network RI-AHSIA hierarchal structure. 
See Figure 5.7 for a bar graph of the GIM values. Like Section 5.3.1, these clusters are labelled 
from 0 to the total number of clusters from the top level cluster on the left to the bottom level 
cluster on the right in Figure 5.6, starting with non-leaf clusters then leaf clusters. Since the 
bridge component model uses nodes that never fail, these ought to be omitted from the 
formulations that require joint failures of all components, e.g. (5.3) and (5.6). Again, since the
int
iGIM  have such a spread of values, the graphical description uses linear scale. This makes it 
more obvious which clusters are most important. The uni
iGIM  description has less variability than 
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previously, indicating that the int
iGIM  description has far more importance. The link-set and cut-
set formulation values show reasonable agreement for both formulations for both cluster 
descriptions. Figure 5.8 show ordinal rankings based on these description with link-set 
formulations in the clustering tree format. Link-set formulations are preferred for the same 
reason cut-set formulations were preferred in the earlier example.  
 
 
Figure 5.7 Bridge network GIM values. 
Note that only the top five int
iGIM  cluster rankings have significant values. The top three of 
these indicate a branch that starts with the highest scale cluster having 102 original components 
and ends at the leaf cluster that contains the source and has 19 components. These clusters are 
also rather close to the epicenter. The fourth ranked cluster is a leaf cluster that contains the 
terminal node. The fifth ranked cluster is the cluster that contains the fourth ranked cluster. The 
sixth ranked cluster and third ranked cluster, which contains the source node, are the two 
subnetworks of the second ranked cluster. The int
iGIM  seems to be strongly influenced by the 
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special node locations in this case. It should also be noted that three of the top six clusters consist 
of less than 20 original components and are leaf nodes. 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Bridge network GIM link-set rankings. 
On the other hand, for the uni
iGIM , one finds that the same top scale cluster is ranked in the top 
six and three of the top six are leaf clusters. All of these clusters are rather close to the epicenter. 
The first and fourth ranked clusters are leaf clusters that are centrally located between the special 
nodes. The fifth ranked cluster is constructed from the union of these two. The sixth ranked 
cluster is the leaf cluster containing the source. The third ranked cluster is the shallowest leaf 
cluster of the highest ranked top-scale cluster subnetwork. Note the contrast of how the other 
subnetwork was ranked higher with the int
iGIM . It seems that more densely connected clusters 
that are in between the source and terminal nodes were favored. Since only one of the top 10
uni
iGIM  value ranked clusters is smaller than 30 original components, there is a bias toward 
larger clusters by the uni
iGIM . 
For both definitions, it seems that both descriptions prefer clusters that allow easiest transversal 
between the special nodes are ranked highest, while the int
iGIM  prefers clusters containing 
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special nodes and the uni
iGIM  prefers clusters spatially located between the special nodes. Such 
connectivity driven importance is further improved by proximity to the epicenter. One should 
also take special note of the clusters that are ranked highly despite the inherent biases for the two 
GIM descriptions. Due to the large number of intersection description highly ranked clusters 
proximal to the source node, these clusters require the most management attention. Two of the 
top 6 union clusters are also in this group. The proximity to a historically dangerous fault also 
indicate that these groups of components are important. 
To revisit the component versus cluster importance investigation, the top 10 ranked components 
are shown in Table 5.2 and Figure 5.5. Note that these are links and have strong proximity to the 
epicenter. Only the second ranked component is used as an inter-cluster link. The clusters 
containing the source contain the others. Both definitions ranked higher more clusters that 
contain these important components, but the int
iGIM  also required that the clusters contain the 
source. Note that the source is also close to the epicenter. While both account for network 
function, the highest CPIM value ranked components seem to function more on distance from 
the epicenter than the GIMs in this network. Revisiting the earlier idea of which clusters and 
series of clusters seemingly violate definition biases, it is clear that the branch containing the 
source is far more important than the other. Both groups of components and components that 
require most attention are nearest the seismicity. 
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
88 79.9 82.3 
89 79.8 82.3 
112 67.4 69.5 
113 67.5 69.5 
90 66.7 68.6 
91 66.6 68.6 
110 59.9 61.8 
111 59.9 61.8 
246 56.6 58.3 
247 56.6 58.3 
 
Table 5.2 Bridge network top ranked components. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
A novel methodology for GIMs of components has been explored and investigated. Descriptions 
for intersection and union-based GIMs, int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  respectively, have been developed for 
both cut-set and link-set definitions to see how converged such results are. One must note that 
there is some bias inherent in both descriptions, with the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM favouring smaller 
and larger size groups of components, respectively. One must consider both int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM
for general networks. Depending on the configuration of component information, one description 
may have more information than the other; however, in general, both may contain useful 
information. For the pipeline network, the highest level cluster not containing special nodes was 
most important. This emphasized the importance of the ability to get through a group of 
components to get from the source node to the terminal node. The networks parts requiring most 
management are the top inter-cluster links and clusters proximal to and containing the terminal 
node. For the bridge network, one found that proximity to the epicenter and whether clusters 
contained special nodes had large influence on which clusters were ranked highly. The clusters 
proximal to and containing the source node required the most management, while the groups and 
components that are most important are both proximal to the seismicity.  
Both analyses also found that clusters containing several highly ranked components may also be 
ranked highly themselves. In particular, the highest level clusters typically received higher values 
for both definitions. This suggests that the most important pieces of information from such 
analysis is which of these highest level clusters is ranked highest and that clusters on lower-
scales of the hierarchy that are ranked highly by both definitions. From these analyses, one 
concludes that it is important to account for the cluster resolution, i.e. several of the highly 
ranked clusters contain one another when trying to select the most important clusters while also 
considering which clusters go against the biases inherent in the GIM definitions. For such 
clusters and series of clusters, more resources must be used to maintain and improve those 
regions. 
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6. DETERIORATION EFFECTS ON NETWORK COMPONENTS AND 
GROUPS  
6.1 Background and motivation 
Since existing civil infrastructure is consistently deteriorating over its life-cycle, if no repairs or 
retrofits occur, the state of both infrastructure and needed investment are both inherently 
dynamic. As discussed in Chapter 1, the infrastructure of the United States (US) receives lower 
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) report card grades when total investment is not 
enough and the future costs increase beyond that of inflation. In the greater field of deteriorating 
bridge network seismic risk analysis, some have attempted this analysis using data-driven 
statistical learning concepts (Rokneddin et al. 2012); however, no one has attempted this type of 
analysis using analytical methods relying on cutting edge closed-form fragilities and correlations. 
A major issue one typically encounters with such statistically learning-based, data-driven 
modelling is that the underlying physics of the system may not be accurately modelled. The 
physics are typically handled explicitly when using an analytical approach.  
In Chapter 3, a network analysis methodology for deteriorating bridge networks subject to 
seismic activity was developed and tested using so-called Fragility Increment Functions (FIFs). 
The most important links in the network were then identified based on Conditional Probability 
Importance Measure (CPIM) values. That study also found that for homogenous deterioration 
models such link CPIM value rankings varied little while the disconnection probability and link 
CPIM values both increased with time. Since homogenous deterioration may not be typical, 
these results may not be general enough. The aforementioned deterioration study also did not 
analyze the inherent hierarchical structure, as described in Chapter 4, or the Group Importance 
Measures (GIMs) corresponding to the identified clusters, as described in Chapter 5. Since it is 
unclear to what extent networks characteristics are static, perhaps such hierarchical structures 
and group rankings may be sensitive to continuous, time-based deterioration. Since only two 
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network examples were investigated in Chapter 5, the GIMs’ applicability to realistic network 
topologies must also be explored. 
Note that the clustering performed in these analyses has relied principally on connectivity 
information. To incorporate the influence of deterioration on the hierarchical structure, a subset 
of the following analyses have a node adjacency matrix constructed with reliability information 
instead of only connectivity information, which will be called the “reliability-based” approach. 
Note that component reliabilities change with deterioration. Although other modifications to the 
adjacency matrix were investigated, such as normalized distance, which is a static description, 
these resulted in hierarchical structures that were inappropriate, e.g. they had large depth and 
accrued too much error for the network analysis. Since the hierarchical structures were mostly 
singular long branches, the resulting normalized distance structures did not suggest a reasonable 
way to describe regions of clusters.  
Recall that the previous deteriorating networks only modeled bridges. Due to the sheer number 
of bridges and that bridges are modelled as discrete components in a multi-scale analysis, these 
analyses require significantly longer compilation times to develop the network definition than the 
pipeline definition, which are modelled as single link-type components between the respective 
nodes. Taking the FIFs as inspiration and recalling that the pipelines fragility models used are for 
brittle pipelines, e.g. asbestos cement, cast iron, or concrete (FEMA 2008), the pipeline links  
deteriorate in environmental conditions using ratios to rescale their fragilities. Since the pipeline 
component models require significantly less time to compile, they will be tested with 
deterioration as well. 
Considering both pipeline and bridge network models, example networks under several 
deterioration scenarios are compared and contrasted. The following sections shall explain the 
exact methodology of these tests. These experiments shall investigate major network rubrics, e.g. 
the selective-Recursive Decomposition Algorithm (S-RDA) disconnection bounds, component 
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CPIMs, GIMs, and hierarchical structures. Then, the main focus of these experiments becomes 
differences between the network deterioration scenarios. Lastly, conclusions on deterioration 
effects are explored.  
6.2 Fragility increment functions and deterioration schemes 
Recalling how Chapter 3 modelled deterioration, FIFs ought to increase a component’s fragility 
and uncertainty over time. Another important factor is how the components are classified based 
on their environment, i.e. the distribution of chloride salts. Both the deterioration scenarios and 
FIFs will now be clarified for both bridge and pipeline component models. 
 Bridge network 6.2.1
One of the most influential factors in reliability analysis of a deteriorating bridge network is the 
bridges’ deterioration pattern. The state of such bridges for given time t in their FIFs can be 
defined by ek and eA , which are environmental factors used to calculate the chloride surface 
concentration. This study classifies bridges as being coastal or not on the coast using 0.265ek   
and 7.758csA  , i.e. “splash-zone” parameters, or 0.676ek   and 2.265csA  , i.e. 
“atmospheric” parameters, respectively. Taking these two terms together, the chloride surface 
concentration is calculated from the water-to-binder ratio. Note that these terms only have an 
effect on the corrosion initiation time. Exterior links located closest to the boundary 
corresponding to the coast line in Figure 5.5 were designated as splash-zone. All others were 
designated as atmospheric. All such FIFs correspond to the bivariate FIF and variable 
descriptions in Gardoni and Rosowsky (2009). All other parameters were the water-to-cement-
ratio ( 0.5cw  ), the concrete curing time ( 1ct  day), the correction factor for tests ( 0.832tk  ), 
the aging factor based on data ( 0.362an  ), and the concrete curing time ( 28ct   days). 
Additionally, the bridges were assumed to be in constantly saturated, constantly humid or many 
humid-dry cycles for simplicity.  
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Note that for the analysis in Sections 4.4.5 and 5.3.2 little initial deterioration had occurred due 
to the ten year difference between the construction of the bridge classes.  The initialization times 
were handled by a corrosion initiation time based on a specific PDF (Dura-Crete 2004). All other 
model parameters are handled by the bridge classes specified in the component models. Since 
chloride based deterioration is strongly influenced by distribution of de-icing salts, sea salts, etc., 
this coast based deterioration is favored over uniform deterioration. Uniform deterioration may 
be similar to some de-icing salt distributions but must be justified and does not have interesting 
deterioration based changes other than multi-scale S-RDA bounds value increases.  
 Pipeline network 6.2.2
For the Bayesian fitted FIFs in Gardoni and Rosowsky (2009). The function form for the 
bivariate demand FIFs was 
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Where corrT  is the corrosion initiation time, , , ,  and  a b c d  are variables that control the shape, 
and aS  is spectral acceleration. Recall that the pipeline fragility functions for the nodes and links 
depend on PGA and PGV respectively. For simplicity, the FIF for pipeline network components 
will be identical for both demand parameters, now denoted by D,   
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 (6.2) 
The parameters , , , and  a b c d are tuned to create fragility functions that have been tuned that the 
steepest analyzed fragility functions have less than 1% survival area at 50t  . Since most pipe is 
constructed with a design life of 50 years, this value seems sensible. Using the node-type models 
which were found to be the most fragile component type, , , ,  and  a b c d were fitted for the 
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developed fragility function. To ensure the survival area is small enough, the time-variant 
normalized average, ( )fragA t , was used. This is determined by 
    
max
minmax
1
( ) ,
d
pipe pipe
frag v v
d
A t FIF t D F D dD
d
    (6.3) 
where D PGA  in g, since nodal fragilities were used, dmin = 0.01, and dmax = 5. To select the 
FIF parameters, 1 ( ) 1%fragA t   satisfies the earlier condition. During the fitting process, the 
deteriorated fragility curve had to be corrected for by ensuring that ( ) 1F d  . Using (6.3) and 
(6.2), the parameters are set to 1.9,a  4.0,b  0.032,c  1.1,d   and 10corrT  . These were 
obtained using exhaustive search and parametric study. Note that this corrT  is only used for the 
fitting. This FIF will be used in the pipeline example. 
6.3 Network examples 
To investigate the time effects on network criteria, the same scenario initialization as the 
example in Chapter 5 will be used for the bridge network model. The examples use network 
topologies and seismicity from Section 5.3.2 and one of the examples from Lim et al. (In print) 
will be used with the bridge and pipeline component models respectively. Recalling the results of 
Chapter 5, it is clear that further application of the GIMs is necessary to understand their 
meaning and optimal use; therefore, a more realistic topology is used for the pipeline network 
examples. Deterioration time-dependence will be explored with the network rubrics for 3 
experiments: a bridge network with binary seaside deterioration in Section 6.3.1, a pipeline 
network with continuous seaside deterioration for all components in Section 6.3.2, and the same 
pipeline network with continuous seaside deterioration for just line-type components in Section 
6.3.3. All experiments will also explore the usefulness of using the original connectivity-based vs 
reliability-based hierarchical structure. Since the sampling pipeline analyses rely on lower 
complexity component models, both pipeline network examples will explore the accuracy of S-
RDA bounds. The bridge network example will also consider inspection information. For readers 
less concerned with particulars, general summaries for each experiment are listed in Sections 
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6.3.1.7, 6.3.2.9, and 6.3.3.5. Due to the nature of the analysis in Section 6.3.2, extra sections are 
used to describe the changes of the network rubrics for both the connectivity-based and 
reliability-based analysis. 
 Bridge network 6.3.1
Recalling some important information from Section 5.3.2, the correlation tolerance was set to 
0.1, the multi-scale S-RDA disconnection bounds were 64.4%-65.3% at 1% and 62.2%-67.1% at 
5% requiring 2,447 sec. The “as-built seaside bridge deterioration” component model required 
45,508 sec to compile. Both of those bounds require a very similar amount of time to obtain 
since the top upper-scale represented subnetwork used relatively few components. The 
magnitude was 6.7 to be similar to the 1994 Northridge earthquake with the topology in Figure 
5.5. The hierarchical structure as well as other important GIM information can be found in 
Figures 5.6 – 5.8. The top ranked component CPIMs are shown in Table 5.2. Since the special 
node placements did not influence clustering much, their original locations from Section 5.3.2 
will be used. Additionally, this example had a somewhat simple GIM and component CPIM 
explanation, e.g. high sensitivity to the epicenter; therefore, deeper discussion of the GIM and 
component CPIM information will be omitted.  
6.3.1.1 100 years seaside bridge deterioration RI-AHSIA 
Using the coastline as a deterioration map, deterioration was set to 100 years after the 
construction of the last bridge class. The “100 years seaside bridge deterioration” component 
model required 47,251 sec to compile, 3.83% more time. Due to the unchanging nature of 
connectivity information, the hierarchical structure was unchanged, as in Figure 5.6. Using the 
same correlation tolerance, the multi-scale S-RDA disconnection bounds were 70.4%-71.4% at 
1% and 68.5%-75.4% at 5% requiring 1,801 sec, 26.4% less time. Note the probability change 
from the as-built analysis, with the 100 year deterioration upper bound being 8.30% larger for 
the 5% bounds. The top ranked components were the same as the ones in Figure 5.2 with values 
as shown in Table 6.1. Other than a 3.51% average value increase for these, little changed for the 
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top components ranking. The GIM values can be seen in Figure 6.1 and the associated ordinal 
rankings on the hierarchical structure from RI-AHSIA are shown in Figure 5.8. Additionally, the 
GIM ordinal rankings are also identical for the as-built and 100 years bridge deterioration cases, 
while the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM average values increased by 0.87% and 1.81% respectively.  
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
88 82.8 84.9 
89 82.7 84.9 
112 71.2 73.0 
113 71.1 73.0 
90 70.2 72.0 
91 70.2 72.0 
110 63.8 65.4 
111 63.8 65.4 
246 60.7 62.2 
247 60.6 62.2 
 
Table 6.1 100 years seaside bridge deterioration top ranked components. 
  
 
 
Figure 6.1 100 years seaside bridge deterioration GIM values. 
 
6.3.1.2 Inspection seaside bridge deterioration RI-AHSIA 
Since no change occurred in the importance rankings of the clusters or components by the 
passage of time in Section 6.3.1.1, special scenarios where different component groups start 
deteriorating at different times will be considered. An inspection scenario has been proposed as 
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shown in Figure 6.2. The region consisting of dark-red, dotted lines corresponds to the inspection 
finding that no deterioration has occurred, while the region consisting of light-purple, dashed 
lines corresponds to the inspection finding that 100 years of deterioration have occurred. The 
other lines are uninspected and have deteriorated to 50 years past the construction of the last 
bridge class, which corresponds to the current time point.  
 
 
Figure 6.2 Inspection seaside bridge deterioration topography.  
 
 40'  20'  118oW  40' 
 20' 
 40' 
  34
oN 
 20' 
 40' 
76 
50         Undeteriorated 
       100 years 
       No inspection 
 
                 
128 
 
It is clear that the proposed scenario tests the effects of different group corrT ’s. The “inspection 
seaside bridge deterioration” case component model required 44,932 sec to compile, requiring 
1.27% and 4.91% time than the as-built and 100 years cases. Using the same moment magnitude, 
epicenter, source and terminal node, i.e. special node, locations, and seaside deterioration; 
however, the elapsed time since construction of the last bridge class was 50, the multi-scale S-
RDA 1% and 5% disconnection bounds were 68.1%-69.0% and 66.1%-70.3% and required 
1,458 sec, which was 40.4% and 19.0% less than the as-built and 100 years cases. The 5% 
bounds are 3.2% larger and 5.1% smaller than the as-built and 100 years cases. These differences 
in bounds between the inspection and as-built scenarios were clearly less than before. The 
clusters received the same ordinal rankings as before. The GIMs, whose values are shown in 
Figure 6.3, have the same rankings, while the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM average values increased by 
0.52% and decreased by 1.02% respectively when compared to the as-built case.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Inspection seaside bridge deterioration GIM values. 
See Table 6.2 to find the top 10 component CPIMs from the inspection state. For all three states, 
the components are ranked the same, while the smallest and largest component CPIM values 
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correspond to the as-built and 100 years deterioration states, respectively. The top component 
CPIMs have increased 1.83% on average from the as-built case. Note that for each of the 
connectivity-based experiments, few changes in network rubrics other than general increases in 
value have occurred. 
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
88 81.9 83.4 
89 81.8 83.5 
112 70.0 71.3 
113 69.9 71.3 
90 69.0 70.4 
91 69.0 70.3 
110 62.5 63.7 
111 62.5 63.7 
246 59.3 60.5 
247 59.3 60.5 
 
Table 6.2 Inspection seaside bridge deterioration top ranked components. 
 
6.3.1.3 As-built seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based RI-AHSIA 
Since no major changes occurred in the importance rankings of the clusters or components with 
the previous line of investigation, the prior experiments will be re-examined with the reliability-
based adjacency matrix. The specific method was described earlier as using reliability 
information. To iterate, the reliability-based AHSIAs are the hierarchical structures generated 
when link reliabilities replace the one values in the connectivity-based adjacency matrix. Since 
these reliabilities are not static, the clustering may become time dependent. Using the same as-
built conditions, which occurred when the last bridge class has just been constructed, and the 
reliability-based adjacency matrix modification, the multi-scale S-RDA 1% and 5% 
disconnection bounds were 65.4%-67.4% and 65.3%-69.8% and required 725 sec. Note that the 
upper bound on the 5% prediction was more than 2% larger and that the required time was less 
than a third of the previous structure. Also note that this analysis agrees better with the crude-
MCS estimate. The same components are used for the reliability-based approach. 
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Figure 6.4 As-built seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based hierarchical structure. 
See Figure 6.4 for the relevant hierarchical structure, which is different than the connectivity-
based structure. Note that the maximum size of subnetworks to be analyzed is somewhat smaller 
and that the change in network clustering structure starts at the first division, annotated by 311; 
however, the second largest represented subnetwork to be analyzed is 20 represented 
components larger. The top level division is also much less balanced. Overall, it seems that the 
divisions are less balanced in this reliability-based structure. Due to the difference in these 
structures, it is difficult to directly compare and contrast these. See Figure 6.5 and 6.6 for the 
GIM values and ordinal rankings of this hierarchical structure.  
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Figure 6.5 As-built seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based GIM values. 
While the intersection description seems to have similar variance to Figure 5.7, the union 
description shows even less, indicating more importance for the intersection description. The 
highest level cluster containing the source is ranked highest by the intersection description again. 
Although, due to the large decrease in size, it is ranked one lower for the union description. The 
same descending branch to the source for the top 3 intersection description ranked clusters is 
present again. The fourth ranked int
iGIM  seems to be strongly influenced by the special node 
locations in this case. cluster contains the terminus. The fifth ranked int
iGIM  cluster contains the 
third ranked int
iGIM  cluster. The 6
th
 ranked int
iGIM  cluster corresponds to a densely connected 
group of components which are on the non-coastal perimeter of the downtown area. Note that 
this last grouping of components did not receive anywhere near the same level of importance in 
the connectivity-based analysis for intersection definition, while the other ranked groupings were 
similar. Instead, more importance was given to the grouping around the special nodes. 
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Figure 6.6 As-built seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based GIM rankings. 
The second ranked union description cluster is the highest level cluster which contains neither 
special node and is closest to the epicenter. The highest ranked uni
iGIM  cluster is a leaf cluster 
contained in the second highest ranked uni
iGIM  cluster, which is close to the epicenter. The third 
ranked uni
iGIM  cluster is the first ranked 
int
iGIM  cluster. The fourth ranked 
uni
iGIM  cluster is the 
leaf cluster that forms the other subnetwork closest to the leaf cluster containing the terminal 
node. The fifth ranked uni
iGIM  cluster is the subnetwork that forms the other branch leading from 
the second ranked cluster. The sixth ranked uni
iGIM  cluster is the leaf node contained in the fifth 
ranked uni
iGIM  cluster that is furthest inland. From this information, it is clear that many of the 
highest ranked uni
iGIM  groups occur closest to the epicenter; however, several of the 
intermediary locations between the source and terminal nodes are especially important to the 
union description. Recalling that the intersection description is more influential, the groups of 
components closest to the source and epicenter are most important, as was the case with the 
connectivity-based analysis.  
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Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
89 80.3 81.9 
88 80.3 81.9 
91 72.7 73.3 
90 72.7 73.3 
113 67.8 69.2 
112 67.8 69.2 
111 60.3 61.6 
110 60.3 61.6 
247 56.9 58.1 
246 56.9 58.1 
 
Table 6.3 As-built seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based top ranked components. 
The top CPIM value ranked components are shown in Table 6.3, using as many sets as needed to 
achieve 1% maximum difference between link-set and cut-set formulations and are 1.11% larger 
than the connectivity-based approach. This procedure was used for the other reliability-based 
bridge network analyses as well. Note that when compared to Table 5.2, a few of the top CPIM 
value ranked components have larger values and that the bi-directional links corresponding to 
112-113 and 90-91 have switched in ranking. Note that the upper-bound CPIM values of these 
components were only 1% different than the connectivity-based analyses, but exhibit more 
variability in the reliability-based analysis. The major difference as it pertains to the components 
in the hierarchical structure is that now the bi-directional link corresponding to components 90-
91 has become a high-scale inter-cluster link, elevating this component’s importance. 
6.3.1.4 100 years seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based RI-AHSIA 
To investigate a more deteriorated scenario that may exhibit further differences, the 100 years 
seaside bridge deterioration case is revisited. Using the same conditions with the reliability-based 
adjacency matrix modification, the 1% and 5% multi-scale S-RDA disconnection bounds were 
73.1%-74.1% and 71.2%-76.1% and required 808 sec, which was 11.4% more than the as-built. 
Note that the upper bound on the 5% prediction was less than 1% larger than the connectivity-
based RI-AHSIA and that the reliability-based formulation required less than half the time. See 
Figure 6.4 for the relevant hierarchical structure, which is the same hierarchical structure as the 
reliability-based RI-AHSIA for the as-built scenario. Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the GIM values 
134 
 
and ordinal rankings of this hierarchical structure. The int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  average values 
increased by 0.88% and 1.96%, respectively, which are similar differences to the as-built 
connectivity-based case.  
 
 
Figure 6.7 100 years seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based GIM values. 
 
 
Figure 6.8 100 years seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based GIM rankings. 
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Note that there were some differences in ordinal rankings shown in Figure 6.8 and those shown 
in Figure 6.6. The difference between these two is that the 10
th
 and 11
th
 intersection definition 
ranked clusters have switched in rankings; however, these values were small enough that their 
switch may correspond to numerical errors. One cannot see this difference in the values bar 
graph.  
The highest CPIM value ranked components can be found in Table 6.4, and correspond to 1.29% 
value increase when compared to the connectivity-based approach. Note that when compared to 
Table 6.3, the majority of the top ranked components have larger values, which correspond to a 
3.07% average increase in values. While there are some differences, further differences may be 
seen from an inspection scenario bridge deterioration example.  
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
89 83.1 84.7 
88 83.1 84.7 
91 76.0 77.3 
90 76.9 77.3 
113 71.4 72.9 
112 71.5 72.9 
111 64.1 65.4 
110 64.1 65.4 
247 61.0 62.2 
246 61.0 62.2 
 
Table 6.4 100 years seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based top ranked components. 
 
6.3.1.5 Inspection seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based RI-AHSIA 
Using the same input as specified in section 6.3.1.2, analysis finds the reliability-based RI-
AHSIA hierarchical structure shown in Figure 6.4. For all three of the reliability-based cases, no 
change in hierarchical structure was found. The 1% and 5% multi-scale S-RDA disconnection 
bounds were 70.9%-71.8% and 68.8%-73.6% and required 694 sec, which was slightly less than 
half of the required time for the connectivity-based case and more than 3 % larger. These bounds 
required 4.28% and 14.1% less time than the as-built and 100 years cases. The disconnection 
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upper bounds for this case were 3% more than the connectivity-based upper bounds.  Figure 6.9 
and 6.10 show the GIM values and rankings.  
 
 
Figure 6.9 Inspection seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based GIMs. 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Inspection seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based GIM rankings. 
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The int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  average values increased by 0.38% and decreased by 0.79%, 
respectively, which are less than the connectivity-based case. From the values, one can clearly 
see the changes in values that result in change in assignment for the 7
th
 and 8
th
 ranked union 
definition components from the as-built case. When one compares these ordinal rankings to those 
of the as-built, one sees that the 14
th
-15
th
 and 12
th
-13
th
 ranked intersection definition components 
have switched. Due to the low level of probability, whether these have switched due to numerical 
error or true changes in network functionality is unclear. The highest CPIM value ranked 
components are in Table 6.5 and are 1.14% larger than the connectivity-based approaches. These 
were 1.14% larger than the values shown for the connectivity-based approach in Table 6.2 and 
were 2.09% higher in value on average than the values in Table 6.3. Even for the reliability-
based approach, none of these bridge examples showed significant changes in hierarchical 
structures or GIMs, indicating that for the network at hand time does not influence which 
components and groups are important much over time.  
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
89 82.0 83.5 
88 82.0 83.5 
91 74.4 74.9 
90 74.3 74.9 
113 70.2 71.5 
112 70.2 71.5 
111 62.8 63.9 
110 62.8 63.9 
247 59.5 60.6 
246 59.5 60.6 
 
Table 6.5 Inspection seaside bridge deterioration reliability-based top ranked components. 
6.3.1.6  Bridge deterioration summary 
After reviewing three bridge network time points for both connectivity-based and reliability-
based approaches, several things are clear for the network rubrics. All values for the S-RDA 
bounds, component CPIMs, and GIMs increase with deterioration for both approaches. While the 
reliability-based and connectivity-based structures are different, they do not evolve over time. 
The reliability-based dendogram has more depth. Direct comparisons between the structures are 
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difficult, since they are different; however, the reliability-based approach performs best for the 
network rubrics. In general, the network metrics do not exhibit changes in the top 10 CPIM value 
ranked components or top 6 GIM value ranked groups over time. The GIM and CPIM values 
change similarly for both approaches; however the CPIM values are multi-scale S-RDA bounds 
are larger for the reliability-based approach. The component models exhibited small changes in 
compilation time requirements; however, more time variation occurs for the connectivity-based 
approach than the reliability-based approach for the bounds times. While the intersection 
description is more important, both the union and intersection description GIMs contain some 
useful information for this example. Using both component CPIM and GIM information, both 
connectivity-based and reliability-based approaches placed most importance on the components 
and groups of components nearest the epicenter and source node.  
Overall, effects of time-dependence for this bridge network are small when it comes to changing 
the distribution of importance. For such a network, interested management entities would only 
need to consider the as-built case. Additionally, due to the efficiency of the reliability-based 
approach, the bridge network is better analyzed with it. While there were increases in values for 
every network rubric with further deterioration, perhaps more deterioration on a different 
network would offer different effects on the distribution of importance.  
 Pipeline network 6.3.2
To evaluate a case where a considerable increase in fragility for the most fragile network 
components occurs in the analysis time frame, the pipeline FIFs from section 6.2.2 shall be 
investigated. These will also have seaside deterioration characteristics, which vary as exponential 
decay functions of the two parameters which define splash-zone and atmospheric based on 
distance from a coastline. Figure 6.11 displays the network configuration and coastline topology 
with the as-built case top CPIM value ranked components. Note that this network has not 
previously been used in this work. This network has 59 nodes and 99 bi-directional links for 257 
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total components. The seismic event is characterized by the displayed epicenter with magnitude 
6.0. The source and terminal nodes are placed at 16 and 46 as shown.  
 
 
Figure 6.11 Pipeline network configuration. 
Recall that the FIF was fitted such that the most fragile component type fails almost 
deterministically at 50t  . One also expects that as deterioration occurs, the component 
reliabilities become very small. Such deterioration, especially for link-type components, ought to 
have deeper impacts on the clustering that results from the reliability-based approach. See Figure 
6.12 for the deterioration map. This mapping was created by using 0 and 1 to define splash-zone 
and atmospheric deterioration states, which have deterioration start times of
0 11 and 20corr corrT T  . Closest coast distances, , are used to construct this map. If the closest 
coast distance is within 10% of the closest component to the shore, the component is assigned a 0 
classification. If the closest coast distance is within 10% of the furthest component from the 
  
16 
46 
54 
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shore, the component is assigned a 1 classification. If the component does not fall into either of 
these categories, a scaled exponential decay function is used to obtain a classification between 0 
and 1. This continuous classifier is formally described as  
    
0                                                      
1 exp 3    
1                                                   
i splash
i i splash atm splash splash i atm
atm i
state
 
      
 


         


 (6.4) 
where  1.1minsplash    and  0.9maxatm   , which represent the largest distance value for 
splash-zone and the smallest distance value for atmospheric deterioration states. The parameter 3 
was used to obtain a more uniform distribution in Figure 6.12 while attempting to make (6.4) 
piecewise continuous. Note that if one has geospatial data on the chloride surface concentration 
map would be modified to reflect such data. Using these rules, connectivity-based and reliability-
based RI-AHSIA are explored for three cases: the as-built, the fully deteriorated (t = 25), and the 
intermediary (t = 13). To further frame deterioration-based changes, how the leaf clusters closest 
to the shore change in importance will be investigated. 
 
 
Figure 6.12 Pipeline deterioration classification. 
 
 
Splash Atmospheric
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6.3.2.1 As-built seaside pipeline deterioration RI-AHSIA 
The as-built scenario, i.e. t = 0, presents a baseline for deterioration. The component model 
required 1,003 sec to compile. The hierarchal structure shown in Figure 6.13 shows the relevant 
hierarchy for all connectivity-based pipeline examples. Note that the hierarchical structure 
identified in Lim et al. (In print) of this network, which used a non-automated approach, was 
simpler. It corresponded to cutting the dendogram in Figure 6.13 such that it had 4 equal level 
leaf clusters and three levels of network representation.  
 
Figure 6.13 As-built seaside pipeline deterioration hierarchical structure. 
Using the correlation tolerance scale factor 0.3 for all further pipeline analyses, the multi-scale S-
RDA disconnection bounds were 51.5%-52.5% at 1% and 47.5%-52.5% at 5% requiring 436 sec. 
The corresponding crude-MCS prediction was 52.3% at 5% c.o.v. The top CPIM value ranked 
components are shown in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.11. These were obtained by adding link-sets 
and cut-sets until the median difference between the two CPIM definitions was less than 1%. 
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Note that the terminal node was ranked 10
th
 and that another node, 54, which is closer to the 
epicenter, was ranked 9
th
. Both of these are adjacent nodes. None of the earlier examples ranked 
a node in the top 10 components. 110 and 111 correspond to a second level inter-cluster link 
while the rest are in the leaf cluster labeled 24 on the right-side in Figure 6.13.  
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
110 39.0 40.7 
111 39.0 40.7 
102 36.0 37.6 
103 36.0 37.6. 
256 34.6 36.1 
257 34.6 36.1 
97 34.2 35.8 
96 34.2 35.8 
54 32.3 34.3 
46 30.8 32.6 
 
Table 6.6 As-built seaside pipeline deterioration top ranked components. 
The GIM values and ordinal rankings, are shown in Figure 6.14 and Figure 6.15, respectively. 
One sees again the exponential trend associated with the intersection description, e.g. only the 
top 6 int
iGIM  have significant value. The union description clusters 
uni
iGIM  had large probability 
values with low variability. The uni
iGIM  variability for this network is the least of all networks 
investigated thus far. The only cluster with a largely dissimilar uni
iGIM  value was the last cluster 
which has only 4 components, which indicates that this cluster ought to be ignored. 
Since the int
iGIM  had more variability, only these GIMs will be fully analyzed. Note that the top 
ranked cluster was the same cluster ranked last by the uni
iGIM ; therefore, it had overly elevated 
importance. The 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 ranked clusters are the two top scale clusters that contain the source 
and terminal nodes, respectively. Since the int
iGIM  typically has a bias toward smaller clusters, 
this indicates that these higher-scale is important. Since they have similar values, neither is more 
important than the other. The 4
th
 and 5
th
 ranked clusters are leaf clusters under the 3
rd
 and 2
nd
 
ranked clusters. The 4
th
 ranked cluster is next to the cluster containing the terminal node while 
the 5
th
 ranked cluster is the cluster mentioned earlier for containing many of the top CPIM value 
ranked components and is also located next to the cluster containing the source node. The 6
th
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ranked cluster is the subnetwork of intermediary depth in the hierarchy between the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 
ranked cluster which contains the terminal node and the cluster of size 4. Some of these lower-
scale clusters may have passed importance to higher-scales. 
  
 
Figure 6.14 As-built seaside pipeline deterioration GIM values. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.15 As-built seaside pipeline deterioration GIM rankings. 
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The leaf clusters between the special nodes, the terminal node, and the inter-cluster bi-directional 
link consisting of 110-111 are the most important areas and components for interested utility 
managers’ intervention. The leaf clusters on the shore correspond to the cluster of size 54 on the 
left and the cluster of size 35 on the right. Note that the size 54 cluster was ranked 9
th
 and 6
th
 and 
the size 35 cluster was ranked 14
th
 and 2
nd
 by int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM . 
6.3.2.2 25 seaside pipeline deterioration RI-AHSIA 
Given the state of the as-built case, the t = 25 pipeline scenario was explored for a highly 
deteriorated case. Due to many components having small reliabilities, the t = 50 scenario was 
found to be too error prone for the method. Furthermore, such deterioration is unrealistic for 
representing an infrastructure network with real-time demand and management. The component 
model required 1,029 sec to compile, which was 2.59% longer than the as-built case. The multi-
scale S-RDA disconnection bounds were 57.8%-60.0% at their closest and 55.1%-60.0% at 5% 
requiring 635 sec. The 5% upper bound was 7.5% larger and required 45.6% more time than the 
as-built scenario. The corresponding crude-MCS prediction, which required 7.6 sec, is 60.5% at 
5% c.o.v. Note that the FIFs must also be used in the sampling analysis.  
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
55 79.6 83.3 
13 78.6 81.7 
12 75.1 77.2 
35 74.1 74.2 
36 66.8 70.4 
56 66.5 69.9 
37 66.4 69.7 
57 65.1 67.9 
47 63.7 65.6 
39 63.2 65.0 
 
Table 6.7 25 pipeline deterioration top ranked components. 
All top 10 CPIM value ranked components, which were 50.0% larger than their as-built values, 
became nodes close to the shore, as can be seen in Table 6.7 and Figure 6.16. Note that another 
deterioration case is also shown in Figure 6.16. Since network function also influences the 
component CPIMs, some are not closest to the coastline. Also, the CPIM values in Table 6.6 
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were 2.62% smaller than those for t = 25. Note that there is no overlap between the as-built and 
25 deteriorated scenarios top ranked components. This indicates that large changes in importance 
occur at the component level for this network. Since the theoretical FIF was fit to the most 
fragile components, which were nodes, this effect must be due to its influence. 
 
 
Figure 6.16 13 and 25 seaside pipeline deterioration top CPIM value ranked components. 
The GIM values and the associated ordinal rankings on the hierarchical structure from RI-
AHSIA can be seen in Figure 6.17 are shown in Figure 6.18. Note that these GIM values are 
exhibit less agreement for the cut-set and link-set formulations and have all increased on average 
by 3.66% and 2.66% for the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM , respectively, when compared to the as-built 
scenario; however, clusters 11 and 13 have an unnoticeable change in value. Due to the small 
variance for the union description, which has shrunk from the as-built, only the intersection 
description GIMs will be analyzed. The top six int
iGIM  ranked clusters have changed somewhat. 
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Since the 7
th
 ranked cluster also has a similar value to the top 6 ranked clusters, it must also be 
considered. There is typically a large differential between the top ranked groups and the rest, 
which is similar to the gap statistics idea from Chapter 4. For this example this occurs after the 
7
th
. 
 
 
Figure 6.17 25 seaside pipeline deterioration GIM values. 
The top two ranked clusters are the top level clusters. The 3
rd
 ranked cluster is the 6
th
 ranked 
cluster in the as-built scenario. This cluster contains the terminal node. The 4
th
 ranked cluster 
corresponds to the size 4 leaf cluster which was ranked 1
st
 previously. The 5
th
 and 7
th 
ranked 
clusters are the same as the as-built. The 6
th
 ranked cluster is the 3
rd
 ranked cluster in the as-built. 
Lastly, note that the clusters closest to the shore, leaf clusters of size 35 and 54, have decreased 
and increased in union description ranking. All the top ranked components are in these leaf 
clusters as well. The leaf cluster of size 54 had even more coastline close to it, resulting in a 
higher rank in intersection description too. The overall importance of these two clusters does not 
indicate that they require intervention by an interested management authority.  
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Figure 6.18 25 seaside pipeline deterioration GIM rankings. 
6.3.2.3 13 seaside pipeline deterioration RI-AHSIA 
To investigate a time point in between the two already discussed, the analysis was repeated for 
the 13t   case.  The component model required 1,011 sec to compile, which 0.797% longer and 
1.75% shorter than the as-built and t = 25 case. Note that there does not seem to be as much of a 
deterioration effect on the component model compilation times for the pipeline model when 
compared to the bridge model. The multi-scale S-RDA disconnection bounds were 48.0%-54.1% 
at their closest requiring 702 sec, which was 61.0% and 10.5% longer than the as-built and t = 25 
cases. Note that this analysis was significantly coarser than either earlier analysis, indicating that 
the inner case was more problematic for the deteriorating component model. The upper bounds 
were around 2% larger than those for the as-built scenario and 6% smaller than those for the t = 
25 case. The corresponding crude-MCS prediction, which required 16 sec, is 52.3% at 5% c.o.v. 
and is contained within the multi-scale S-RDA bounds. 
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Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
35 51.5 45.6 
55 51.1 45.3 
38 45.9 33.0 
37 45.8 23.7 
13 42.3 40.3 
12 42.0 39.7 
36 41.0 33.6 
111 40.1 40.2 
110 40.1 40.3 
102 37.0 37.1 
103 36.9 37.1 
28 33.9 29.1 
 
Table 6.8 13 seaside pipeline deterioration top ranked components. 
The top 10 CPIM value ranked components, as displayed in Table 6.8 and Figure 6.16, which 
required all sets, contain only two components, nodes 28 and 38, which are not ranked in the 
earlier two cases. It is clear though that the node-type have become the most important rankings 
at t = 13. Since the analysis exhibited coarse convergence, all sets were used to obtain these. The 
4 top ranked components from the as-built scenario remain and are ranked 8
th
 through 11
th
. See 
also that the values in Table 6.8 are 13.5% larger than the as-built case and 19.8% smaller than 
the t = 25 case. There are no components ranked highly by all three cases. 
 
 
Figure 6.19 13 seaside pipeline deterioration GIM values. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.01
0.02
G
IM
Intersection description
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.5
1
G
IM
Union description
 
 
Cut-set based
Link-set based
149 
 
For the GIM values, which were 0.21% and 1.48% larger for the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  when 
compared to the as-built case, and ordinal rankings, see Figures 6.19 and 6.20. These values are 
much closer to the as-built case than the t = 25 case. Note the similarities between the current 
uni
iGIM  and the t = 25 case; On the other hand, the 
int
iGIM  still has a high value for the cluster 
with 4 components and values that are in between the earlier analyses.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.20 13 seaside pipeline deterioration GIM rankings. 
6.3.2.4 Connectivity-based component and group importance pipeline deterioration evolution 
To clarify how the important groups and components evolve over time, all time-point 
information for the connectivity-based approach has been compiled into two tables. See Table 
6.9 for a summary of the top CPIM value ranked components. Note that nodes 28 and 38 are 
only highly important to the t = 13 case. As described previously, all top ranked components 
eventually become nodes closest to the seaside and gain in CPIM value. The largest value gain 
happens between the as-built and t = 13 case. 
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Component 13 rank As-built rank 25 rank 
35 1 N/A 4 
55 2 N/A 1 
38 3 N/A N/A 
37 4 N/A 7 
13 5 N/A 2 
12 6 N/A 3 
36 7 N/A 6 
111 8 2 N/A 
110 9 1 N/A 
102 10 3 N/A 
103 11 4 N/A 
28 12 N/A N/A 
 
Table 6.9 Seaside pipeline deterioration top ranked component summary. 
To see how these rankings compare to the earlier analyses, Table 6.10 shows the top six clusters 
from each pipeline case for each description. Note how all GIM top ranked clusters in the t = 13 
case are in the top rankings of the as-built and t = 25 cases. The small cluster that was ranked 
first by int
iGIM  loses importance as time progresses, making the two top level clusters become 
ranked 1
st
 and 2
nd
 in the later cases. The 4
th int
iGIM  component decreases in both values over 
time. Recall this component represents a cluster in between the source and terminal nodes. The 
5
th
 int
iGIM  ranked seems to be mostly unaffected; however, the 6
th
 int
iGIM  ranked cluster gains 
in intersection ranking but oscillates in union ranking. The union definition rankings are listed 
for reference, but contain little range, disqualifying the need for further analysis.  
Cluster ID 
As-built rank 13 rank 25 rank 
Intersection Union Intersection Union Intersection Union 
13 1 14 3 14 4 14 
1 2 4 1 1 1 1 
0 3 3 2 2 2 2 
7 4 5 4 6 6 7 
11 5 11 5 12 5 11 
2 6 10 6 8 3 12 
9 10 1 11 5 12 5 
8 14 2 14 3 14 4 
6 9 6 8 4 8 3 
3 13 7 12 7 11 6 
 
Table 6.10 Seaside pipeline deterioration top ranked group summary. 
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The most important clusters from the int
iGIM  were then the two leaf clusters at the bottom of the 
network, with the one containing many of the top ranked components in the as-built unaffected 
by deterioration in ranking. The other leaf cluster is contained in the cluster intersection ranked 
just 6
th
 initially, but, while this cluster decreases in ranking, the higher-scale cluster increases in 
ranking. The other clusters ranked highly by intersection are on the highest-scale of the network. 
One sees a general trend that the clusters closer to the source gain or maintain importance 
ranking over time, while those closer to the terminus lose in importance ranking over time. Since 
the coast is sloped so that it is closer to the source, one may say this is somewhat intuitive.  
To address the coast cluster discussion, the cluster IDs 6 and 8 correspond to the cluster or size 
54 on the left and size 8 on the right in Figure 6.13. These clusters contain all top ranked nodes 
for t = 13. Cluster 6 gains in importance for both descriptions over time. Cluster 8, On the other 
hand, lost in importance for uni
iGIM  and stayed the same for 
int
iGIM . These changes in 
importance also seem to be related to the slant of the coastline and the number of components of 
closest to the coastline, which are merits more associate with cluster 6. Note that both the 
component and group rankings were extremely sensitive to this deterioration scheme. Since new 
components were listed in the top 10, this was most pronounced for the components with 
continued deterioration; however, the connectivity-based adjacency matrix was invariant to time. 
6.3.2.5 As-built seaside pipeline deterioration reliability-based RI-AHSIA 
To see the effects on how the hierarchical structure may change over time, the previous three 
analyses are recreated using the reliability-based adjacency matrix. First, the as-built case is 
revisited. See Figure 6.21 for the requisite structure. Note that this structure had the same depth 
and number of clusters, but did not specify a leaf cluster of size 4, as in Figure 6.13. The top 
level division was also more balanced than before. The smallest leaf cluster was now of size 14 
and contained the source node, while the leaf cluster closest to the shore had increased in size 
from 54 to 57 original components. Many of the leaf clusters were of similar size. Using the 
same component model that was compiled for Section 6.3.2.1, the multi-scale S-RDA 
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disconnection bounds were 48.4%-49.4% at 1% bounds and 44.6%-49.5% at 5% bounds, 
requiring 538 sec, which was 23.4% more time. The 5% upper bound values were 3% lower than 
the connectivity-based approach and agreed worse with the crude-MCS prediction.  
 
Figure 6.21 As-built seaside pipeline detereoration reliability-based hierarchical structure.  
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
111 39.6 40.4 
110 39.6 40.4 
102 36.6 37.3 
103 36.6 37.3 
257 35.0 35.7 
256 35.0 35.7 
97 34.7 35.4 
96 34.7 35.4 
54 34.2 35.2 
46 33.8 34.7 
 
Table 6.11 As-built seaside pipeline deterioration reliability-based top ranked components. 
See Table 6.11 and Figure 6.11 for the top 10 CPIM value ranked components, which were 
0.44% larger than the connectivity-based analysis. Note that these components are the same as 
10+10+8 = 28
16 + 10 + 4 = 30 16 + 10 + 4 = 30
16 + 25 + 6 = 47 16 + 16 + 8 = 40 16 + 9 + 8 = 33
9 + 7 + 4 = 20
257
128 121
64 60 60
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30 28 27 25
33
19
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the connectivity-based analysis with similar values. The components 110, 111, 46 and 54 
correspond to inter-cluster links and adjacent nodes, as before.  
 
 
Figure 6.22 As-built seaside pipeline detereoration reliability-based GIM values. 
See Figures 6.22 - 6.23 for the GIM values and ordinal rankings. Both the highest values and 
average values for the reliability-based GIMs were higher than the connectivity-based GIMs for 
both descriptions. Also, there is even less variability with the union definition, with the lowest 
ranked cluster, which happens to be smallest in size, contains the source node, and is ranked 5
th
 
int
iGIM , having a significantly different value, indicating it is as unimportant as the cluster of 
size 4 from the connectivity-based structure. Since the uni
iGIM  values are similar again, the
int
iGIM  will drive importance selections. This is the same effect as the 
uni
iGIM  trend in the 
connectivity-based analysis. The 3
rd
 and 4
th
 ranked clusters are the highest ranked clusters. Since 
the top level clusters were also ranked highly previously, this is unsurprising. The 3
rd
 ranked 
cluster contains the 1
st
 ranked cluster, which is adjacent to the source, the 2
nd
 ranked cluster, 
which is the leaf cluster that contains the six top ranked components that are not adjacent, the 5
th
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ranked cluster, which has over-elevated importance, and the 6
th
 ranked cluster, which contains 
the 1
st
, 2
nd
, and 5
th
 ranked clusters. Clearly, the branch containing the source node performs best 
for int
iGIM . The 5
th
 ranked cluster is the last ranked union definition cluster, suggesting that this 
intersection definition ranking may be driven by the small size. The 6
th
 ranked cluster is two 
levels above the leaf cluster containing it. The 5
th
 and 6
th
 ranked int
iGIM  clusters contain the 
majority of the top CPIM value ranked components.  
 
 
Figure 6.23 As-built scenario pipeline detereoration reliability-based GIM rankings. 
Revisiting the seashore cluster investigation, the 7
th
 ranked cluster is the leaf cluster closest to 
the shore. Note that this cluster also was ranked 4
th
 by the union definition and been given more 
importance than the connectivity-based approach. Note that the smaller leaf cluster on the right 
side of the shore, which has size 30, was given the lowest possible and 5
th
 ranking for int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM . In this analysis, the larger coast proximal cluster is much more important.  
Since this analysis also ranks the top level clusters as important, the importance indicated here 
may be due to the circular nature of the network, with most components having similar failure 
likelihoods and correlations from their similar epicentral distances. Note that none of these 
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clusters other than a highest level cluster contain the terminal node in this analysis, unlike the 
connectivity-based analysis. By the reliability-based analysis, the portions of the network 
requiring intervention from an interested management body were: the groups close to the source 
node, the components 110 and 111, and the source node. Since the    
6.3.2.6 13 seaside pipeline deterioration reliability-based RI-AHSIA 
Revisiting the 13 seaside deteriorated pipeline case with the reliability-based approach, one finds 
the hierarchical structure from RI-AHSIA in Figure 6.21, which is the same structure as the as-
built reliability-based analysis. Using such a structure, the multi-scale S-RDA disconnection 
bounds were 49.0%-52.3% at closest bounds and 47.5%-52.4% at 5% bound, requiring 948 sec. 
Note that these bounds are significantly less coarse than the ones found with the connectivity-
based approach, are 1.7% less, agree with the crude-MCS prediction, and require 35.0% more 
time. These 5% bounds increased 2.9% from the as-built, reliability-based approach and required 
76.2% more time.  
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
35 51.6 49.7 
38 42.3 28.8 
13 41.7 41.7 
37 41.5 36.6 
12 41.0 41.2 
111 39.9 40.2 
110 39.9 40.2 
28 39.5 39.3 
102 36.7 37.1 
103 36.7 37.1 
 
Table 6.12 13 seaside pipeline deterioration reliability-based top ranked components. 
See Table 6.12 and Figure 6.16 for the top 10 CPIM value ranked components, which required 
all sets. Contrasting these to the original 13 deteriorated case rankings, i.e. Table 6.8, the only 
major difference is that the other direction on the link corresponding to components 102 and 103 
and node 28 have been included while the nodes 55 and 36 have been omitted. These values are 
12.1% higher on average than the as-built case, but similar in distribution to the connectivity-
based t = 13 case, as the reliability-based values were only 1.05% larger on average. The 4
th
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ranked intersection cluster contains the bi-directional link corresponding to components 101-102, 
while the clusters closest to the shore contain the majority of top ranked nodes.  
 
 
Figure 6.24 13 seaside pipeline deterioration reliability-based GIM values.  
The GIM values and ordinal rankings can be seen in Figures 6.24 and 6.25, respectively. There is 
less variability with the uni
iGIM  than before, although the 
int
iGIM  have increased in value 
significantly for the highest ranked cluster. The uni
iGIM and
int
iGIM  values have increased on 
average by 0.36% and 0.70% from the as-built, reliability-based case. Comparing these rankings 
to the case with the connectivity-based adjacency matrix, one sees that the highest level clusters 
and smallest cluster receive similar rankings, although more importance has shifted toward the 
highest level cluster containing the source. The leaf cluster closest to the seaside, which many of 
the new ranked components are contained in, has also increased in importance from int
iGIM  7
th
 
to 5
th
, while the cluster of size 19, which contained many of the original important components, 
has dropped in int
iGIM  ordinal rankings from 2
nd
 to 4
th
. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
G
IM
Intersection description
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.5
1
G
IM
Union description
 
 
Cut-set based
Link-set based
157 
 
 
 
Figure 6.25 13 seaside pipeline deterioration reliability-based GIM rankings.  
6.3.2.7 25 seaside deterioration pipeline reliability-based RI-AHSIA 
Revisiting the 25 deteriorated pipeline case with the reliability-based approach, one finds the 
hierarchical structure from RI-AHSIA in Figure 6.21. Using such a structure, the multi-scale S-
RDA disconnection bounds were 56.6%-58.9% at closest bounds and 54.1%-59.0% at 5% 
bounds in 652 sec, which is 2% slower than the connectivity-based approach and 31.2% slower 
than the t = 13 case. Note that these bounds are lower than the crude-MCS prediction, are 1 % 
lower than the connectivity-based case, and are 6.3% larger than the t = 13 case. See Table 6.13 
and Figure 6.16 for the top 10 CPIM value ranked components, which required all sets. 
Contrasting these to the connectivity-based t = 25 case rankings, i.e. Table 6.7, which were 
1.10% larger, convergence is still an issue for the component rankings. Furthermore, these 
rankings were 33.0% larger than the reliability-based t = 13 case. This is reflected in the cut-set 
values being larger than the link-set values. 
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Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
13 80.2 72.7 
12 76.7 73.6 
36 70.7 70.1 
56 70.3 69.5 
37 70.3 69.3 
55 69.4 68.0 
57 69.3 67.5 
47 67.6 65.3 
35 67.6 72.3 
39 67.4 64.6 
 
Table 6.13 25 pipeline deterioration reliability-based top ranked components.   
 For the GIM values, which were 3.21% and 2.55% larger for the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  when 
compared to the as-built case, and ordinal rankings, see Figures 6.26 and 6.27, respectively. 
When compared to the connectivity-based structure, the GIM values change less and exhibit 
different trends for the int
iGIM , which arise from a difference in structure. The highest level 
clusters receive also receive similarly high rankings. Particularly for the reliability-based 
approach, the large leaf cluster by the coast, which is of size 57, has increased in importance. 
Additionally, the uni
iGIM  has low variance. The most highly ranked clusters are again clusters 
closest to this source and on the side of the network closer to the seaside. 
Comparing to the previous reliability-based case, the most obvious change is the increased 
importance of the highest level clusters for the int
iGIM . Additionally, one must note that the leaf 
cluster on the coast, containing the majority to top ranked components has increased in int
iGIM . 
Despite gaining the rest of the top ranked components, the smaller seaside cluster has not gained 
significant importance. Other than this, the top ranked clusters not close to the shore have 
decreased by 1 ordinal ranking.   
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Figure 6.26 25 seaside pipeline deterioration reliability-based GIM values. 
 
 
Figure 6.27 25 seaside pipeline deterioration reliability-based GIM rankings. 
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6.3.2.8 Reliability-based component and group importance pipeline deterioration evolution 
Revisiting the top CPIM value ranked component comparison from the connectivity-based 
analysis, there are no components ranked highly by all three cases, as shown by the ranking 
comparison in Table 6.14. Again, components 28 and 38 are only ranked highly by the t = 13 
case. The t = 13 CPIM top ranked components are 12.1% higher on average than the as-built. 
Additionally, these components are 17.3% lower on average than the t = 25 case.  
Component 13 rank As-built rank 25 rank 
35 1 N/A 8 
38 2 N/A N/A 
13 3 N/A 1 
37 4 N/A 5 
12 5 N/A 2 
111 6 1 N/A 
110 7 2 N/A 
28 8 N/A N/A 
102 9 3 N/A 
103 10 4 N/A 
 
Table 6.14 Seaside pipeline deterioration reliability-based top ranked components summary. 
See Table 6.15 for a time description of the top 6 GIMs for both descriptions. Unlike the 
connectivity-based trials, the top int
iGIM  six clusters do not remain the same six. While the 5
th
 
and 6
th
 ranked clusters eventually became ranked 7
th
, the 7
th
 ranked cluster eventually became 
the 4
th
 ranked cluster throughout the time span. Incidentally, this 7
th
 ranked cluster corresponds 
to the larger seaside leaf cluster on the left, which came to contain the majority of highly ranked 
components. The smaller seaside leaf cluster on the right, which came to contain the other highly 
ranked components, did not gain as much importance, but did become the third highest rank 
cluster by uni
iGIM . The highest level clusters do become the most highly ranked groups by both 
definitions; however, this is likely due to similar component failure probabilities and 
correlations. The leaf clusters near the source decrease in ordinal ranking, but are still within the 
top 6 at the end of the analysis. The leaf cluster containing the source eventually becomes ranked 
7
th
 . The largest change for this example is that the size 57 seaside cluster on the left becomes the 
most important cluster. 
161 
 
Cluster ID 
As-built rank 13 rank 25 rank 
Intersection Union Intersection Union Intersection Union 
13 1 9 2 9 3 10 
12 2 13 4 13 5 13 
2 3 2 1 1 1 2 
1 4 3 3 2 2 1 
14 5 14 6 14 7 14 
5 6 12 7 12 6 12 
3 12 1 11 3 8 5 
6 (57) L 7 4 5 4 4 4 
7 (30) R 14 5 12 5 12 3 
10 8 6 8 6 10 7 
 
Table 6.15 Seaside pipeline deterioration reliability-based top ranked groups summary. 
6.3.2.9 Pipeline deterioration summary 
With the pipeline network example, one finds that there are noticeable changes in component 
importance towards the sea shore over time for both connectivity-based and reliability-based 
approaches. The GIMs also change over time toward the shore, but do not show as much 
sensitivity as the component level. Since the range of values is small, the union description does 
not offer much important information for this example for each deterioration scheme and 
approach. While both approaches favor the same components, the connectivity-based approach 
favors the leaf clusters between the special nodes, with the cluster closer to the source node 
gaining in importance. The reliability-based approach favors the leaf clusters near the source 
node, with the large cluster on seaside gaining in importance while the leaf clusters inland near 
the source node lose some importance. The reliability-based approach also exhibits larger 
changes in importance rankings than the connectivity-based approach. The changes in how 
components are ranked are not directly related to the changes in how groups are ranked. The 
multi-scale S-RDA bounds were typically lower, inaccurate, and required more time, while the 
CPIM values were typically larger for the reliability-based approach. 
Since the pipeline FIFs were numerically modelled to be more sensitive, the network rubric 
values for the pipeline network are much more sensitive to time than the bridge network; 
however, the component model compilation times are again largely unaffected by the 
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deterioration. While the dendogram for the reliability-based approach does not specify a tiny leaf 
cluster and provides better convergence overall, the connectivity-based approach exhibits better 
accuracy and requires less time. Using the connectivity-based analysis, the component CPIM 
rankings require future time analyses for these analyses; however, the GIM rankings from the as-
built state are just as useful as those from the GIM rankings for the other deterioration states. The 
component model compilations seem to be less sensitive to the deterioration state, but require 
slightly more time as more deterioration occurs. Note that the structures do not evolve over time. 
 Pipeline network revisited 6.3.3
Since the earlier analysis showed the extent to which the node-type components were more 
fragile to deterioration, how network that has link-type components that are most susceptible to 
deterioration responds may be significantly different. This reflects deterioration more typical of 
the bridge component model presented earlier, and any model that has node-type components 
that exhibit deterioration over time at a much smaller time-scale than the line-type components. 
Using the same fitting process described in Section 6.2.2, but for line-type components of 
network average length, one obtains FIF parameters 100,  50,  0.05,  and 0.9,a b c d     with 
10corrT  . Since (6.2) only affects how the network deteriorates, the as-built case remains the 
same. For brevity, the deterioration schemes will only be compared in the connectivity-based 
approach. 
6.3.3.1 13 seaside pipeline link-deterioration RI-AHSIA 
Once again revisiting the t = 13 case with the link-deterioration model, the connectivity-based 
adjacency matrix obtains the same hierarchical structure shown in Figure 6.13. The component 
model required 1,031 sec to compile, 2.79% and 1.98% longer than the as-built and earlier t = 13 
case. The multi-scale S-RDA disconnection bounds were 81.3%-82.3% at 1% and 77.5%-82.4% 
at 5%, requiring 664 seconds, which was 52.3% longer and 5.41% shorter than the as-built and 
earlier t = 13 case . Note that these bounds are markedly higher than the as-built case, which had 
5% bounds that were 29.5% less, and the previous t = 13 case, which 5% bounds were 28.3% 
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less. The network reliability seems to be much more sensitive to the link-deterioration model. 
The corresponding crude-MCS estimate is 82.0% at 5% c.o.v. required 2.0 sec.  
 
 
Figure 6.28 13 pipeline link-deterioration GIM values. 
See Figures 6.28 and 6.29 for the GIM values and ordinal rankings. For the values, one finds that 
the overall values are larger than the as-built time case, which were 1.35% and 7.86% larger for 
the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM , and the t = 13 case with the earlier deterioration model, which were 
1.14% and 6.38% for the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM . The large increase in GIM values was clearly 
related to the much higher multi-scale S-RDA bounds. The top 7 ranked cases were the same for 
all three analyses.  The values have less range for the link-definition for both GIM definitions.  
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Figure 6.29 13 seaside pipeline link-deterioration GIM rankings.  
The top 10 ranked components can be found in Table 6.16 and Figure 6.30. A subset of cut-sets 
and all link-sets were used to make the maximum difference between definitions 1%. Many of 
the as-built components still remained in the top components, with the top 10 CPIM values 
increases 27.8% on average. When compared to the t = 13 case with the earlier deterioration, the 
top CPIM values were 27.5% larger on average. The large increase in CPIM values was clearly 
related to the much higher multi-scale S-RDA bounds.  
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
111 65.6 66.4 
110 65.6 66.4 
257 61.8 62.5 
256 61.8 62.5 
102 61.0 61.7 
103 61.0 61.7 
237 60.3 60.1 
236 60.3 60.1 
96 59.6 60.3 
97 59.6 60.3 
 
Table 6.16 13 seaside pipeline link-deterioration top ranked components. 
Since the deterioration only affected the links, no nodes occur in these rankings. Interestingly 
enough, only 236 and 237 occur as newly ranked uni-directional links. The other new 
10+10+6 = 26
30 30
37 47 33
21
257
133 6.
1.
118 2.
2.
68 5.
8.
61 12.
6.
60 7.
12.
54
11.
4.
32 8.
9.
28
3.
7. 35
13.
3. 20
14.
5. 28
9.
10. 24
4.
11.
24 10.
13.
4 1.
14.
165 
 
components correspond to the other directions of previously ranked unidirectional links. When 
the full network deterioration model was used, many more components were ranked more highly 
closer to the coastline. Also note that this newly high ranked bidirectional link is not ranked 
highest. 
 
 
Figure 6.30 13 and 25 seaside pipeline link-deterioration top ranked components. 
6.3.3.2 25 seaside pipeline link-deterioration RI-AHSIA 
To investigate the time state where large amounts of deterioration occur, t = 25 is used once 
again. The hierarchical structure is the same yet again. Using the multi-scale S-RDA, the closest 
and 5% disconnection bounds were 82.1%-83.3% and 78.5%-83.4%, requiring 847 sec, which 
was 94.3% and 33.4% longer than the as-built case and t = 25 case from the earlier deterioration 
scheme. The 5% upper bound was 30.9% and 23.4% larger than the as-built case and t = 25 case 
from the earlier deterioration scheme. It is interesting to note that the convergence is coarser for 
16 
46 
236, 237 
                 
        13  
        13, 25       
        25  
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the 25 case than the 13 case using the link-deterioration model while the earlier model showed 
the opposite issue. For comparison, the crude-MCS result, which agrees well, was 83.1% with 
5% c.o.v. requiring 1.9 sec.  
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
237 76.2 75.6 
236 76.2 75.6 
111 75.2 75.6 
110 75.1 75.6 
196 71.6 72.2 
197 71.5 72.2 
102 70.1 70.3 
103 70.1 70.3 
257 69.4 70.1 
256 69.4 70.1 
 
Table 6.17 25 seaside pipeline link-deterioration top ranked components. 
Table 6.17 and Figure 6.30 show the top 10 ranked components, which required all identified 
sets be used. The average CPIM values of these components were 39.6% and 40.3% larger than 
the as-built case and t = 13 case from the earlier deterioration scheme. For this time point, the 
other deterioration resulted in lower average CPIM values than the as-built case. Even after using 
all sets, there still seems to be some mismatch for the top two components. These correspond to a 
bi-directional link close to the coast. 96 and 97 have dropped out of the rankings while a bi-
directional link closer to the shore, corresponding to unidirectional link components 196 and 
197, has taken the 5
th
 and 6
th
 rankings. The 3
rd
 and 4
th
 ranking corresponds to the top ranked 
component in the earlier 2 cases. While the system disconnection bounds have not moved much, 
a new component has managed to become much more important. This indicates that little 
movement in bounds does not suggest that component network contribution remains static.  
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Figure 6.31 25 seaside pipeline link-deterioration GIM values.  
The relevant GIM values, which were 1.88% and 8.70% larger, and 1.78% smaller and 6.04% 
larger than the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  for the as-built case and t = 25 case for the earlier 
deterioration scheme, and ordinal rankings can be seen in Figures 6.31 and 6.32. From the value 
description, one sees less variability and higher values on average than the as-built and 13 link-
deteriorated cases for the int
iGIM . Note that these values are somewhat smaller than those from 
the original deterioration model. For the uni
iGIM , there is little change in values with similar 
trends as before. While there has been some re-ordering of cluster rankings, one finds the same 
top 6 and 7 ranked clusters for the int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  from the ordinal rankings. The leaf 
clusters closest to the coast have increased in value but have only slightly increased in 
importance over the entire course of deterioration. Little change has occurred for the leaf clusters 
containing the source and terminal nodes. Carefully reviewing the ordinal ranking changes from 
the earlier deterioration model, one sees that less change has occurred using the link-
deterioration model, especially for the connectivity-based approach. 
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Figure 6.32 25 seaside pipeline link-deterioration GIM rankings. 
 
6.3.3.3 13 seaside pipeline link-deterioration reliability-based RI-AHSIA 
Since the analyses utilizing the connectivity-based adjacency matrix show less change in group 
structure than before, the previous two analyses will be repeated using the reliability-based 
adjacency matrix. Interestingly enough, the reliability-based approach obtains a different 
hierarchical structure than the as-built case, as shown in Figure 6.33. This has the same top level 
division as Figure 6.13, but has many similarly sized leaf clusters. In particular, only the leaf 
cluster not directly on the coast but to the right side of it, which has increased in size from 30 to 
35, has changed noticeably with this structure. This coastal leaf cluster has been downgraded in 
importance by both descriptions while the other has increased in importance for both 
descriptions. Using this structure, the multi-scale S-RDA disconnection bounds were 81.7%-
82.3% at 1% and 77.9%-82.8% at 5% and required 545 sec, which was 1.31% larger and 17.9% 
smaller than the as-built case and connectivity-based case. These agree well with the crude-MCS 
prediction, and the 5% upper bounds are 33.3% and 0.4% larger than the as-built and 
connectivity-based approach. 
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Figure 6.33 13 seaside pipeline link-deterioration reliability-based hierarchical structure. 
See Table 6.18 and Figure 6.30 for the top 10 CPIM value ranked components, which were 
28.4% and 0.17% larger than the as-built and connectivity-based t = 13 cases. Note that these 
rankings are markedly similar, but somewhat higher than those is in Table 6.13. Overall, these 
trends are largely similar to the connectivity-based case. Note that the bi-directional links 
corresponding to these top ranked components are ordered the same way as the connectivity-
based case. 
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
110 66.1 66.5 
111 66.1 66.5 
256 62.3 62.6 
257 62.3 62.6 
102 61.4 61.8 
103 61.4 61.8 
237 60.1 59.8 
236 60.1 59.8 
97 60.0 60.4 
96 60.0 60.4 
 
Table 6.18 13 seaside pipeline link-deterioration reliability-based top ranked components. 
10+10+6 = 26
16 + 10 + 4 = 30 10 + 16 + 4 = 30
25 + 16 + 6 = 47 16 + 16 + 8 = 40 16 + 9 + 8 = 33
9 + 7 + 4 = 20
257
133 118
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35 28 27 25
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The respective GIM values and ordinal rankings can be seen in Figures 6.34 and 6.35. While the
uni
iGIM  trend is similar to the one presented in the connectivity-based analysis but with less 
variance and an increase in values, the connectivity-based int
iGIM  trend is markedly different 
due to the change in structure; however, the int
iGIM  trends are similar to the ones for the as-built 
case, with the lower ranked cases gaining much more probability. Since decreased reliabilities 
around the coast would indicate a relaxing of the clustering such that the different hierarchical 
structures do not differentiate the as-built case, these trends are directly tied to the deterioration.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.34 13 seaside pipeline link-deterioration reliability-based GIM values. 
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Figure 6.35 13 seaside pipeline link-deterioration reliability-based GIM rankings. 
6.3.3.4 25 seaside pipeline link-deterioration reliability-based RI-AHSIA 
Using the reliability-based formulation with the t = 25 case, the hierarchical structure was 
actually the same as the t = 13 case. The multi-scale S-RDA bounds were 83.7%-84.7% at 1% 
and 80.0%-84.8% at 5% requiring 762 sec, which was 41.6% longer and 10.0% shorter than the 
as-built and connectivity-based cases. Note that the difference between the as-built case’s and the 
t = 13 case’s 5% upper bounds were only 2% less than the as-built case and this case, which was 
35.3%. Despite being the 5% bounds being 1.3% larger than the connectivity-case, they agreed 
reasonably well with the crude-MCS prediction.  
Component Cut-set(%) Link-set(%) 
236 75.4 74.7 
237 75.4 74.7 
111 73.8 75.6 
110 73.8 75.6 
196 69.7 72.3 
197 69.7 72.3 
103 68.9 70.4 
102 68.8 70.4 
256 68.7 70.2 
257 68.7 70.2 
 
Table 6.19 25 seaside pipeline link-deterioration reliability-based top ranked components. 
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See Table 6.19 and Figure 6.30 for the top 10 CPIM value ranked components. Note that the bi-
directional links that these components correspond to are ranked the same. These values are 
0.65% lower than the connectivity-based analysis on average, while they are 39.3% larger than 
the as-built case, which was 10.9% larger than the differential for the t = 13 case, on average. 
Even though the bounds changed marginally, the top CPIM values changed a good deal. 
Figures 6.36 and 6.37 show the GIM values, which were the same as and 0.89% larger than the
int
iGIM and
uni
iGIM  for the t = 13 reliability-case, and ordinal rankings for this case. While the 
uni
iGIM  show even less variability for this case, the 
int
iGIM  shows larger increases in values for 
the lower ranked components. While many slight int
iGIM  value changes have occurred, the leaf 
cluster with 14 components that contains the source node has jumped up two ordinal rankings. 
This exhibits the opposite trend for the analogous leaf cluster with the previous deterioration 
scheme; however, the connectivity-based analysis ranked the cluster containing this leaf cluster 
lower than the higher-scale cluster containing the leaf cluster. Also note that the two leaf clusters 
closest to the coast, which were given the same low ordinal rankings for the intersection 
description, have changed in union ranking, with the smaller and larger cluster gaining and 
losing, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 6.36 25 seaside pipeline link-deterioration reliability-based GIM values.  
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Figure 6.37 25 seaside pipeline link-deterioration reliability-based GIM rankings.  
6.3.3.5 Pipeline link-deterioration summary 
The major differences between the link-deterioration experiment and earlier deterioration 
experiment are that link components near the seaside become important instead of the node 
components and that earlier times have larger effects on the network rubric values. For the link-
deterioration scheme, the reliability-based structure actually changes over time; however, this 
structure performs worse with more deterioration while the connectivity-based structure 
performs better. In general, the reliability-based approach provides less accuracy, higher values, 
and somewhat better convergence for network rubrics. Similarly, to the general deterioration 
scheme, the component level seems most sensitive to deterioration, with GIMs and structures 
having less sensitivity. Particularly for this deterioration scheme, the range of values for both 
GIM descriptions were smaller as time progressed, indicating that such a regional approach is 
not very useful for this particular example. In general, the top ranked groups for the as-built case 
are the same as those for the most deteriorated case. Similarly to the earlier deterioration scheme, 
only CPIM information changed in a meaningful way for interested network managers.  
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6.4 Conclusions 
A study to investigate the system effects of deterioration on civil network infrastructure, 
hierarchal structure, and component and group importance has been completed. First, a 
deteriorating bridge network with a realistic topology was analyzed by considering the as-built, 
100 years, and inspection scenario cases. Using FIFs based on data and structural response, the 
connectivity and reliability-based structures did not evolve in time. Typically, one found that the 
reliability-based structure was far more efficient, but also ranked the top 10 components with a 
different ordering, although they were the same components. The reliability-based structure also 
finds disconnection bounds that are around 3% larger and exhibits more changes in GIM 
rankings than the connectivity bounds. The major difference between these two analyses was that 
6 of the top components were inter-cluster links for the reliability-based approach versus 4 for 
the connectivity-based approach. Note that the bridge model uses nodes that cannot fail. In 
general only the as-built information was needed for selecting clusters and groups of importance. 
Secondly, a deteriorating pipeline network with a realistic, circular topology was analyzed. The 
FIFs for this analysis was created by using the same form as the bridge FIFs but were fit to make 
the most fragile component, a node model, fail deterministically at t = 50. Neither the 
connectivity-based nor reliability-based structure evolved over time. The difference between 
these two approaches was that two of the as-built top 10 components were adjacent nodes only in 
the reliability-based model. Additionally, these components eventually become nodes close to 
the shore. Typically, the reliability-based structure requires more time for calculating the bounds 
and component CPIMs and predicts smaller bounds; however, it exhibits better convergence. 
Several changes for which clusters were deemed important occurred over time in this network, 
but mostly for the reliability-based structure, which was deemed less useful than the 
connectivity-based approach. Only the components required further time analyses. 
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Lastly, since link-deterioration may occur at faster rates than node-deterioration in certain 
networks, the FIF shapes were refitted such that a link of average length would fail almost 
deterministically at t = 50. For this model of deterioration, the reliability-based structure changes 
before t = 13. For the t = 13 and t = 25 cases, the reliability-based structure predicted higher 
values. These trends were more evident with increased deterioration. Only 4 new top 
components were in the top 10 ranked components. Although the ordering of top ranked groups 
changed as time progressed, the same groups were ranked highest. While the reliability-based 
structure is more sensitive to the link-deterioration, the top ranked components and groups of 
components seem to be affected more when all components are being deteriorated. Recalling that 
node reliabilities do not affect the structure, this is probably because the links are much less 
fragile with the overall deterioration model and the GIMs are sensitive to changes in node 
reliabilities. For this deterioration state, only the components require further analysis. 
Although it is difficult to make many general statements about civil infrastructure network 
examples due to their characteristics, some trends did occur for specific component models and 
deterioration schemes. The bridge model does not exhibit significant changes for the component 
and group rankings over time, while the pipeline model exhibits many changes over time. The 
reliability-based approach performs better for the bridge study; however, there are trade-offs 
between the approaches when one considers the pipeline network study. Intuitively, a network 
that offers models for both nodes and links exhibits more complexity. Only the pipeline network 
with full-deterioration exhibited expected increases in importance for the leaf cluster closest to 
the seaside. Particularly for the reliability-based approach, such complexity enables a general 
increase in changes of the component and cluster rankings when all network components are 
deteriorated.  The choice of which approach to use for deteriorating networks and whether 
further analysis beyond the as-built is required is dependent on the network characteristics. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding chapters touched upon several topics relevant to analyzing civil infrastructure 
systems. In Chapter 1, the motivations for such analysis were presented. The state of such 
networks is non-constant and without further funding will require mounting costs for baseline 
upkeep. In Chapter 2, a concern for using additional field data in numerical models led to the 
development of an adaptive importance sampling (AIS) scheme, which was able to handle many 
configurations of component and system models. Such an approach is general enough that it may 
be used for more complex systems. The approach is not sensitive to numerical noise, complex 
limit state functions, and larger dimension problems. In Chapter 3, a methodology for analyzing 
highway bridge networks was presented. This approach relies on local bridge databases, 
reinforced concrete (RC) bridge fragilities formulated from both experimental data and time-
history analysis, RC bridge deterioration models formulated from earthquake engineering models 
of shrinking steel area that do not require additional component reliability analysis, an 
appropriate network realization, and the use of the selective-Recursive Decomposition Algorithm 
(S-RDA) for network analysis. From this methodology, time-variant component rankings and the 
system reliability bounds are obtained. In Chapter 4, the issue of the exponential time costs 
associated with the S-RDA was addressed using automated hierarchical structure identifications 
algorithms (AHSIAs). Since these heuristic AHSIAs were developed based on how a network 
containing clusters of many resolutions typically presents itself, the networks that saw little 
increase in benefit when using AHSIAs had regular structure. The relative ignorant-AHSIA (RI-
AHSIA) exhibited the most robust approach of all AHSIAs. In Chapter 5, the idea of grouping 
components based on network hierarchical structure was investigated. While such structures 
indicate how the networks were organized based on a regional approach, individual groups of 
different resolutions can be rated based on group importance measures (GIMs). Lastly in Chapter 
6, all of the preceding tools were used to analyze deteriorating network civil infrastructure. Since 
the earlier deterioration study was relevant only to bridges, saw little change in network features 
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other than overall increases in values, and used a uniform deterioration mapping, this study 
focused on non-uniform types of deterioration for both bridge and pipeline networks. The bridge 
network again exhibited few changes over time; however, the pipeline network saw many 
changes, especially on the component level. Group importance rankings seemed to be less 
sensitive to deterioration when compared to the component importance ranking. Overall, using a 
reliability-based approach performed better than the connectivity-based approach for the bridge 
network, but exhibited worse performance for the pipeline network. This work also found 
valuable information on how time-variant GIM and component CPIM values and rankings ought 
to be used through an in depth study; however, further application for these is necessary. When 
one reviews this body of work, several limitations and improvements come to mind.  
7.1 Adaptive importance sampling 
Reviewing the AIS scheme proposed in Chapter 2, the need for many parameters is an obvious 
limitation. Some parameters had clear values based on parametric study, e.g. the percentage of 
samples needed in the failure domain, the target coefficient of variation (c.o.v.) for sampling, 
etc., but some are still somewhat ill-defined, e.g. the number of presamples, the optimal number 
of densities, etc. To remove the contingency of some of these parameters, the number of 
densities should not be fixed and begin with a large value, e.g. 100. As the process converges, 
several densities take on similar means and covariances. This indicates that these should be 
merged; however, some densities may take on large covariances, indicating these ought to split 
into at least two densities. Some densities may also have very small weight, indicating that they 
ought to be discarded.  If this process is dynamic, the question of how many densities and how 
many samples per density becomes less important. The heuristics based on parametric study in 
the dissertation may be used, allowing the AIS scheme to be expanded to further complex 
systems. Additionally, to diminish the uncertainty associated with parameter selection, a 
parametric study using tools from statistics must be completed for specific problems, e.g. series 
system, parallel system, different curvatures for component problems; however, recall that such a 
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study may not be useful for the general system problem due to its largely variable shape and 
complexity that may increase drastically when more component limit states are included. Until 
such dynamic changes are made, this approach will be inherently limited to more simple 
examples.  
Due to the distinct states the algorithm uses, one may think that the approach common in 
statistical learning where some data is used for having the algorithm learn and another portion of 
the data is used for testing the algorithm is a proper description. Such an idea is only useful in 
that it provides an analogy. Recall that this data is being generated during the process. It is 
inherently somewhat artificial. Likewise, the samples used during the optimization process need 
not be discarded. This process should continue indefinitely until the c.o.v. for the probability 
estimate is decreased below acceptable tolerances. Since such an algorithm would combine both 
fitting and final sampling states, the original analogy is not truly applicable. 
7.2 Bridge network methodology 
For the analysis methodology for deteriorating bridge network infrastructure, several issues arise 
that require further development. The S-RDA bounds were sensitive to the distribution of bridges 
using the bridge models. This approach ought to be applied to an actual network of highway 
bridges with exact bridge locations. While using densities from data to multinomially distribute 
the bridges on links is efficient, it is difficult to claim this is accurate for the actual network 
without thorough testing.  
The node models are currently uncorrelated and have no failure probability. These presumably 
represent highway interchanges. Since interchanges are a dense subnetwork of bridges with high 
skews and curvatures, such node models much be representative of these. When studies have 
been completed to determine the hazard response to these types of bridges, the node models 
ought to be updated to represent these.  
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7.3 Network analysis 
While the developed AHSIAs, particularly the Relative Ignorant-AHSIA (RI-AHSIA), present 
major improvements to network analysis for some of the examples, other issues and limitations 
require further study. The AHSIAs do not work well with regular or scale-free networks. If the 
hierarchical structure is too deep, too much occurs for the highest represented subnetwork. Since 
the S-RDA requires a specific special node pair, a major contingency is the effect this has on the 
component and group rankings, and the disconnection bounds. To guarantee the results are not 
overly specific, special care must be given to where these are placed. It was suggested earlier to 
place such special nodes where either they would not affect the clustering or be most 
representative of a specific evacuation scenario. This tool may be used to compare different such 
configurations, but this would entail additional analysis for each special node pair.  
In Chapter 3, the analysis for a bridge network required subjunctive links and special nodes. In 
particular, this subjunctive representations makes clustering intractable because it connects the 
network in such a way that would-be distinct clusters are now connected. Due to the major affect 
these have on clustering, such an approach is not appropriate if the network size is too large. 
These subjunctive links may only be used in a way that they do not fundamentally alter the 
network shape.  
In a similar manner, the way such special nodes are placed will inevitably affect the super-
component representation. Notice that when the source and/or terminal nodes are not present, the 
super-component representation requires the number of super-links be proportional to the square 
of the number of adjacent nodes. Should they be present, the number of super-links vary as a 
linear function of the adjacent nodes. The second rule could be used by selecting an interior node 
in each cluster not containing a special node. Only when there are two adjacent nodes and no 
special nodes are present will this rule not be necessary. This essentially becomes an issue of 
implementation and how best to select the internal node. 
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Since this study has been relevant to unimodal network analysis, i.e. bridge or pipeline analysis, 
it would be useful to look at a multimodal network realization, where both the pipeline network 
and the electrical transmission network that runs the pumping stations in pipeline networks, e.g. 
water, gas, etc. are analyzed. Such interdependencies are ideal, since, if the transmission network 
cannot deliver power to pumping stations, the pipeline network will experience failures that 
cannot be captured by the current unimodal model. Such a network could possibly be posed as a 
unimodal network where there are more node and link-type models, but the network 
characteristics may be of two different network types, depending on how the two network modes 
are connected.  
An interesting further study would be to see to what degree the unimodal networks may be 
separated in the multimodal model. While most current studies of multimodal networks use some 
theoretical constructs to link different modes together, it would be desirable to study many 
existing multimodal networks to define such parameters explicitly. Additionally, multi-scale 
SRA may only be useable to a certain threshold of linkage.  
7.4 Hazard model 
Another issue is that the current method relies on a specific attenuation rule. It was mentioned 
several times throughout the various analyses that the epicentral location had a strong influence 
on both the component CPIMs and cluster GIMs. Seismic hazard maps would help decrease 
some of that dependence, but they also assume a specific, geospatial vicinity. The attenuation 
rules are more general. Exact, real network topologies and seismicities can be cumbersome to 
collect without direct communication and collaboration with a managerial body, i.e. utility 
companies, governmental bodies, etc. For more academic study, attenuation rules are acceptable, 
but if this methodology were to be used for consulting purposes, such hazard maps would be the 
best seismic models. The only situation where this would not present significant benefit would 
be if the managerial body specifies a scenario where such maps do not present a high degree of 
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confidence. Either way, further interesting results could be found in studying the effects of 
hazard maps on the methodology. If there is one region where higher demand parameters, e.g. 
Sa, PGV, etc. exhibited high influence on the component CPIMs and cluster GIMs, using the 
hazard maps may present similar results to the attenuation rule based approach. 
7.5 Component model 
The component models used are very sensitive to size. The bridge component models also 
require long times to compile when thousands of bridges are in the network. For either 
component model, the majority of this computational time is used to compile the link 
correlations, which has a number of needed terms proportional to a quadratic function of the 
number of links. Recalling that the bridge model’s sub-link correlations were required to use a 
simplification scheme inspired by finite element methods, as described in Chapter 3, the overall 
link correlation matrix’s computational demands for both the pipeline and bridge models may be 
reduced using a numerical method.  
As hinted in Chapter 4, one possible way to do this is to use a statistical learning approach. First, 
obtain a representative sample of the correlation coefficients. Secondly, select a suite of 
dimensionless terms related to the link correlations and reliabilities. Using techniques similar to 
those in Huang et al. (2010), a parsimonious model may be obtained to predict the remaining 
correlations. Note that avoiding terms which require integration will drastically reduce 
computational times in predicting correlations with the regression model. Transformation of the 
data may also be essential for ensuring homoscedasticity.  
7.6 Deterioration model 
Particularly for time-variant analysis, one finds the importance of coastline topologies. In the two 
network examples investigated in Chapter 6, a coastline that was more or less a straight boundary 
was used. In general, more complex coastlines, e.g. an ocean bay, land peninsula, etc., may 
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manifest. While the simplified coastline model may be appropriate for a first study, more in 
depth studies may want to consider how sensitive the spatial, chloride-based deterioration affect 
is to complex, realistic coastlines. Since this study also assumes a model for pipeline 
deterioration, a study relying on relevant data is essential for making this approach more accurate 
and useful. Additionally, a study for deteriorating pipelines and chloride spatial distribution 
based on data must be completed.  The current study is based mostly on theory. 
7.7 Closing remarks 
The author would like to remind the reader that this list of improvements is by no means 
exhaustive, especially for improvements on implementation. Due to the nature of research, there 
are always new topics that arise with further investigation. Lastly, the author would like to thank 
any readers for reviewing this document and hopes that they have been able to glean some useful 
suggestions and information.  
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